

Eva-Maria Auch (ed.)

**The Karabakh Conflict  
in Selected German Media, 1988–2008**

A research paper

This project was conducted by the Caucasian-European Association for Culture and Science r. A. in cooperation with the Foundation Professorship for the History of Azerbaijan at the Humboldt University Berlin. It was sponsored by the Council on State Support to Non-Governmental Organizations under the Auspices of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan.



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## Foreword

“Reporting is to be guided by an unconditional commitment to truth and objectivity.

Any doubts as to the reliability of a report need to be made known.”

*From the “Guidelines for broadcasting and televised media programming”  
of Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen*

Given current developments in crisis regions such as Syria and the Ukraine, it is with ever increasing urgency that the question of the media’s role in shaping public opinion and influencing political decisions through its reporting be addressed.

To what extent is our society kept informed of the actual events in these regions in a way that is objective and free of stereotypes? What role do the media play as a “fourth power” in the public sphere and in (foreign-)policy decision-making? These and similar questions are currently being asked in ever more explicit terms. Yet they are also of retrospective interest, for they bear on so-called “frozen” conflicts from the past. This is especially true given the long afterlife of stereotypes and caricatures .

It is against this backdrop that the present research project came to address itself to problems surrounding the coverage of crisis regions in the German media. A position of key importance within this is occupied by one of the most volatile hot-spots in the break-up of the USSR, the Karabakh conflict.

The *cultural and scholarly association EuroKaukAsia e.V.*, and the *Foundation Professorship for the History of Azerbaijan* at the Humboldt University Berlin, applied for funding for the project in 2013, and launched it in 2014/15. It represents the continuation of the initiative “Dialogue Karabakh”, which, as well as working to establish contact between representatives of the conflict parties, paid particular attention to perceptions of the conflict among the German public, and sought to encourage representatives from academia, politics and the media to engage in critical self-reflection on their own activity.



On numerous occasions as part of the project preliminary results were presented to the public, and invitations extended to the editorial staff of the newspapers under review. With the exception of freelance journalists and ND, we were met with a total lack of interest in engaging in an exchange of opinions. Might this be taken as a sign of ignorance of the deficiencies in the way conflicts are reported?

Given the topicality of the question framework “media and conflicts—media and politics”, a further investigation ought to analyse the German media’s reporting of other conflicts (e.g. in the Balkans or in Chechnya), and thereby facilitate a comparison. Only then would it be possible to assess whether the results of the present investigation pertain only to the reporting of the Karabakh conflict, or whether they are indicative of tendencies (especially with regard to “Muslim”/“Christian” stereotypes) in the representations of other European and extra-European conflict zones as well. A possible next step would be to situate the results of the analyses in the context of German and/or European foreign policy, in order then to be able to draw conclusions about the relationship between the media and politics. As yet it has not been possible to conduct an analysis of the actual influence of the information and images presented by the newspapers and magazines on public awareness of the Karabakh conflict in Germany. Further research will follow.

Alongside the editor, in her capacity as project leader, and Dr. Rasim Mirzayev, two doctoral candidates (Nargiza Abdullaeva and Ziya Gaziyeu for the F.A.Z.) and two students (Julian Kose for ND, and Hasan-Ali Yıldırım for Der Spiegel and Die Zeit) were involved in the collection and analysis of data. This was an opportunity for them to gain their first practical experience in the scholarly treatment of media, as well as in the presentation of results over the course of three workshops in Berlin and Baku. Matthew Allen and Dr. Rasim Mirzayev provided the translations of the research paper into English and Azerbaijani. Matthias Mundt aided with proof-reading and managed printing. Julia Stadtfeld coordinated the organizational processes. The journalist Dr. Birgit Wetzel and the scholar of Media Studies Dr. Sabine Schiffer, as well as Prof. Lutz Mez, took an active part in discussing provisional results. Sincere thanks are given to them and to all the others who supported and took part in the project for the good teamwork!

## 1. Research object and methods

The task of the project as stated was to investigate the reporting of the Karabakh conflict from 1988 to 2008 in selected German daily newspapers and magazines: viz. *Der Spiegel*, *Die Zeit*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Neues Deutschland*.



The decision to focus on print media, in this case daily and weekly newspapers, was made on the grounds of the particular weight they carry in the German public. Of all the media, it is still the printed word which holds first place in the formation of public opinion.

### Credibility of the media in Germany




Fig. 1: Basis: members of the population aged 14 years and over (figures given in percent) <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Public opinion research of 2012.



A glance at the press landscape as of 2013 confirms the size of the German newspaper market.

newspapers	amount	number of copies
local and regional newspapers	313	12.94 m
national newspapers	8	1.24 m
papers sold in the street	8	3.36 m
daily papers in total	329	17.54 m
weekly papers	20	1.73 m
Sunday papers	6	2.93 m
total circulation		22.20 m
number of copies in total	1.528	
journalistic units	129	
Per 1.000 inhabitants, people aged 14 or more get supplied by 248 daily issues		

Fig. 2: Overview of newspapers for 2013 <sup>2</sup>. Circulation information based on reports submitted to the IVW/II 2013. 2) Starting 2013 the IVW has tabulated the *Frankfurter Rundschau* in the category of local and regional subscription newspapers. 3) Weekly papers linked up with the IVW. 4) All Sunday newspapers separately registered by the IVW.

In stating the case for 3 the importance of newspapers, Anja Pasquay, on behalf of the Federation of German Newspaper Publishers in November 2014, mentions the following facts which underline the special role of the newspaper medium in shaping public opinion in Germany:

#### Keywords for newspapers and their readers in 2014/2015 <sup>4</sup>

1) Germany is a land of the newspaper: **every day 351 daily papers with 1,528 local editions are published, with a total *printed* circulation of 16.8 million copies.** In addition to this 21 weekly papers with 1.7 million copies, and seven Sunday papers with a circulation of 2.9 million are published. This amounts to 306 newspaper copies per 1,000 inhabitants over the age of 14.

2) Indeed, Germany has been a land of the newspaper: the oldest newspaper in the world appeared for the first time 410 years ago: in 1605 in Strasburg Johann Carolus printed and sold his "Relation" of events from around the world, instead of, as had hitherto been the practice, laboriously copying them out by hand. **The oldest *daily* newspaper in the**

<sup>2</sup> cf. <http://www.bdzv.de/markttrends-und-daten/wirtschaftliche-lage/schaubilder/> (retrieved July 2014).

<sup>3</sup> pasquay@bdzv.de; cf. ag.ma, BDZV, horizont, IfD Allensbach, IVW, Presse-Grosso, VDBB, WAN-IFRA, ZAW, ZMG.

<sup>4</sup> cf. <http://www.bdzv.de/markttrends-und-daten/wirtschaftliche-lage/wissenswertes/> (retrieved 22.01.2015).

**world** originated in Leipzig. On 1st July 1650 the printer Timotheus Ritzsch brought out the first issue of the bulletin he named “Einkommende Zeitungen”. Six issues came out per week; in fact, for a time this number rose to seven issues per week.

3) **Subscription:** local and regional subscription newspapers have a loyal readership in Germany. A good 11.3 million copies are issued to subscribers every day, arriving on the doorstep either via paper delivery or in the post. Roughly 600,000 copies are sold across the counter in kiosks and shops per day. The national papers sell an easy 750,000 copies every day via subscription, and a further 130,000 in individual sales. Newsstand papers, on the other hand, generate their revenue through daily sales of 2.7 million copies in the kiosk; however, they sell over 240,000 copies every day on a subscription basis.

4) **Highest concentration of retailers in the world:** those who choose not to subscribe to a daily paper have to option of buying their copy at any one of around 116,000 newsagents in Germany. This amounts to a ‘retail density’ equivalent to 1.4 newsagents per 1,000 inhabitants. This makes Germany the country with the highest concentration of news retailers in the world. Approximately 5,000 points of sale stock international dailies as well. Well over half of foreign press sales take place at the roughly 460 outlets to be found in railway stations and airports.

5) 30.9 million unique users online: three out every four Germans over 14 years of age (**63.2 percent**) **regularly read a printed daily newspaper. This amounts to 44.7 million men and women.** Of these, the percentage who read local and regional subscription papers is slightly higher for women, at 52 percent, compared to 50.2 percent for men. By contrast, newsstand papers and national subscription papers are more frequently read by men (23.2 percent and 5.7 percent respectively) than by women (13.2 percent and 3.6 percent respectively). Online editions of newspapers receive 30.9 million visits from unique users over 14 years of age (43.9 percent). These numbers are joined by the over 9.6 million mobile users, who keep abreast of current events with the help of an app on their smart phone or tablet.

6) **Online newspapers are very popular among the young:** when broken down by age, the category of people which is traditionally the most likely to read a daily newspaper is those from 50 to 70 years, and the over 70ies: 72 and 79 percent respectively. As many as 64 percent of those from 40 to 49 years reach for a paper. The figure for 30 to 39 year olds is a mere 54 percent. Within the younger age brackets the printed newspaper is less widely read: around 45 percent of those aged between 20 and 29 read newspapers, and approximately one third of 14 to 19 year-olds (31 percent). However, the 14-29 year brackets account for the largest portion (67 percent) of total usage of the online offerings from newspapers.<sup>5</sup>

7) Local news items are of especial interest for newspaper readers; 86 percent read them “in general”. Next on the scale of popularity are **political reports from Germany (67 percent) and abroad (55 percent)**, as well as sports and advertisements (both 44 percent). Furthermore, readers are also interested in editorials, factual reports on daily life and letters. By contrast, only 38 percent regularly devote time to the culture section, 34 percent regularly read news about the economy, 33 percent are interested in reports on trial proceedings, 31 percent in science and technology news.

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5 In 2005 more than three quarters of Germans over 14 (75.7 percent) regularly read a daily paper. This was equivalent to 49 million men and women.; cf.<http://www.fr-online.de/zeitgeschichte/statistik-zeitungen-und-ihre-leser-in-stichworten,1477344,2715232.html> (retrieved 5.2.2015).

8) **39 minutes every day spent reading the paper:** an average of 39 minutes per day is spent reading the paper; as long as 44 minutes at the weekend. Men spend slightly longer reading than women: 40 minutes as opposed to 38. Readers over 50 spend significantly more time (47 minutes) than the 14 to 29 year group (30 minutes).

9) Advertising in newspapers seen as **particularly credible:** adverts in daily papers count as enjoyable reading. After the local-interest, politics and editorial sections, adverts count as the fourth most popular item among readers. Advertisements in newspapers, moreover, are regarded as being particularly credible: whereas 78 percent of those surveyed would happily do without adverts on TV, only 38 percent of readers consider advertisements in the daily papers to be superfluous. In this regard advertising in newspapers benefits from the credibility accorded to the rest of the paper.

10) **Very serious reporting:** newspapers are held to be particularly credible by their readers. According to a survey by the *ZMG Zeitungs Marketing Gesellschaft*, 46 percent of those asked trust the information reported in the papers about local and regional themes. Public television broadcasting only achieves 23 percent, followed by public radio (10 percent) and the internet (8 percent). Private television and radio bring up the rear, each with 3 percent.

11) **Most diverse newspaper market in Europe:** 2,500 newspapers are published every day in Europe, with a total print run of 85 million copies. **Germany has the most diverse offering, with 351 daily papers (129 of which have their own in-house editorial staff, able to bring out 1,528 local editions).** Italy holds second place with 111 newspapers. Following on are Spain (110), the United Kingdom (94), France (84), Sweden (75), Norway (74), Finland (46), Denmark (30) and the Netherlands (28). At the bottom of the pack are Austria (15), Ireland (9) and Luxemburg. Among the recently joined EU member states, the Czech Republic (79), Bulgaria (61), Poland (35) and Hungary (30) have a particularly large number of titles on offer. In terms of the proportion of the print run actually sold, German newspapers represent, **at 16.8 million copies, the biggest market for newspapers in Western Europe by a significant margin. They are followed by Great Britain, with a daily run of 9.8 million newspapers...** China and India have the largest newspaper markets worldwide: respectively 116 and 112 million copies are sold daily. Japan is number three at 47 million copies. Germany takes fifth place after the USA (40 million).

12) Varying **scope** covered by newspapers: the range of readers reached by newspapers varies significantly from country to country in Western Europe. **In Germany 67 percent of those over 14 regularly read the paper (including weekday and Sunday papers).** Switzerland (77 percent) and Austria (72) are slightly ahead in this respect.

13) **662 different newspaper websites** in Germany: German newspapers have had an online presence since the early days of the internet. The first online editions were put out in 1995 by *taz—die tageszeitung* (Berlin), the *Schweriner Volkszeitung*, *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich) and *Rheinische Post* (Düsseldorf). According to a count made by the *Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger* (BDZV=federal association of German newspaper publishers), in the summer of 1996 there were already 41 newspapers with an online presence alongside their printed edition; in 2014 there were 662 different newspaper websites.

14) **125 foreign language titles** are sold in Germany: demand for the international press is high. Around 125 foreign language titles are on offer daily. The market is particularly large for Turkish daily papers. *Hürriyet* has a print run for Germany of 23,000 copies alone. The lion's share, however, goes to English-language papers from the USA and Great Britain. Conversely, a certain demand does exist for German papers abroad: 1.3 percent of the total print run is sold abroad.

## 1.1 Data sources – on the choice of newspapers

Given the nature of the newspaper trade in Germany, it was of course impossible to conduct an exhaustive study of all of the daily papers appearing throughout the country. An analysis on this order would have entailed an immense amount of work, not to mention that the cost of such an undertaking would exceed the limits of the funds at our disposal. An online text search, employing a high-end search engine such as GBI, may have cut down on the time required, but was beyond our financial means.

In order nonetheless to cover a sufficient range of the political spectrum represented by daily papers, in the end the decision was taken to focus on two weekly press media and two daily newspapers. Each was then assigned to a dedicated working group. The teams comprised two doctoral students (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* – Nargiza Abdullaeva/ Ziya Gaziyeu) and a further two graduate students (*Neues Deutschland* – Juliane Kose and *Der Spiegel/Die Zeit* – Hasan-Ali Yıldırım)<sup>6</sup>, for whom the project represented a first experience at collecting, coding and analysing data, as well as presenting results over the course of three workshops in Berlin and Baku.

The goal was to choose as representative a sample as possible. The team decided on *Der Spiegel* and *Die Zeit* for the weekly press media, and for *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Neues Deutschland* for the daily papers.



**Der Spiegel** (in-house style DER SPIEGEL), with a circulation of 843,085 copies, is the most widely-sold weekly news magazine both in Germany and Europe:

Actual circulation: 854,031 copies (IVW 4/2014); 6.33 million readers (MA 2012 I).<sup>7</sup>

Owing to its influence in shaping public opinion, *Der Spiegel* is often referred to as a 'leading-light' of journalism.<sup>8</sup> Founded in 1947 by Rudolf Augstein, the publication earned its reputation in the struggle for press freedom (cf. the 'Spiegel affair'), and through its uncovering of numerous political scandals. The Spiegel editorship cooperates with Spiegel Online (founded in 1994), one of the most widely-read German-language news websites. Although belonging to the Spiegel Publishing House, Spiegel Online is a separate business with a separate editorial board from the magazine.

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<sup>6</sup> The project's team-based nature is reflected in the varying structures of the individual text contributions.

<sup>7</sup> [http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Der\\_Spiegel](http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Der_Spiegel) (retrieved 06.02.2015).

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/sowi/journalistik/kvvarchiv/KvvArchiv/jouridmp.pdf> (retrieved 3.02.2015).

# DIE ZEIT

**DIE ZEIT**<sup>9</sup> is a nationwide German weekly paper, which first appeared on February 21st 1946. Since July 1st 1996 the *Zeit* Publishing House and *Zeit* itself have belonged to the Georg von Holtzbrinck publishing group. The publishers today include former West-German chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who has sat on the editorial board since 1983. Ever since its inception the paper has been published in Hamburg. In addition to their main headquarters, *Zeit* maintains editorial offices in Baden (Switzerland), Berlin, Brussels, Dresden, Frankfurt am Main, Moscow, New York City, Paris, Istanbul, Washington, D.C. and Vienna.

Further correspondents for the newspaper work in New Delhi, Beijing, Tel Aviv, London and Rome. The newspaper is targeted at the highly-educated; their readership has traditionally been composed of academics and members of the educated class. Politically the paper can be considered liberal.

The number of papers sold is listed as 510,634 (IVW 4/2014) and the range as 1.52 million readers (MA 2011 I). In addition the publisher administers the news portal *Zeit online*.

## Frankfurter Allgemeine ZEITUNG FÜR DEUTSCHLAND

The politically liberal-conservative **Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)**,<sup>10</sup> with a print run of 305,257/319,465 copies (IVW 4/2014, Mon-Sat/Sun), is second only to *Süddeutsche Zeitung* in terms of circulation size.

The reason for choosing *FAZ* is the immense role it has played in shaping opinion since it was founded in 1949. It is the most widely-read of all German papers abroad, and not only plays a large part in shaping opinion over debates in society, more often than not it is responsible for sparking these debates in the first place. Examples of this include important voices in the 'Historikerstreit' (historians' quarrel) which first made it to print in the pages of the *FAZ*. Former head of the domestic politics editorial section Friedrich Karl Fromme has characterized the political colouring of the *FAZ* as black-red-gold: black for the paper's conservative politics section, red for the leftwing arts pages, and gold for the liberal economic analysis.

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<sup>9</sup> [http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Die\\_Zeit](http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Die_Zeit) (retrieved 03.02.2015).

<sup>10</sup> [http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frankfurter\\_Allgemeine\\_Zeitung](http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frankfurter_Allgemeine_Zeitung) (retrieved 03.02.2015).

The daily newspaper **Neues Deutschland (ND)** <sup>11</sup> is strongly associated with the Left, especially in the formerly East-German federal states. From 1946 to 1989 the paper was the central news organ of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) of the German Democratic Republic. Subsequently it belonged to the PDS (Party of Democratic Soicialism) until 2007. With a circulation of 30,409 (2014) it is the smallest of the newspapers in this study. Up to 1990 the paper enjoyed a circulation of one million, making it the second most widely-read paper in the GDR after *Junge Welt*.

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<sup>11</sup> [http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neues\\_Deutschland](http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neues_Deutschland) (retrieved 03.02.2015).



## 1.2 Research questions – time-span of investigation – methods of research

The goal was a systematic empirical<sup>12</sup> study of the coverage of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.




Fig. 3: Description of the research process<sup>13</sup>

We were particularly interested in the frequency, forms and contents of reporting, as well as the viewpoints projected, and thus the ways in which the German public has been influenced in this particular foreign policy context.

The research questions were deliberately general in their formulation: how did German daily newspapers report on the Karabakh conflict?

The 'how' in the question was to be answered on two levels. Firstly, by quantitative means, and thus through the bare analysis of the frequency with which themes cropped up, and the scope of reporting of the conflict. Secondly, a content-based analysis of the way themes were represented was to be undertaken.

<sup>12</sup> Empirical is understood here to mean based in experience (sociology is a discipline of experience) - theoretically-formulated assumptions are tested against specific aspects of reality. By 'systematic' we mean that these experiences of the world are to be collected according to rules. Thus the course of research must be planned according to certain principles, and in all of its phases it must be clear to an observer what has happened. Social facts are understood to be observable human behaviours, man-made objects as well as opinions conveyed through language, information about experiences, opinions, value-judgements and intentions. Cf. Kopp, D./R. Menez: Computergestützte Auswertung qualitative Daten. Arbeiten mit MaxQDA anhand eines aktuellen Beispiels. In: WIP working papers, Nr. 27 (2005), pp. 4-5.

<sup>13</sup> cf. Kopp/Menez (2005), p.6.



The quantitative side was investigated by means of statistical constants along the axes of 'extent' and 'intensity' of reporting. The goal of the quantitative analysis was to describe the status accorded to the theme within foreign policy reporting generally. Qualitative analysis took the form of coding the texts on the basis of a digital log of all articles from 1988 to 2008, made possible through the use of the MAXQDA data processing system.

The decision to opt for MAXQDA was made not on cost grounds alone, but because it comes pre-programmed with the following basic functions essential to the project:

- "Highlighting of text segments and marking them according to evaluation categories,
- selective synthesis of coded text segments, even possible between large bodies of text (retrieval),
- ability to review all points of the text in their original context as defined by the evaluation code,
- ability to alter categories and codes as the analysis requires,
- creation of main and sub-categories,
- search function,
- memo function for commenting on and later revising the coding,
- easily finds example quotations, which can be used as evidence in closing remarks,
- preparation for possible quantitative analysis,
- content analysis for the sequencing and localization of codes,
- The possibility of defining variables which can then be assigned to individual documents and thus aid in the searching-out of points in the text." <sup>14</sup>

Thus the programme fulfils certain fundamental requirements for the quantitative and qualitative analysis of newspapers and magazines.

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<sup>14</sup> Kopp/Menez (2005), p.21.

Stages of work: choice of media - importing of all Texts available online 1988-2008 - preparation of the code tree – coding - electronic analysis of qualitative data according to criteria of extent and intensity - content analysis was initially conducted according to unitary guidelines separated from each other; comparative analysis was left to a second step in order to identify similarities and differences in the reporting.




Fig. 4: Description of the research process II

The advantage of an online search is that it saves time and money. Nonetheless the search parameters employed cannot guarantee 100 percent completeness. By way of control, therefore, random samples of the originals housed in the Staatsbibliothek were made (e.g. first year online - comparison with paper version/microfiche).

The second important aspect of this procedure concerns the quantitative analysis of the collected articles. If one wishes to investigate the relative importance accorded to a theme by the editorial board of a newspaper, one can do worse than to examine the page or segment of a paper devoted to this topic.

Accordingly the quantitative analysis comprised the criteria of 'extent' and 'intensity'. Both aspects were investigated by the working group.

## Extent of reporting

For the purposes of 'extent'-analysis, all articles were gathered which contained the keyword "Karabakh". Use was made of the online archives<sup>15</sup> of the above mentioned newspapers in

<sup>15</sup> In the case of ND, we were granted access to the archives in Berlin, which is where material pertaining to the earlier years under investigation was gathered. We are very grateful for this support.

order to gather material. All of the archives offer the possibility to conduct a search of entire texts, such that it is possible to filter results according to theme by inputting keywords.

Because simply running a search for the term “KARABAKH” (“Karabach” in German) does not necessarily call up all of the articles dealing with the conflict, various combinations of terms were input, taking into account possible spellings.

Examples of the varying spelling of searched words include:

nagorno/ nagorni/ nagorny/ nagorniy/ nagornij/ nagornyj,

qarabag/ qarabagh/ karabakh/ garabag/ gharabagh/ garabagh,

bergkarabach/ berg-karabach/ karabach/ arzach/ arzakh,

Place names were counter-checked in various combinations, such as khojali/ khojaly/ chojali/ chodschali/ chodschaly/ xocali/sumgait/ sumqayit. However, since they were always associated with the term “Karabakh”, there was no need to organize them separately.

All articles appearing between 01.01.1988 and 31.12.2008 were counted.

The **twenty-year time span** was chosen for the following reasons: 1988 marks the outbreak of hostilities, and 2008 signals a turning-point for the online versions of the relevant press media, insofar as the proliferation of social networks and internet portals decisively altered the way information is gathered and shared from this point in time onwards.

The analysis was reliant on documentation being as extensive as possible. To this end, all articles were copied into the special MAXQDA data processing software.

The advantages of using computers in empirical social research include

“the speed with which data can be gathered: software programmes offer the possibility of managing codes and memos in a structured and flexible way, and to use this as a basis for developing the analysis, which correspondingly makes it easier to appraise the data with an eye to constructing hypotheses and theories. In addition, a complex evaluation of the data material (such as through logical analysis, search functions or complex retrieval methods) makes it possible to critique conclusions and theories through the investigation of connections between data, lists etc. in ways manual analysis cannot. Moreover, computerized analysis makes it easier to work in a team. This can be achieved through the use of a dataset, or even multiple identical or different datasets, which can later be brought together and ‘harmonized’. IT-based techniques necessitate the systematization of many research methods, which are otherwise typically applied in an unsystematic manner, and thus facilitate transparent evaluation, which is as far as possible guided by explicit rules.” (cf. Kelle 2000: 500)

These advantages pertain mostly to the ‘routine’ processing and analysis, and thus tend not to be controversial. Discussions of the limits of computer-based qualitative evaluation are directed more towards methodological concerns. The main source of unease is the distance

between the researcher and the actual data which arises when one attempts to deploy all of the complex methodological potentialities of the software at the same time.<sup>16</sup>

It was mostly in the subsequent stages of our project—namely, the investigation of intensity by means of coding and content analysis—that these limits became clear.

Because the team comprised seven members (two each for *Die Zeit*/*Der Spiegel*—*FAZ*—*ND*) with varying levels of knowledge and experience, who, despite training and in-depth discussion of the codes (and supervised coding in cases of doubt) had to implement their own codes, subjective impressions could not entirely be ruled out.

### Intensity of reporting

After gathering together of all the articles, the second step taken was to measure the intensity of reporting, for which the following indicators were laid out:

- how often is the theme featured among the headlines?
- how often is the theme mentioned within the titles of article?
- how often and in what form of article or section does it appear?

For the purposes of classification we followed the accepted definitions<sup>17</sup> of journalistic texts, which serve either to inform or to shape opinion:

**Bulletin:** this is the shortest mode of journalistic presentation, and informs briefly and in general terms of an occurrence or coming event.

**Dispatch:** a short and factually-dense description of an event or theme. The author is above all concerned with the cardinal questions; who? what? when? where? how? why? whence? The most important questions come first: what happened? who did what? Information on the specifics and the background follow after.

**Report:** structured along similar lines to the dispatch. The most important information comes first, but is more thoroughly described than in the dispatch. Connections are made, details expanded upon, experts questioned and cited, peculiarities highlighted.

**Reportage:** describes events and themes from the perspective of first-hand experience. Its author adopts the role of an observer of the events, describing his or her impressions, interviewing people involved, and imparting factual information in a vivid and accountable

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<sup>16</sup> Kopp/Menez (2005), pp. 36-39.

<sup>17</sup> Zusammengestellt nach: Schulze, Volker: *Die Zeitung. Ein medienkundlicher Leitfaden*, Aachen 2005.

way. The reportage is less distanced than other types of informative newspaper article, such as the dispatch and report.

**Interview:** comprises a conversation between the reporter a person of interest, structured as a series of questions and answers. The focus may be on the person specifically, his or her opinion, or a set of circumstances of which he or she provides an account.

**Feature:** deploys concrete examples to expand upon a general factual occurrence, with special attention paid to unique and particular aspects.

**Portrait:** may be a depiction of a person, an institution or a group.

Various forms of opinion-based newspaper article:

**Gloss:** a medium which lends itself to expressing a trenchant opinion in a short amount of space. The author's tone may range from sharply-worded, polemic, ironic and satirical, and be joined by rhetorical features such as metaphor, wordplay or even the use of dialect words.

**Commentary:** generally less stylistically elaborate than the gloss, and also not as trenchant or polemical. It conveys the author's opinion of a current theme, backed up by rational argumentation.

**Editorial:** another example of opinion-based and opinion-shaping article. It presents the view of the author and editors on current political, social, economic or cultural developments.

**Critique/review:** this type of newspaper article is a commentary on events (theatrical, film, concerts), music or books. The critique/review combines information on the object under discussion with the opinion of the author on its form, content, composition etc.

**Essay:** offers the author an opportunity to formulate thoughts and observations on cultural, social or scholarly phenomena. It is a platform for the author to grapple with a theme: mentally sound it out, putting the thought processes on show for the reader in an entertaining and stimulating way.

**Column:** a regularly-appearing contribution from a well-known author, where he or she has free scope to choose the topic and comment on it. It is very similar to other opinion pieces, such as the gloss and the commentary.

A further question of interest was how often articles were accompanied by images or other visual depictions, such as maps.

The following types of article were excluded from the terms of investigation: content pages in the style of headline ("Today in the *FAZ*"), any headline boxes, including images and caption bars, as well as the last lines of the front page and any freestanding images (photos, graphics, cartoons).

However, it became apparent that when working with the online versions, the original page format cannot always be retrieved, and thus certain pictures and references to other pages in

the original printed edition are missing from the analysis. Since the *FAZ* is known for being sparing when it comes to images, in this case the question could be avoided.

Of no small interest to us was the proximity of the reporting to the main events in the conflict. The following events from the “hot phase” of the outbreak of hostilities up to the ceasefire were singled out:

- Start of the expulsion of Azerbaijanis/refugee movement out of Armenia (1987/88),
- Mass demonstrations (1988),
- Supreme Soviet of NK passes resolution to join the Armenian SSR (20th February '88),
- Sumgait pogrom (27th-29th February '88),
- Resolution by the Supreme Soviet of Armenia on merger of NK in 1989 (7th December '89),
- “Black January” (19th/20th January '90),
- Massacre of Khojali (25th/26th February '92),
- Negotiation attempts by the Minsk Group (24th March '92),
- Armenian annexation of territories beyond NK (see table),
- Ceasefire, 12th May '94.

point in time	district
2 <sup>nd</sup> september 1991	Karabakh declares its own independence (incl. district Shahumyan)
25./26. february 1992	Armenian incursion on the route Stepanakert-Martakert; Khojali massacre – 613 dead, among which 150 women and 63 children; 1,575 captives
May 1992	Lachin (1.835 km <sup>2</sup> ); Shusha (970 km <sup>2</sup> )
April 1993	Kalbajar (1.936 km <sup>2</sup> )
April, July-August 1993	Jabrail (1.059 km <sup>2</sup> ); Fuzuli (1.386 km <sup>2</sup> )
June 1993	Aghdam (1.093 km <sup>2</sup> )
July-August 1993	Qubadli (802 km <sup>2</sup> ); Zangilan (707 km <sup>2</sup> )

Fig. 5: Annexation of Azerbaijani territories 1991-1993

## 1.3 Coding

As far as methodology was concerned, the project took its cue from the way a historian handles texts as historical sources. The following criteria for extrinsic and intrinsic source criticism were adopted as a basic standard, and applied in modified form.

<b>A - “formal provenance”</b>	A1 - dating of the text A2 - place of production/transmission A3 - who is the author? (correspondent, journalist - local/foreign) A4 - institution (agency, bureau etc.)
<b>B - author’s “horizon”: what they could have known.</b>	B1 - identity of the author? B2 - spatial and temporal proximity to the event? B3 - is the information based on the author’s own observations? Which sources or who is used as back-up? B4 - what set of values is applied?
<b>C - “tendencies”/ intention: what does the author want to report on?</b>	C1 - standpoint of the writer (idealization, warping of facts, pontificating, omissions etc.)? C2 - relation to the events described? (Is the author directly implicated in the events? What relation does he or she bear to the people and events named?) C3 - interests of the writer? (e.g. justification, emoluments) C4 - how is the argument constructed? Is any insinuation in evidence? C5 - relation to the addressee (German/European public, economy, foreign policy, churches, faith congregations...)? C6 - was the piece commissioned? If so, whose interests does it serve? C7 - what indications of the author’s connection to the time and place are present in text?
<b>D - how does the author report?</b>	D1 - under what heading? D2 - register, writing style, word choice, topoi, stereotypes? D3 - keywords in the text (headline, word choice, repetition)?



This formed the basis which governed the way code trees were drawn up for the extrinsic source criticism, and for the way the content analysis was developed and implemented.

<b>“Extrinsic source criticism”</b>			
<b>Date</b>	<b>Article format</b>	<b>Rubric<sup>18</sup></b>	<b>Origin</b>
Date/ month/year	Brief communiqué (up to ca. 65 characters)	Politics, economy, sport etc.	Correspondent and place <sup>18</sup>
	News article (up to 65 characters, up to 30 lines, 65 characters per line.)		News agency and place <sup>19</sup>
	Reportage (up to 100 lines of 65 characters)		
	Commentary/gloss (up to 50 lines of 65 characters)		
	Interview		
	Editorial (Feature story or main article of the publication)		
	Dossier (collection of articles on a common theme)		
	Review of international press/ quotations from other publications		
	Readers' letters		
	Miscellaneous		

<b>“Evaluation of content”</b>		
<b>Main category</b>	<b>Subcategory</b>	<b>Sub-subcategories</b>
<b>Result</b>	political	
	military	
	socio-economic	
	cultural	

18 The weekly newspapers turned out to be very varied in their composition: „Karabakh“ appeared in the following sections: page three; theme: hot-bed of tension; Berlin cinemas; theme of the day; Europe; Berlin-culture; pastime; literature; sport; TV schedule; economy and society; Feuilleton; main theme; ND-supplement; opinion; domestic politics; report; news/domestic; Berlin; Foreign news/ democracy and society; domestic; reportage; news/foreign; general; foreign; news and commentaries; opinions and reports; domestic/sport; title; politics; foreign policy.

19 The origin of contributions was extremely diverse. This included the following places as designated by the articles: Key West; Warsaw; Nicosia; Bishkek; Budapest; London; Maarianhamina; Istanbul; Paris; Frankfurt am Main; Brussels; Prague; Erfurt; Tehran; Ashgabat; Ankara; Helsinki; Chisinau; Alma-Ata; Rome; New York; Göttingen; Washington; Berlin; Stepanakert; Yerevan; Baku; Moscow; Tbilisi and others. Correspondents were listed as: Irina Volkova; Elke Windisch; Pentti Virtanen; Hugo Braun; Frank Wehner; Klaus Joachim Herrmann; Frank Herold and others.

20 The following news agencies: ZB; ddp; Reuter; dpa; AFP; AP; TASS; ADN.



<b>Causes</b>	general-historical	Tsarist Era/Soviet Era/since 1991
	“struggles for independence”	
	ethnic	
	religious	
	global interests	
<b>Actors</b>	national governments	Armenia, Azerbaijan (as republics of the Soviet Union or, from 1991, as independent states)
	civil movements	
	European policy on the Caucasus	
	national populations	
	refugees/ displaced persons	
	Russia	
	Turkey	
	Iran	
	NATO	
	USA	
	UN	
	CSCE/OSCE/EU-Caucasus policy	
<b>Interests</b>	military	
	domestic policy	
	territorial	
	geopolitical/hegemonic	
	cultural	
	socio-economic	
	peace policy	
<b>Solutions/negotiations</b>	Minsk Group	
	USSR/Russian Federation (“Moscow”)	
	CSCE/OSCE/EU/ Council of Europe	
	UN	
	CIS	
	bilateral negotiations	
	NGOs	

## 2. Results of the quantitative analysis

Altogether, nearly 2,000 articles were examined as part of the project, and roughly 12,500 codes entered, the distribution of which varied markedly across the different news media.

The most intensively coded, with on average between 34 and 25 entries per article, were contributions from weekly newspapers. This can in part be explained by the format and larger scope of these contributions. At the same time, however, it was in these contributions that stereotypes were most in evidence (cf. Section 3). FAZ and ND contained more short reports, which accounts for a coding of roughly 4 to 5 entries on average.

<b>gathered articles</b>	<b>set codes</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Der Spiegel – 48</li><li>• Die Zeit – 31</li><li>• FAZ – 1,156</li><li>• ND – 616</li></ul> <p><b>in total: 1,861 articles</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Der Spiegel – 1,612</li><li>• Die Zeit – 1,013</li><li>• FAZ – 4,366</li><li>• ND – 5,606</li></ul> <p><b>in total: 12,597 codes</b></p>

Fig. 6: Amount of gathered articles and set codes

Concerning chronology, the highest concentration of articles was to be found in the period beginning with the break-up of the USSR and leading up to the ceasefire agreement of 1994 (cf. the timeline of the Karabakh conflict at the end of the report).

Generally speaking there was no difference in this regard between the weekly and daily newspapers. For the period after 1994, however, it should be noted that Der Spiegel revisited the topic sporadically in a number of contributions from 1997/1999 and 2007, whereas the daily newspapers, along with Die Zeit, provided only infrequent coverage.

Events which prompted the later mentions include, significantly, the efforts to broker a peace, as well as the commencement of oil export out of Azerbaijan, or the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, both of which were placed in the context of the Karabakh conflict.




Fig. 7: Number of articles (weekly newspapers)




Fig. 8: number of articles – weekly and daily newspapers

## 2.1 Der Spiegel

Data collecting was conducted through the use of the online archive of the weekly magazine *Der Spiegel*.<sup>21</sup> It was possible to download all of the articles either as PDF-files or as scanned image files.

48 articles on the Karabakh conflict could be found for the period from 1988 to 2008. 1988 was the year with the highest frequency of reports pertaining to Karabakh. Thus on average one article appeared for every four issues of the 52 total issues per year. The following year saw a drastic decrease, down to just two articles. As late as 1992 eight articles were published, but from then on in there were never more than five reports per year. The topic was completely absent for the years 1994 to 1996 and 2004 to 2006. This finding gave rise initially to the suspicion that the data gathering method might have been incomplete; subsequent repeated searches, however, merely served to confirm the initial finding.



Fig. 9: cover of Der Spiegel 49/1988

Of the total 48 articles in *Der Spiegel*, 44 contain no information on the **place of writing**. The remaining four articles are identified as coming from Baku, Yerevan, Stepanakert, and Shushi respectively.

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<sup>21</sup> <http://www.spiegel.de/suche/index.html?suchbegriff=> (retrieved 27.12.2014).

In 82 percent (40 articles), *Der Spiegel* provides no information on the **correspondent** or any alternative **sources**. Dr. Christian Neef<sup>22</sup> and Uwe Klußmann are each listed three times, as sources in Moscow<sup>23</sup> from 1999 to 2009.

81.2 percent, or three quarters of all articles, were published under the **heading foreign news**. The three-part dossier *The struggle for Nagorno-Karabakh and the genocide of the Armenians* appeared under the heading *series*. Other pieces were to be found under the headings *Eastern Block*, *Special*, *History*, *Travel*, and *Commentary*. The report *Drops of blood falling to ground* made it as far as the *Title* section of issue 49 of 1988.

At 23 out of 48 articles, almost half of the articles appeared in the Feature format<sup>24</sup> typical of *Der Spiegel*; a further ten were written as News articles. Additionally, five interviews were published, including with A Ghukasyan, president of the disputed Republic of Karabakh; the Armenian president R Kocharyan; and the Azerbaijani opposition politician S. Husseinov. Further to this, three reportages, three dossiers, portraits and two commentaries were published.

In total 40 reports were accompanied by 126 thematically relevant photos, which amounts to a lot of imagery for a small number of contributions.

<p>frieden und in Eintracht lebenden sowjetischen Völkerfamilie?</p> <p>• Mit Redakteur Jörg R. Mettke in Moskau.</p>	<p>stammt der von uns zitierte Hymnus?</p> <p><b>TADEWOSJAN:</b> So was kann zu ganz verschiedenen Zeiten geschrieben wor-</p>	<p>der Presseagentur Nowosti mit dem schönen Titel „Die Lösung der nationalen Frage in der UdSSR“. Inzwischen herrscht in Aserbaidschan Pogromstim-</p>	
			<p><b>Eduard W. Tadewosjan</b></p> <p>war immer mit dabei, wenn in den vergangenen Tagen im Zentralkomitee der KPdSU oder im Obersten Sowjet die drängenden Nationalitätenprobleme des Vielvölkerstaates Sowjet-Union behandelt wurden. Der 60jährige Armenier lehrt als Professor an der Moskauer Universität und am Staatsinstitut für Internationale Beziehungen, an dem die Sowjetdiplomaten geschult werden. Von der Ausbildung her Jurist und Diplomat, gilt Tadewosjan als einer der wenigen Spezialisten für zwischennationale Beziehungen in der Sowjet-Union mit ihren 15 Teilrepubliken.</p>
<p><b>Tadewosjan (r.) beim SPIEGEL-Gespräch*:</b> „Ein Bruder verläßt den anderen nicht“</p>			

22 <https://netzwerkrecherche.org/termine/termin/nr-stammtisch-mit-dr-christian-neef/>; last retrieval 25.12.2014. A journalist for *Der Spiegel*, Christian Neef (born 1952) studied journalism and history in Leipzig (Moscow correspondent, deputy director of the *Spiegel* foreign desk, reporter). He is considered today as a renowned expert in reporting on Russia/Soviet Union, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Eastern Europe. From 1983 to 1996 he worked as a correspondent in Moscow, from 1990 for *Der Spiegel*. From 1996 he worked in the Hamburg-based foreign desk, and from 2012 once again as an author in Moscow.

23 [http://www.randomhouse.de/Autor/Uwe\\_Klussmann/p433947.rhd](http://www.randomhouse.de/Autor/Uwe_Klussmann/p433947.rhd) (retrieved 25.12.2014). Uwe Klußmann, born in 1961, has been an editor for *DER SPIEGEL* since 1990. From 1999 to 2009 he lived in Moscow as a correspondent. He has become known for his handling of historical themes, including as an author of numerous books.

24 [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Der\\_Spiegel](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Der_Spiegel) (retrieved 11.12.2014).

## 2.2 Die Zeit

Data collecting for *Die Zeit* was conducted using the online archive on the homepage of the weekly newspaper.<sup>25</sup> All articles could be downloaded as PDF-files or as text documents. A total of 31 articles on the topic of Karabakh were gathered.

Similar tendencies to those found in the analysis of *Der Spiegel* became apparent here: 1988 was the year of most intensive reporting on the topic of research, with eleven reports in roughly every fifth edition of a total of 52 per year. The following year saw a reduction to only three reports, a number which rose by two in 1990 to a total of five articles. From 1991 onwards there were never more than three articles per annum. Between 1996 and 1998, and in the 2000s - with the exception of 2000 and 2007 - there was no coverage of the Karabakh conflict.

In one out two reports from *Die Zeit*, the place of writing was not given. In the remainder, Moscow was given 10 times as a reference, Baku and Stepanakert twice each, followed by Yerevan, Spitak and Kirovakan (both in Armenia). Hence the reporting was relatively seldom conducted directly from the theatre of conflict. It was not always easy for the reader to identify where the authors gathered their information.

Concerning the authors, the reports were overwhelmingly written by the correspondents, who seemed to hold a monopoly over reporting: 14 articles, i.e. almost half of all contributions, were written by Christian Schmidt-Häuer.<sup>26</sup> For twelve years he was *Die Zeit's* Moscow correspondent, and thus tended to give Moscow as place of writing. Nonetheless, this journalist - regarded as an expert on the East - cited on several occasions Armenian refugees living in the Russian capital as first-hand sources.<sup>27</sup> A further two articles listed the Slavic scholar Dr. Johannes Grotzky as author, and two Maria Hüber. A number of further authors wrote one article each, and a remaining three articles do not disclose the identity of their author.

More than half were published under *Die Zeit's* lead heading 'Politics'. Five appeared there, plus two each in country review and society sections.

For the time period of the investigation *Die Zeit* published 13 features, three chronicles and one interview with a member of the Azerbaijani opposition. A further 14 reports did not fall under any of the formats listed in the chapter on intensity of reporting, and were thus categorized as special article format.

Texts retrieved from *Zeit online* were without images, graphs or maps. However, three of the scanned files contained ten empty frames intended for this kind of imagery, which bolsters the supposition that the printed edition did have a certain amount of pictorial material, which would have served to lend authenticity.

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<sup>25</sup> <http://www.zeit.de/suche/index?q=> (retrieved 27.12.2014).

<sup>26</sup> Christian Schmidt-Häuer (\*1938) began his career as a correspondent during the Prague Spring of 1968. From 1970 to 1980 he reported for ARD, first from the Balkans, then from Moscow, whence he subsequently wrote reportages for *Die Zeit*. In 1980 he joined *Die Zeit* entirely, and shifted to Afghanistan. In 1988 to 1996 he returned to Moscow as a correspondent for *Die Zeit*, reporting among other things on the Chechen war, as well as writing the world's first biography of Mikhail Gorbachev; cf. <http://zeitreisen.zeit.de/interviews/begegnung-mit-christian-schmidt-haeuer-0>.

<sup>27</sup> cf. DIE ZEIT (18.03.1988): Die schrecklichen Tage von Sumgait.



## 2.3 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

### Search methods:

Data collecting was conducted by means of the online search engine of the Humboldt University of Berlin (HU) and the Central and State Libraries of Berlin. The former was used to collect relevant articles for the period from 1993 to 2008, the latter for the period from 1988 to 1992.

We called up the relevant printed edition of the *FAZ* in order to correlate the number of articles found online with the number of articles from the printed edition. Access to the printed version of the paper from the 90s held in the Central and State Libraries was denied on technical grounds owing to the fact that paper quality had changed and become fragile with time. The Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm Centre of the Humboldt Universität does not hold printed editions of the *FAZ*.

For these reasons a request was made directly to the archive of the *FAZ*, asking whether the number of publications appearing online corresponded to the number from the printed edition for the time period that interested us. The “archive and informational production” department gave us the following confirmation: “The *FAZ* archive archives articles from the newspaper. This means the newspaper articles (printed versions). Only articles in the *F.A.Z.net* department do not originate in the paper, but online.”

### Data analysis:

The data was gathered and analysed with the use of the MAXQDA 11 software programme.

A possible disadvantage of the programme is its rather limited capabilities for visualization. Additionally, MAXQDA 11 is still not wholly cross-compatible between the Mac and Windows versions of the software, which made our working in a team more difficult.

### Extensivity:

A keyword search for “Karabakh”, in varying spellings, was conducted for the time period from 01.01.1988 to 31.12.2008.

In total **1,178 hits** were returned (among which 182 articles for “Berg-Karabach” / 57 for “Nagorny Karabach” / 22 for “Arzach” / 2 for “Bergkarabach”).

In each case these results were checked against results from searching simply for “Karabakh”. It turned out that this keyword covered all other spellings. Hence further keywords such as “Armenia” and “Azerbaijan” appeared under the heading “Karabakh”.

Although the search engine called up a total of 1,178 articles, only **1,156** were available to be downloaded for processing. The remaining 22 therefore had to be left out of the evaluation.




Fig. 10: Karabakh-related articles in the FAZ by year, 1988-2008  
(Abdullaeva/Gaziev 2014)

The largest number of articles appeared in the years **1988, 1992** and **1993** (in total **561** articles, or **roughly 50 percent** of the total number of articles). From 1995 the number of articles on the topic fell drastically. 2002 was the year with the least articles (9). The topic experienced a slight resurgence in 2008. This increase could be explained first and foremost by the presidential elections in Armenia in the first quarter of 2008, and the war in Georgia declared in August 2008.

Of the **1,156** articles handled, the contents of **139** of them bore no direct connection to the theme of the project. They were therefore coded under dating and placed under the coded category indirect connection. The following may serve as an example:

“It is not dreams that are depicted on Roman Bezjak’s pictures, but rather the moment of waking the morning after. He uses faces and glances to reflect current events...What can flags and uniforms, courtyards and deserted squares, tell us about life in a country about which we know little more than what is reported in the papers? From 1990 to 1995 Bezjak travelled in Bucharest and Baku, Bishkek and Nagorno-Karabakh, Yerevan and Etchmiadzin, Kabul and Kostroma, Dushanbe and Almaty, even, photographing the signs of collapse, the dawn of a new era, the lures of power and folly: candid insights into countries and people, systematic surveys of social reality.”<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup> FAZ (06.11.1998): Zwischen Eriwan und Etschmiadsin.



A further set of articles from the **1,156** returned included **11** without any connection to the theme of the project, and were coded simply as dating or no connection. Thus:

“Fitful sleep last night. A round-the-world trip in my dreams. From Pavlodar via Casamance to Gujarat. Quite a bit of unrest there. So on we go through Sabul, Ituri, Kalimantan and Bujumbura to Nakhon Sri Thammarat, Kunar, Urusgan, Sulawesi and Marib. Not much quieter there either, and it got worse in Asyuth and Arauca. Nothing for it but to continue, over Xinjiang and KwaZulu-Natal to Aceh, Irian Jaya, Chiapas and Nagorny-Karabakh to Ajaria and Abkhazia. Man, there’s a lot of unrest there! Final return to the rumpled cushion of the homeland, but not, alas!, before crossing Tibet and Kashmir, Chechnya, Kosovo, the Basque country and Northern Ireland. Wake up in a cold sweat in provincial Hessen...So I turn off the computer, settle down on my bunk for a well-deserved rest. Now off to bed, quiet night-time slumber in Hessen’s land of peace and quiet.”<sup>29</sup>

Precise information on the provenance of the various articles and contributions was provided under the heading *source*.

A total of 553 articles were from **news agencies**. The most frequently-cited news agencies: Bc. Moscow (15 times), AFP (38 times), Reuters (23 times), dpa (76 times), W.A. Moscow (78 times), AP (17 times).

The most frequently cited **locations** (in 551 articles) were Moscow (143 times), Yerevan (36 times) and Baku (25 times). This suggested it was Moscow, rather than the site of the action, which played the most central role.

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<sup>29</sup> FAZ (27.03.2004): Beunruhigend.

The most frequently **cited correspondents/authors** (named in 287 contributions) were Adam Werner (40 times) <sup>30</sup>, Wolfgang Günter Lerch (24 times) <sup>31</sup>, Johann Georg Reißmüller (20 times) <sup>32</sup>, Reinhard Vesper (16 times) <sup>33</sup> and Michael Ludwig (13 times). <sup>34</sup>

The following results were obtained by analyzing the nature of appearance by heading:

Heading in the <i>F.A.Z.</i>	Tally
Politics	605 articles
Current events	30 articles
Sport	14 articles
Science and nature	1 article
Economy	4 articles
Magazine	1 article
New non-fiction	1 article
Frankfurt	1 article
The Present	3 articles
Germany and the world	5 articles
Literary supplement	2 articles
“Bilder und Zeiten” [Images and times]	10 articles
Rhine-Main newspaper	2 articles

30 Adam Werner (1935-2009) was a German philologist and journalist. In his first foreign post he worked for Neue Zürcher Zeitung in Pakistan from 1968; from 1984 he worked in Moscow as a correspondent, where he was able to observe at first hand the collapse of the Soviet Union up to 1989. From 1989 he sat on the central editorial board for the FAZ, from where he ran the foreign policy desk from 1994 to his retirement in 2001; cf. [http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Werner\\_Adam](http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Werner_Adam) (retrieved 12.2.2015).

31 Wolfgang Günter Lerch (born 1946) studied Islamic Studies, philosophy, religious studies and German language and literature. Starting in 1978 he worked for the news editorial board of the FAZ. In 2000 he published a monograph entitled *Der Kaukasus. Nationalitäten, Religionen und Großmächte im Widerstreit* [The Caucasus: Nationalities, religions and the struggles of great powers], Europa, Hamburg, Vienna.

32 Johann Georg Reißmüller (born 1932). A German journalist (Dr. jur., Dr. sc.h.c.), he worked from 1974 to 1999 as co-publisher of the FAZ in Frankfurt am Main; 1961 to 1967 as FAZ editor; 1967-1971 as correspondent for the Balkans; 1971-1974 editor in chief for domestic politics. He published, among other things, „Die vergessene Hälfte - Osteuropa und wir“ [The forgotten half: Eastern Europe and Us] (1986), „Der Krieg vor unserer Haustür“ [The war outside our front door] (1992), „Die Bosnische Tragödie“ [The Bosnian Tragedy] (1993). (<http://www.whoswho.de/bio/johann-georg-reissmueller.html> - retrieved 13.2.2015). According to accounts in the media and by contemporaries, Reißmüller's commentaries and editorials in the FAZ had a considerable influence in Germany on political decision-makers, especially on the Balkan question; cf. [http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johann\\_Georg\\_Rei%C3%9Fm%C3%BCller](http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johann_Georg_Rei%C3%9Fm%C3%BCller) (retrieved 13.2.2015).

33 Reinhard Vesper (born 1968), scholar of Slavic languages, East European history and political science; from 2000 editor of the political desk of the FAZ, chiefly responsible for Eastern Europe. <http://www.faz.net/redaktion/reinhard-veser-11104421.html> (retrieved 13.2.2015).

34 Correspondent for the FAZ in Warsaw and Moscow, known today for his coverage directly from the Caucasus.

Feuilleton	8 articles
Travel section	1 article
Sunday edition	6 articles
Letters to the editor	4 articles
Political books	2 articles
Leading pages	2 articles
Front page	6 articles
Events and personalities	2 articles

As is clearly shown above, *FAZ* published most of its articles on Nagorno-Karabakh under the heading of politics. Cultural dimensions and the historical background were either omitted or subordinated to politics.

**Code: *Article format***

short dispatch	120 articles
news article	531 articles
reportage	40 articles
commentary/gloss	64 articles
interview	7 articles
editorial	124 editorials
dossier	0 articles
international press review/excerpts from other publications	40 articles
readers' letters	11 articles
miscellaneous	87 articles




Fig. 11: Article formats of *FAZ*

The *article format* category with the highest number of articles comprised those coded under *news article*. Of 40 reportages, 15 articles were written at the beginning of the 1990s. The remaining 35 reportages appeared from 2001 onward. Reportages were written about various events, such as the economic development of Azerbaijan; the “ill-starred destiny” of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh; on Russian and Turkish engagement in the South Caucasus. Of the 7 interviews, two were conducted with the Armenian prime minister and later president Serzh Sargsyan (11.05.2007 and 10.11.2008), one with the leader of the Country of Rights party in the Armenian parliament Arthur Baghdasaryan (19.04.2006), two with the Azerbaijani foreign minister Elmar Mammadjarov (04.11.2005 and 07.07.2006) and one each with the Armenian foreign minister Vartan Oskanyan (23.04.2001) and the minister for economic development of Azerbaijan Farhad Aliyev (01.07.2002).

The articles coded as *review of foreign press/external citation* came from the period 1988 to 1994 and mostly quoted the Russian news agency Interfax.

### Code: *Images*

Only 135 of the articles gleaned through the online search were accompanied by pictures. These pictures were above all photographs and maps.

As mentioned above, two different search engines were used (HU/ZLB). The first search engine called up articles for the period between 1993 and 2008 without pictures; however, it was possible to tell by examining the file whether or not a picture had once accompanied

it (e.g. through accompanying captions and the name of the images' author). Nonetheless it was impossible to examine the images themselves, which ruled out a content analysis for the period 1993-2008.

The second search engine from ZLB called up newspaper pages for the period 1988-1992 in PDF format, with the original images available for our examination. These four years (1988-1992) contained 52 of the overall total of 135 articles accompanied by images.



## 2.4 Neues Deutschland

One can gain an impression of the quantitative scope of the day-by-day reporting of the newspaper *Neues Deutschland* by examining the extent of reporting for the entire time period 1988-2008.

Principally one can ascertain the high frequency of coverage of the Karabakh conflict in the years 1988-1994. The year of the outbreak of the conflict, 1988, saw the printing of 82 articles related to this topic. In the following three years the quantity of reporting hovered around roughly 40 articles per year (1989: 40 articles; 1990: 39; 1991:46). With the hostilities in Karabakh intensifying and escalation of clashes, ND devoted more attention to the topic from 1992. Between 1991 and 1992 the number of articles increased from 46 to 171. This amounted to an unusually sharp increase of 272 percent. The number of articles remained over 100 in the following year (1993: 109 articles) and reflected a continually intensive rate of reporting, if not quite on the scale of 1992. The last year in which a significant number of articles was printed was 1994, with 47 reports.




Fig. 12: Quantitative representation of the intensity of reporting in the newspaper *Neues Deutschland* for the years 1988-2008.

No more than nine articles related to Nagorno-Karabakh were published in the years 1995-2008; only one article from 2004 could be found in the newspaper's archive. Thus, with the number of articles per year ranging from 171 down to 1 in a twenty year period, intensiveness of reporting was very varied. The sharp downturn in articles printed after 1994 could possibly be attributed to the fact that in the mid-90s the eyes of the world were on the conflict region of Yugoslavia. This was reflected in the direction taken by the European

media, since Southern Europe was much more readily perceptible as belonging to the European core than a conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

We must also bear in mind that from 1988 to the early 1990s, *Neues Deutschland* was a medium in transition. Starting out as a daily paper in the GDR covering events in the socialist sphere of influence through the lens of a sharply defined East-West ideological split, it evolved into an organ up to the task of reporting on German reunification, the process of European integration and global politics more broadly. This diversification of themes and political debates covered may have led to a corresponding shift in the interest spheres of the editorial staff and their correspondents.

An important category in the analysis, along with the extent of reporting, was the question of the place from which correspondents covered the conflict over Karabakh. This question is directly relevant to the understanding of media described above. According to this it is not merely the event itself which shapes the information published by journalists; the external factors which preside on and shape the way political events become the grist for articles, commentaries and, ultimately, debates and discourses are just as important.

When considering the question of where the Karabakh conflict was reported from, one must bear in mind certain factors pertinent to *Neues Deutschland* which did not apply to the already well-established West German papers. Up until 1990, there was no free and pluralistic media landscape in the GDR. Rather, to a great extent print media, radio broadcasting and television were state-run and state-controlled. This was particularly the case for *Neues Deutschland*, which to a great extent served as a mouthpiece for the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED). News about foreign socialist countries were often delivered to the editorial offices in the GDR directly from Moscow. This was the case for coverage of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Of a total of 623 articles analyzed for the period of study, 310 list the place of origin of information as Moscow. Thus it could be deduced that for nearly 50 percent of articles, the correspondent writing was not based in the region, but instead covered the war in the Caucasus from Moscow. This was particularly true for the years 1989-1990, in which 135 of the 310 articles from Moscow were written. Starting at the beginning of the 1990s the places of origin of information broadened to include cities such as Ankara, Rome and Istanbul.<sup>35</sup>

Compared with the 310 articles from Moscow, 217 came from the Caucasus. All articles listing Georgia, Armenia or Azerbaijan as place of origin were included in this category. Correspondents reported from the Azerbaijani capital Baku 97 times, followed by 72 reports from Yerevan and three from Tbilisi. Interestingly, the political centre of Nagorno-Karabakh, Stepanakert, appeared relatively frequently as the place from which reporting was conducted (45 times in total). The 217 articles from the Caucasus amounted to a 34.8 percent portion of the total 623 articles by place of reporting.

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<sup>35</sup> For the period studied, eleven articles from the daily paper *Neues Deutschland* listed Ankara as place of writing, and a further five Istanbul. Rome appeared as place of reporting a total of twelve times.




Fig. 13: Place of reporting of *ND*.

The majority of articles from Moscow and the other cities as well listed a single news agency and place of origin for information. Nonetheless there was also a number of articles from the time period in question in *Neues Deutschland* which listed a named correspondent. In their journalistic form these articles were less oriented towards reporting facts than to providing a commentary of the current political situation surrounding the Karabakh region. The most frequently mentioned correspondent for *ND* was Klaus Joachim Herrmann, with a total of 40 contributions to his name. Herrmann's commentaries for the most part did not focus solely on Karabakh, but treated a wide variety of themes touching on the Eastern European and Caucasus spheres, situating the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict within a broader context of transformation affecting the region. For the majority of articles by Klaus Herrmann, either the place of origin was given as Moscow, or the notice "from our Moscow correspondent Klaus Joachim Herrmann" <sup>36</sup> was appended to the commentary. A second Moscow correspondent, whose articles appeared in *ND* a total of 11 times from 1994, was Irina Volkova. Each of her contributions was described as having been written not in the region itself, but in Moscow. Owing to the relatively small number of contributions written directly by the hand of a correspondent (73 out of 623 articles), it was essential to take into consideration the news agencies *ND* cooperated with. From 1988 up until the mid-1990s the General German News Agency (ADN) was the most important agency for the coverage of the Karabakh conflict (260 articles from February 1988 to August 1994). In 1988 the Soviet news agency TASS was also well represented with 11 reports.

The analysis of the news agencies used by *ND* for its reporting revealed just how the paper evolved from a state-sponsored medium into a newspaper operating within a democratic and pluralistic but also market-oriented media landscape. These changes could be observed in the diversification of news agencies, among other things. From 1991 the editors of *ND* drew increasingly on communications from such agencies as dpa and Reuters.

<sup>36</sup> *ND* (06.02.1992): Krieg der tausend Schlachten um Nagorny Karabach, p.5.



Along with the questions into the origin and publication processes of reporting in the media, the organization of themes was also interesting for the analysis of newspapers.

The **headings** used to structure the reporting revealed above all how the editorial board perceived the Karabakh conflict. A front-page appearance, or the presence of a page-long article, would be indicative of a tendency quite distinct from that of a single brief report on the last page of a newspaper.

In the 20-year period of examination, articles related to Karabakh appeared under a total of 33 different headings in *ND*. Headings in *ND* appeared towards the middle of the head of the page. At first glance this may seem like a high number; however, one must bear in mind that both the content and the layout of the paper underwent a series of radical changes over a 20 year period. Certain headings received a different name after a change of layout, but carried on with the same content. For instance, the heading *Foreign policy* ceased to exist after 1996, but naturally news items and articles related to foreign affairs continued to be published, except this time under the heading either of *Foreign* or *Politics*.

Karabakh made the front page 52 times during the period of the investigation. Although this translated to a mere 8.3 percent of the total number of articles occupying a prominent place on the front page, one must not forget that current events from different parts of the world face stiff competition, driven by factors of relative importance.

Along with the question of the headings used, it is of further interest to consider which **journalistic formats** were used for reporting the conflict. The most frequent format for *ND* (431 times from 1988 to 2008) in reporting on Nagorno-Karabakh was the classic newspaper article. A newspaper article is distinct from a commentary, insofar as the former is mostly limited to relating concrete events. Any investigation into the causes or the broader political and historical contexts of a given theme are generally left out.




Fig. 14: Article formats of *ND*

As a format, the commentary is more suited to analysing the given political situation, its background and prospects of future development. Commentaries represented the second most frequent form of reporting in *ND*, with 82 of them written on Karabakh. The third relatively well-represented form was the short report, with 35 instances found in the source material. Similar to the classic news article, the short report is purely a vehicle to convey events; however, compared to the former the short report is much shorter and is usually focused on a specific occurrence, such as a general strike or airplane crash. Questions such as “how” or “why” are left unanswered in the short report.

In the first two years of reporting investigated, *ND* made extensive use of the international press review (15 times in the period 1988-1989). In this regard *ND* reprinted quotations principally from such Soviet newspapers as *Izvestija* and *Pravda*. This was a sign of the close proximity to Moscow as a centre of power determining opinion in the early period of reporting on Nagorno-Karabakh.

In print media such as the daily newspaper *ND*, **pictorial material** accompanying the content plays an important role in conveying information. *ND* was rather sparing in its deployment of imagery, be it photographs or maps, and thus differentiated itself from the tabloid media, with their low ratio of information content to entertainment.

Results of the analysis of the newspapers showed that a total of 75 articles were accompanied with cartographical representations or photographs. This number is divided into 45 photographs and 30 geographical depictions. If one assumes that an image is both an informational and opinion-forming medium in equal measure, the geographical depictions of the region in *ND* on their own offer material for a highly interesting media analysis. This would entail looking at the politically charged depiction of borders, but also the naming of places and territorial units, in language conveying information with polemical overtones. The representation of the self and others through geographical depictions may well have formed an important aspect of the political agenda of the warring parties, which in turn were reproduced, either deliberately or unintentionally, in the news media. Alongside arguments found in the text, such naming can play an important part in shaping the opinions of readers. Critical reflection on the practices of geographical naming is almost always disregarded in a current affairs media, since a discourse-analytical discussion of that nature belongs principally to the province of academic debate, and thus exceeds the parameters of what is in the first instance a means of conveying information.

The 45 photographs in *ND* from Nagorno-Karabakh depicted moments in the conflict situation extremely varied in nature. The very language used to talk about photographs reveals one of the problematic aspects of photography, as they depict a specific situation with an extremely selective image. At the same time, the reader is not necessarily savvy of this limitation. It is furthermore unclear exactly what forms of staging may have had a bearing on the production of the photograph. And at the same time photographs are shrouded in an aura of authenticity. The situation depicted bears a “believability” which is not amenable to critical reflection. Despite these concerns which the use of photography raises, it remains a highly present form of reporting in the modern media. War photographs bring the viewer closer to the reality of a conflict, and evoke an emotional response towards the people and situations depicted, and all this in a sphere of communication dominated by facts, dates and concrete occurrences. Photographs, moreover, represent a useful selling-point for the media content, helping to “market” the text-based information better.

### 3. Qualitative analysis

#### 3.1 Reporting in Der Spiegel

The variety of different formats of the contributions and the individual writing styles of the authors posed a problem for **coding**. It was not possible for each member of the team to be present to discuss every application of a code. Subjective assessments could not be completely ruled out. Occasionally the authors mention codes by name: “(...) Russian tactic of exploiting ethnic conflicts in order to secure own influence in the region.”<sup>37</sup> (code: geopolitical interests). Other times they are indirectly expressed: “Gorbachev had the tanks roll into Baku at the precise moment that the people’s front had attempted to overthrow communism for the first time.”<sup>38</sup> (code: geopolitical interests).

In several cases even the **headlines** of individual contributions showed signs of authorial subjectivity, as is illustrated by the following sample:

- Kampf um Bergkarabach und Genozid an den Armeniern\*, 3 parts  
[The struggle for Nagorno - Karabakh and the genocide of the Armenians]  
(Der Spiegel 23.03., 30.03., 04.06.1992);
- Deformierte Gefühle\* [Deformed feelings] (Der Spiegel 29.02.1988);
- Oma, du musst fliehen, es ist Krieg [Time to flee, grandma; there’s a war on]  
(Der Spiegel 20.06.1988);
- Geistiges Tschernobyl [Spiritual Chernobyl] (Der Spiegel 25.07.1988);
- Stich ins Herz der Nation\* [A stab to the heart of the nation]  
(Der Spiegel 28.11.1988);
- Kopfhaut abgetrennt\* [Severed scalp] (Der Spiegel 23.03.1992);
- Wir dürfen keinen Genozid zulassen\* [We cannot allow a genocide]  
(Der Spiegel 23.03.1992);
- Von Gott verlassen\* [Forsaken by God] (Der Spiegel 07.04.1997).

Those headlines marked with an asterisk \* correspond to an article with a pro-Armenian leaning.

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<sup>37</sup> DIE ZEIT (12.11.1993): Nur Russland ist Sieger.

<sup>38</sup> DIE ZEIT (20.03.1992): Selbst die ewige Flamme ist erloschen.

# „Wir werden euch ausrotten“

## Kampf um Berg-Karabach und der Völkermord an den Armeniern (I)

Seit zwei Jahren herrscht Krieg um Karabach, einem mehrheitlich von christlichen Armeniern bewohnten Bergland im moslemischen Aserbaidshan. In blindwütigem

Haß stehen sich an dieser Nahtstelle zwischen Orient und Okzident die Völker gegenüber. Der SPIEGEL schildert in einer neuen Serie die Geschichte des Konfliktes.

**P**ogrom. Eine moslemische Meute stürmt durch die Straßen, plündert Läden und Wohnungen der Mitbürger christlichen Glaubens, erschlägt Männer, vergewaltigt Frauen, verstümmelt noch Leichen. Religiöser Fanatismus und nationale Überheblichkeit mischen sich mit der Frustration der sozialen Unterschicht, dem Neid der Ärmsten auf die erfolgreichereren, wohlhabenderen Armenier: Sie sind es, die büßen müssen, wann immer im Kaukasus, an der Grenze zwischen Asien und Europa, der Völkerhaß ausbricht – und, wenn die Opfer sich wehren, der Krieg.

So geschah es Ende Februar 1988, als der aufgehetzte Pöbel im aserbaidshanischen Sumgait die Armenier am Ort lynchte. Den Deklassierten ging es um Beute und Wohnraum, die von den Drahtziehern ausgegebene Parole aber

in Aserbaidshan, die nun wieder als Streitobjekt zwischen zwei inzwischen der Nato assoziierten Staaten einen Kriegsgrund liefert. Und wieder schont die Mordlust nicht die Kinder und die Greisinnen, unschuldige Zivilisten insgesamt.

Die durch neue Greuel geweckte Erinnerung an den ersten Völkermord des Jahrhunderts, die Ausrottung der türkischen Armenier 1915, treibt das erste christliche Volk der Geschichte in die Furcht vor einem neuen Genozid.

„Meine Schülerin machte ihr Kleid auf“, berichtete die armenische Fremdsprachenlehrerin Raissa Dallakjan nach dem Pogrom von Sumgait, „und zeigte mir ihren Körper, auf den mit Messern Kreuzzeichen eingeschnitten waren. 17 Männer waren in ihre Wohnung eingedrungen und hatten sie vergewaltigt.“ Auch über ihre jüngste Schwester waren

Als „Türken“ oder „Osttürken“ bezeichnen die Armenier ihre islamischen Nachbarn in Aserbaidshan, wo bis kurz vor dem Pogrom auch eine halbe Million Armenier wohnten. Die Täter seien zum Teil sehr jung gewesen und waren „wie schwarze Raben gekleidet und mit Eisenstangen und Beilen bewaffnet“, sagte eine Zeugin.

„Armenier, wenn ihr nicht binnen drei Tagen die Stadt verlaßt, werden wir euch wie Hunde abschlachten“, stand auf Flugblättern. Sogar in eine Entbindungsstation drangen die Aserbaidshanner ein und massakrierten armenische Wöchnerinnen und die Neugeborenen. Sie hätten geschrien: „Tod den Armeniern! Wir werden euch ausrotten.“

Samwel Schamuradjian meldete im Organ des armenischen Schriftstellerverbands die Tötung eines Ehepaars, die Tochter sei „von ihren Mördern ent-

Kampf um Bergkarabach und Genozid an den Armeniern\*, 3 parts

[The struggle for Nagorno - Karabakh and the genocide of the Armenians]

(Der Spiegel 23.03., 30.03., 04.06.1992)



... sind es die Armenier, die büßen müssen: Begräbnis eines gefallenen Armeniers in Eriwan (1990)

DER SPIEGEL 13/1992 139



JURUS  
80

]

sie immer wieder auf.

Nach den ersten Massakern 1988 an den kaukasischen Armeniern bekannte die türkische rechtskonservative Zeitung *Tercüman*: „Wir sind eine Kultureinheit mit Aserbaidschan.“ Nach

dem Golfkrieg 1991 nannte der türkische Präsident Turgut Özal („Wir sind eine Nation von Krieger“) den Kaukasus eines der Ziele türkischer Expansion.

Im Herbst 1991 präzisierte er seine Vorstellungen. In der klassischen Zeit, referierte er, hätten die Türken Wien belagert und den Balkan „religiös und rassisch“ beherrscht. Vor Wien habe dann der „Schrumpfungsprozeß“ des Osmanischen Reichs begonnen. „Jetzt“, so Özal, „gelte es, eine Chance zu nutzen, die sich nur alle 300 Jahre“ biete. Balkan und Kaukasus seien „alternative Lösungen zur Europäischen Gemeinschaft, die keineswegs die einzige strategische Perspektive für die Türkei ist“.

Der Turanismus mit der Konsequenz einer gewaltsamen Lösung des Minderheitenproblems war der ideologische Hintergrund für den Völkermord von 1915, er ist die Triebfeder für den Vernichtungsfeldzug der Aserbaidschaner gegen die Armenier in Berg-Karabach.



# „Wir werden euch ausrotten“

Kampf um Berg-Karabach und der Völkermord an den Armeniern (II)

**N**iemals sah die Zukunft so schön aus wie in diesen traumähnlichen Tagen der Hoffnung und der Gefühle“, jubelte im Frühjahr 1917 die Zeitschrift *Horizont*, das Blatt der armenischen Daschnakenpartei: Der Zar in Petrograd (St. Petersburg) war zur Abdankung gezwungen worden, eine bürgerliche Regierung verhiess endlich Freiheit für die Völker Rußlands, und die Bolschewiken mit Lenin und Stalin waren noch fern.

Doch der Krieg ging weiter, im Westen gegen Deutschland und Österreich, im Süden gegen das mit den Deutschen verbündete Osmanische Reich. „Eine Revolution mitten im Krieg“, prophezeite denn auch Stepan Sorian, genannt Rostom, der Mitbegründer der Daschnakenpartei, „das ist der Tod für das armenische Volk.“ Noch standen die Russen mehrere

hundert Kilometer tief auf osmanischem Territorium, aber bereits im April funkte der russische Oberbefehlshaber der 5. kaukasischen Armee, General Dragomirow: „Die Soldaten haben nicht mehr die geringste Lust, den Feind anzugreifen.“ Als im November die Bolschewiken in Petrograd und Moskau die Macht übernahmen, waren bereits ein Drittel der russischen Soldaten getümt.

„Nur die armenischen Einheiten“, meldete der stellvertretende russische Kriegsminister Boris Sawinkow seiner Regierung, „erweisen sich weiterhin als kampfstark und entschlossen.“

Im Waffenstillstandsvertrag vom 15. Dezember 1917 verpflichteten sich die Bolschewiken, auf die Vorkriegsgrenze zurückzugehen (siehe Karte Seite 164). Die armenischen Soldaten in russischen Diensten standen praktisch allein

gegen eine osmanische Armee, die alle kampfstarken Truppen von der arabischen an die kaukasische Front geschickt hatte. Als die Armenier ihre alten Hochburgen Ersindschan (Erzinjan) und Erzurum vertragsgemäß räumen mußten, schlug für sie die Stunde der Rache. Wie grausam sie dabei mit der türkischen Zivilbevölkerung umsprangen, das versuchen die Armenier bis heute zu verdrängen.

„Überall, wo die Armenier einen Türken trafen“, so ein Zeuge in einer holländischen Zeitung, „machten sie ihn unbarmherzig nieder.“ Erwachsene seien zum Wegebau fortgeschleppt worden, berichtete der türkische Kommandant der 3. Armee nach der Einnahme Ersindschans und Erzurums, die übrigen wurden „in Häusern verbrannt, durch Bajonette verstümmelt, Frauen an ihren Haaren aufgehängt, nachdem alle möglichen Grausamkeiten“



Armenier bei einer Karabach-Demonstration in Eriwan 1992: Alte Träume von Größe und Sehnsucht nach Genugtuung

### Deformierte Gefühle

**Nationalistische Unruhen im Kaukasus alarmierten Moskau: Panzer rollten nach Eriwan.**

Schon 17 Jahre Haft, Arbeitslager und Verbannung hat Paruair Airikjan, 39, hinter sich, weil er einst mit Flugblättern für eine Volksabstimmung über die Unabhängigkeit seines Landes geworben hatte. „Er erklärte, daß die ganze armenische Nation unter Moskaus Macht weint und stöhnt“, hieß es in der Urteilsbegründung.

Zurück aus Sibirien, sah Airikjan vorigen Mittwoch von seiner Wohnung aus am Opernhaus der armenischen Hauptstadt Eriwan einen ungewöhnlichen Ausbruch von Nationalismus: Eine riesige Menschenmenge, nicht von der Partei gerufen, forderte die Wiedervereinigung seiner geteilten Heimat: „Eine Nation, eine Republik.“ Airikjan rief das Moskauer Büro der US-Presseagentur AP an: „Hier sind an die 200 000 Menschen, ich habe nie so etwas gesehen.“

Auch die Sowjetagentur „Tass“ meldete die „Massenversammlung“: Extremisten hätten „Verstöße gegen die öffentliche Ordnung provoziert“, sie verlangten die Revision des nationalen Status quo. Die ganze Woche über gingen Demonstranten auf die Straße. Polizei griff ein, es habe Tote gegeben, berichtete eine Studentin, am Ende hätten fast eine Million Menschen demonstriert – das gab es noch nicht in 70 Jahren Sowjetgeschichte.

Gorbatschows Perestroika hat die nationalen Minderheiten des Vielvölkerstaates UdSSR ermutigt, Gleichberechtigung mit dem russischen Staatsvolk und Emanzipation von der Bevormundung durch Moskau zu fordern. 1986 revoltierten die Kasachen in Alma-Ata gegen einen neuen, russischen Parteichef. Im Juli 1987 setzten sich Hunderte Krimtataren auf den Roten Platz in Moskau.

Im August verlangten Tausende in den drei baltischen Republiken Offenlegung der historischen Umstände – nämlich des Hitler-Stalin-Pakts –, deretwegen sie heute zur Sowjet-Union gehören. Am 1. November kam es zu nationalen Protesten im belorussischen Minsk, dann sogar im sibirischen Jakutsk.

Nationale Anwandlungen, die sich im Kaukasus kundtun, scheinen Moskau besonders gefahrenträchtig. Das Völkergemisch im temperamentvollen Süden, erst im vorigen Jahrhundert von Rußland unterworfen, gilt als neuralgischer Punkt des Sowjetsystems: Libertinäre Widersetzlichkeit und hitziger Nationalitätenhader sind seit jeher landesüblich. Rotten sich dort Unzufriedene zusammen, heißt das Alarm für die UdSSR.

Nach dem Zusammenbruch des Zaren-Reiches 1917 hatten sich alle drei Kaukasus-Nationen – Georgien, Armenien, Aserbaidshan – von Rußland gelöst und ihre Selbständigkeit proklamiert. Wegen der blutigen Methoden, mit denen Stalin, ein Georgier, die eigene Heimat ins Reich zurückzwang, grämte sich Lenin noch kurz vor seinem Tode.



**Armenien-Parteichef Demirtschjan**  
„In alten Gleisen steckengeblieben“

Ein Stück Armeniens ging 1923 an Aserbaidshan: Die Gebirgslandschaft Karabach, kleiner als der Regierungsbezirk Trier, ist noch heute eine durch einen acht Kilometer breiten Korridor von Armenien getrennte Exklave mit 126 000 armenischen und 37 000 aserbaidshanischen Tabakbauern und Winzern.

Aserbaidshaner mit islamisch-schiitischer Tradition herrschen dort über Angehörige des Volkes mit der ältesten christlichen Kirche Europas, dessen Sprache und eigene Schrift in Berg-Karabach nicht als Verwaltungssprache gilt. Sie wollten immer heim ins Mutterland.

Alleged **causes of the Karabakh conflict** are cited in *Der Spiegel* on 58 occasions.

At 18 places in 48 articles, pre-Soviet conflicts of interest between Armenians and Azerbaijanis were cited; for example: “Beginning in the 18th century increasing numbers of Armenians emigrated to the Muslim Khanates [...] and were favoured by the tsarist administration.”<sup>39</sup> On 21 occasions the seed of the conflict was identified as being in the Soviet period, such as: “twice it was attempted to merge the patchwork of peoples in the mountainous region into a “Transcaucasian Federation”, and both times the attempt failed.”<sup>40</sup>

A post-Soviet attribution of the causes of conflict occurred six times.

The Karabakh conflict was interpreted as being an *ethnic conflict* in 8.6 percent of articles. By contrast 14.3 percent stress the *religious differences* between the parties of the conflict, but without following this up with a discussion of the religious differences within the societies. Thus analysis of this nature served to define and perpetuate stereotypically static images of the supposed enemies.

Among the *evaluation codes* listed in Chapter 1, *Holocaust* and *Genocide* were the most frequently used terms in *Der Spiegel*. Differences of meaning between the two terms was disregarded.

On 14 occasions, or 29 percent of the time, comparisons were made in this regard with the Ottoman-Armenian, without requisite discussion of this theme and the role of Azerbaijanis.

## Evaluation




Fig. 15: Journalistic evaluation in *Der Spiegel*

<sup>39</sup> DER SPIEGEL (22.1.1990): Gorbatschow muss hart sein.

<sup>40</sup> DER SPIEGEL (25.7.1988): Geistiges Tschernobyl.



The *right to self-determination* was on 13 occasions accorded exclusively to the Armenians of Karabakh. Consequently the unilateral declaration of independence of Karabakh and the military intervention by the Republic of Armenia were tacitly supported. By way of counterbalance, a single mention is made of the *territorial integrity* of the Republic of Azerbaijan, but in the guise of a contra-argument in the mouths of (pro-)Azeri supporters. *Occupation* and synonymous terms such as *annexation* or *absorption* were used 8 times to characterise the military presence of the Republic of Armenia, partly with sarcastic overtones: "The chronicles and history books hold that the territory [Karabakh] is being occupied by Armenia." <sup>41</sup> On 12 occasions the Karabakh conflict is referred to as a *civil war*. *Aggression* is attributed on two occasions each to Armenia and Azerbaijan.

**Actors in the Karabakh conflict** are identified on 504 occasions. "Moscow" appears as the most frequent actor, at 20 percent of the time. Up until the breakup of the USSR this was used to refer to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. For the post-Soviet period it was applied to "the Kremlin" of the *Russian Federation*. On two occasions the name "Moscow" appeared without any further definition of its intended referent. Right up until the breakup of the Soviet Union the Karabakh conflict was presented as an internal affair of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

With a 17.5 percent frequency, the second most prominent role is attributed to the *Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic* and its successor the *Republic of Azerbaijan*; third place, with 12.7 percent frequency, is attributed to the *Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic* and its successor the *Republic of Armenia*. Much less prominence is given to the disputed "*Republic of Karabakh*" / "*Artsakh*", with a frequency of only 7.6 percent. As a consequence the line of conflict is drawn mainly between "*Yerivan*" and "*Baku*". The aspect of the Karabakh Armenians is relegated to second order importance in relation to the supposed international duel in the perception of the conflict.

*Citizens' movements*, such as national opposition and non-state committees, such as the *Karabakh Committee* among others, account for only 7.1 percent of the actors named.

Even outside political powers were accorded little significance. The most frequently mentioned, with an average 6.7 percent, was Turkey, mostly on account of Ottoman-Armenian history. Otherwise the country is cast in a present-day narrative as supporter of "Eastern Turks", which is to say the Azerbaijanis to whom it is "related".

*Refugees* and/or *displaced persons* account for only 6.2 percent of mentions of actors in the contributions.

Although receiving increased attention in the more recent articles, the percentage for "the West", which included alongside the USA the *EU*, *OSCE*, *CSCE* and *NATO*, remains relatively insignificant at 7.1 percent. Not infrequently the writers of articles look to, - mentioned 1.8 percent of the time - as a long hoped-for mediator. Only a single reference was made to the UN.

In total 16 mentions were made of **attempts at resolutions or peace negotiations**. "Western" organizations such as *CSCE/OSCE*, the *EU* and the *Council of Europe*, with a 37.5

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<sup>41</sup> DER SPIEGEL (19.02.2008): Auferstehung aus Ruinen.

percent share among of the mediators mentioned, was identified as the most committed to peace in the South Caucasus. With one reference made to it, “Moscow central”, along the thrice-mentioned CIS to which it is closely tied, and which had stationed troops in the crisis region after the collapse of the USSR, were presented as hardly interested at all in resolving the conflict. The *United Nations* were also referred to a total of three times, and bilateral negotiations, such as the dialogue between *Aliyev* and *Kotcharian* on the possibility of an exchange of territory, were only mentioned two times. No mention is made either of Non-governmental Organizations or the *Minsk Group*. Sporadic mention was made of *Turkey* and *Iran* as holding key positions in peace negotiations.




Fig. 16: Actors and their distribution according to *Der Spiegel*

On a few occasions certain contributions were assigned multiple codes: hence certain **events**, such pogroms and general strikes, were categorized as both *political* and *socio-economic*. Around 41.4 percent of the 338 events reported were marked as political, 28.7 percent as socio-economic. Events concerning the *military* or *militias* amounted to roughly 21 percent. By contrast *cultural* aspects played barely any role in this context: they accrued only 8.9 percent of mentions.

**Interests** were attributed to the events and actors mentioned 171 times.

At 26.9 percent, the Karabakh conflict was most frequently portrayed as a *territorial conflict*. Occasionally Armenians of the republic and of Karabakh were conflated into a single conflict party. Based on *Der Spiegel* *military interests* accounted for only 7.4 percent of interests. This is countered with a regular rate of mention of 21.1 percent of pro-peace intentions, mostly pursued by the “West”. “Moscow” and other competing political powers were at 26.3 percent accused of *geopolitical* machinations over the South Caucasus. Around a tenth of

the total interests draw attention to the *socio-political interests* surrounding Azerbaijan's oil reserves. Two out of four mentions suggest Turkey as having *cultural interests* in Azerbaijan in promoting the idea of Turanism, i.e. the realization of a political and social union.

In order to tailor the analysis to the question of proximity in time to the events reported, key moments in the developing conflict were chosen in order to compare the coverage between papers. Investigation of the parameter **“Key events” in the Karabakh conflict** (cf. also the chronology of events in the appendix) produced the following picture:

### Selection of “key events” - examples of reporting

- **Mass demonstrations—expulsions (1987/88)**  
Der Spiegel: *Deformierte Gefühle* (29.2.88) discusses Armenian demonstrations, but no mention of Azeri ones, let alone of the expulsion of the Azerbaijani populace in Armenia.
- **Supreme Soviet of NK passes resolution on joining the Armenian SSR**  
(20. February '88) Der Spiegel: *Deformierte Gefühle* (29.2.88); *Das war die Woche der Freiheit* (7.3.88)
- **Sumgait Pogrom** (27th – 29th Feb. '88)  
Der Spiegel: *Ein Volk; ein Land* (23.3.88); *Es gibt nichts zu beschönigen* (28.3.88)
- **1989 resolution of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia on the merger of NK**  
(1st/7th December '89) Der Spiegel: no mention
- **Black January** (20th January '90)  
Der Spiegel: *Gorbatschow muss hart sein* (22.1.90)
- **Khojali massacre** (25th/26th February '92) Der Spiegel: *Neues Blutbad in Bergkarabach* (9.3.92), *Flammender Zorn* (16.3.92) followed by a three-part series „Wir werden euch ausrotten“. *Kampf um Bergkarabach und Genozid an den Armeniern* (Nr. 13, 14, 15 – 1992, 25 pages!)
- **Efforts at negotiation by the Minsk Group** (24th March '92)  
Der Spiegel: no mention
- **Armenian annexation of territories outside of NK** (June '93)  
Der Spiegel: no mention
- **Ceasefire** (12th May '94) Der Spiegel: no coverage close to the time

No mention was made of the expulsion of Azerbaijanis from Armenia or of Azerbaijani mass demonstrations on January 1988. Instead, Armenian protests were mentioned one month later.<sup>42</sup> In the same article *Der Spiegel* referred to the *Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of*

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<sup>42</sup> cf. DER SPIEGEL (29.02.88): *Deformierte Gefühle*.

*Karabakh on merger with the Armenian SSR* on 20th February '88, one week after it had been passed.

Above all the focus was on the *Pogrom by Azerbaijani masses against their Armenian fellow citizens in the city of Sumgait* from February 27th to 29th 1988 which was mentioned twice in the following four weeks.

None of the articles mentioned the *Armenian law on the merger of Karabakh* of December '89, let alone any discussion of the legal situation.

"Black January", the tragic events of the night from January 19th to 20th 1990 in Baku, was reported on 22.1.1990 under the title *Gorbatschow muss hart sein* (22.1.90).

*Der Spiegel* referred to the *massacre of the population of the Karabakh village Khojali* in the night from February 25th to 26th '92 in *Neues Blutbad in Bergkarabakh* (9.3.92) and the following article *Flammender Zorn* (16.3.92). Nonetheless these articles were followed by the three-part pro-Armenian series *Kampf um Bergkarabakh und Genozid an den Armeniern*. This was the most extensive series of articles on the Karabakh conflict in the press (every article 7-9 pages!). *Khojali* was relegated to the background; in its place the Ottoman period in Armenian history was brought to the fore, in order to draw supposed parallels with "Turkish brutality".

As noted above, the session of the *Minsk Group* on 24th March '92 apparently did not draw any attention. No mention was made of the *Armenian march into territories outside of Karabakh* in June '93, and the *Ceasefire* of May 12th '94 did not merit any report in *Der Spiegel*.

The question of proximity in time was investigated by looking at a period of ca. four weeks after the events in question. Whereas *Der Spiegel* reported on the events in Sumgait in February 1988 in two contributions nearly four weeks after they happened, *Black January* in 1990 was covered only two days after the event.

Other events which seemed important to us were left out.

This partiality of coverage was joined by **one-sided figurative language**, for example in pronouncements to the effect that the Karabakh Armenians wished to "*return to their motherland*".<sup>43</sup> Moreover, Karabakh was consistently referred to as an *Armenian en-/exclave*. Correspondingly Azerbaijan's sovereign right was tacitly unrecognised. Images were consistently projected of irreconcilable foe, along such lines as Christians versus Muslims and/or Armenians against "Turks" (including the linguistically related Azerbaijanis). A corollary of this is that Karabakh was presented as an "area of Armenian settlement in the middle of a Muslim state", and Armenia appeared as the "[...] oldest Christian country in the world, living sandwiched between predominantly Muslim neighbours"<sup>44</sup>. In making this point the fraught history of Azeri-Iranian relations, and the support of Armenia by the Islamic Republic of Iran were edited out.

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<sup>43</sup> cf. DER SPIEGEL (26.09.1988): An die Kehle.

<sup>44</sup> DER SPIEGEL (20.08.2007): Auf leisen Sohlen.

Also of importance is the fact that the Karabakh conflict was often compared with the developments in the multi-ethnic Balkans<sup>45</sup>, presumably in no small part because they happened at around the same time.

## Summary:

In 1949 the editors laid down the *Der Spiegel* Statute, a text which ought still to be valid today.

In this text stands:

“DER SPIEGEL is a news (current-affairs) magazine. To this end DER SPIEGEL must:

1. be up-to-date
2. have a high news (current-affairs) content. In this regard the magazine must prepare and transmit other, which is to say more personal, intimate and contextualized news (current-affairs) than the daily press has to offer ...

further to point 2: all news, information and facts prepared and listed in DER SPIEGEL must be entirely accurate. Before being passed on to the editors, every news item and every fact must be checked to the most pedantic detail. Sources are to be cited informatively in every case. In case of doubt it is preferable to do without a piece of information than to run the risk of reporting a falsehood.”

Briefly summarized, *Der Spiegel* makes the claim not only of being up-to-the-minute and having a higher and more profound new content than the daily papers, but above all to verifiable truthfulness.

Dr. Hauke Janssen, head of documentation at the *Spiegel*-Verlag in Hamburg, points to the following prerequisites of editorial work in his presentation “Fact-checking at SPIEGEL” of 11th February 2014:<sup>46</sup>

The editors expect from the documentation “certain verification of the completed manuscript” (prerequisites of collaborative work...). Which entails that “every fact intended for publication in its own right and in the context of the available means and as the available time allows [be] checked for factual correctness”. (...)

Owing to time constraints, priorities must on occasion be set. It is therefore not always possible to check line by line. Instead, facts are preferred which fall recognizably under the responsibility of the documentation.

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<sup>45</sup> DER SPIEGEL (10.06.2007): Es besteht Kriegsgefahr.

<sup>46</sup> [http://www.fjum-wien.at/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/FactChecking\\_Wien\\_2014.pdf](http://www.fjum-wien.at/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/FactChecking_Wien_2014.pdf) (retrieved 03.01.2015).

The following points are of especial significance:

- Are the facts correct?
- Are the names and functions correct?
- Are the references to time correct?
- Does the text contain internal contradictions?
- Are the quotations correct (in terms of wording and meaning)?
- How far are the sources used up-to-date and serious?

If we compare these claims made by *Der Spiegel* to the contributions we analyzed on the Karabakh conflict, numerous questions and points of criticism arise, which are in no way new, but were astutely formulated as far back as 1957 by Hans M. Enzensberger. They can be summarized as follows:

“1. The language of *Spiegel* serves to obscure that which is spoken about. 2. the “German news magazine” is no news magazine at all. 3. *Der Spiegel* does not engage in criticism, rather its surrogate. 4. The reader of *Spiegel* does not become oriented, but rather disoriented.”<sup>47</sup>

What this means is that the deficiencies which came to light in our investigation are not necessarily related to the Karabakh conflict per se, but are much more the fault of the specific manner in which *Spiegel* produces its “stories”.

This in no way excuses such a dangerous form of spin:

“whereas the news report serves as a reliable means of orienting one’s own conduct, and can thus be considered a means of production, the story remains merely an object of consumption. It is consumed only to leave behind an emotional residue, which functions as a source of resentment.” (Enzensberger)

The dramatic formulation of the **headlines** is thus part and parcel of the medium.

What follows is an overview:

29.02.1988	Deformierte Gefühle [Deformed feelings]
07.03.1988	Das war die Woche der Freiheit [Such was the week of freedom]
23.03.1988	Ein Volk, ein Land [One people, one land]
28.03.1988	Es gibt nichts zu beschönigen [There is nothing to whitewash]

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<sup>47</sup> Die Sprache des SPIEGEL. Hans Magnus Enzensberger, 1957, on the style and goal of the magazines, cited under <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-8650409.html> (retrieved 05.01.2015); excerpt from: Hans Magnus Enzensberger: Einzelheiten I. Bewußtseins-Industrie . Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt. Originally appearance 06.03.1957, in: DER SPIEGEL 10/1957.



04.04.1988	Mit Gefühlen spielen [Playing with feelings]
20.06.1988	Oma, du mußt fliehen, es ist Krieg [Time to flee, grandma; there's a war on]
07.11.1988	Karabach - Anschluss an Gorbatschows Heimat? [Karabakh—merger with Gorbachev's homeland?]
25.07.1988	Geistiges Tschernobyl [Intellectual Chernobyl];
26.09.1988	An die Kehle [At each other's throats];
28.11.1988	Stich ins Herz der Nation [A stab to the heart of the nation];
05.12.1988	Tropfen von Blut, die zur Erde fallen [Drops of blood, falling to the ground];
05.12.1988	Wir haben Probleme einfach verschwiegen [We simply stayed silent about problems];
12.12.1988	Im Schmerz sind wir vereint [We are united in pain];
19.12.1988	Wir stehen am Abgrund [We are standing before the abyss];
09.10.1989	Neue Waffe [New weapon];
18.12.1989	Gezielte Provokation [Deliberate provocation];
22.01.1990	Gorbatschow muss hart sein [Gorbachev needs to be tough];
07.10.1991	Moralisch am Ende [Morally exhausted];
02.12.1991	Was soll das, Zar Boris? [What's that supposed to mean, Tsar Boris?];
03.02.1992	Panzer in Bergkarabach [Tanks in Nagorno-Karabakh];
09.03.1992	Neues Blutbad in Bergkarabach [Another bloodbath in Nagorno-Karabakh];
16.03.1992	Flammender Zorn [Raging fury];
23.03.1992	„Wir werden euch ausrotten“ – Kampf um Bergkarabach und Genozid [“We are going to wipe you out“ – Struggle for Nagorno-Karabakh and genocide];
23.03.1992	Kopfhaut abgetrennt [Severed scalp];
23.03.1992	Wir dürfen keinen Genozid zulassen [We cannot allow a genocide];
30.03.1992	„Wir werden euch ausrotten“ – Kampf um Bergkarabach und Genozid (II) [“We are going to wipe you out“ – Struggle for Nagorno-Karabakh and genocide (II)];
06.04.1992	„Wir werden euch ausrotten“ – Kampf um Bergkarabach und Genozid (III) [“We are going to wipe you out“ – Struggle for Nagorno-Karabakh and genocide (III)];
29.06.1992	Ein Schritt zuviel [One step too many];
09.11.1992	Piloten als Söldner in Aserbaidshan [Pilots as mercenaries in Azerbaijan];
19.04.1993	Kein Platz mehr für Stammesfehden [No place for clan feuds];
28.06.1993	Das Volk leidet [The people are suffering];
05.07.1993	Rote Socke [Red socks];
18.10.1993	Smartes Stück Kolonialismus [A clever bit of colonialism];
07.04.1997	Von Gott verlassen [Forsaken by God];
06.10.1997	Die Seidenstraße des 21. Jahrhunderts [The Silk Road of the 21st century];

09.02.1998	Kampf um Karabach [Struggle for Karabakh];
05.04.1999	Neuer Krieg im Kaukasus [Another war in the Caucasus];
05.07.1999	Enge Umarmung [Tight embrace];
27.10.1999	Armenien - erst seit acht Jahren [Armenia—for the first time in eight years];
27.10.1999	Ein Literat an der Macht [An man of letters in power];
08.11.1999	Sehnsucht nach dem Imperium [Imperial longings];
06.03.2000	Geheimgespräche über Gebietsaustausch [Secret talks over territorial exchange];
02.04.2001	Frontalangriff der USA [Frontal attack of the USA];
26.08.2002	Pipelines, Bomben, Soldaten [Pipelines, bombs, soldiers];
06.10.2003	Moskaus Vorposten [An outpost of Moscow];
16.02.2006	Risk Map Armenien [Armenia];
”	”
10.06.2007	Es besteht Kriegsgefahr [There is a risk of war];
09.07.2007	Autonomie bedeutet Krieg [Autonomy means war];
20.08.2007	Auf leisen Sohlen [Treading softly];
01.10.2007	Säbelrasseln in Baku [Sabre-rattling in Baku];
18.12.2007	Russisch denken, sprechen, fühlen [Thinking, speaking and feeling Russian];
19.02.2008	Auferstehung aus Ruinen [Resurrection from ruins].

The sources of reporting are inaccessible to the reader in these examples; only in critical cases are references of this sort provided (cf. Chapter on Intensity of Reporting - *Der Spiegel*).

This leaves the reporting bereft of a significant basis for objectivity; “neutrality” can hardly be spoken of. Concerning individual findings:

1) The Karabakh conflict is very frequently linked to the Gorbachev era: glasnost and perestroika allegedly encouraged the Armenians to seek the supposedly justified “reunification” with the “motherland”. Without enquiring into precisely what RE-unification is meant here, a number of references are made to the fact that Stalin unjustly assigned Karabakh to the Azerbaijani SSR.<sup>48</sup> Accordingly the Karabakh Armenians were merely trying to exercise their right to self-determination, and had arrived at the decision by vote to leave the Azerbaijani SSR. And, according to later reports, Armenia was merely trying to lend a helping hand to Karabakh’s independence. At no point are any questions posed as to the legitimacy of the demands made by the Republic of Azerbaijani for the maintenance of its territorial integrity, or the shift of policy in Armenia from a desire for annexation and merger to “help for the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh”.

2) “Only that which can be backed up by the sources shall be written”, says *Der Spiegel*. Maybe, but there appears to be no one to check how evenly-weighted these “sources” are. Even in the interviews, which are apparently intended to provide a veneer of objectivity, one

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<sup>48</sup> DER SPIEGEL (04.04.1988): Mit Gefühlen spielen.



finds three pro-Armenian interviewees pitted against a single member of the Azerbaijani opposition. The “place” code also contains significantly more Armenian entries than Azerbaijani ones.

3) Readers for the most part are left in the dark as to pre-Soviet Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. Instead, the Ottoman-Armenian relationship is thoroughly “recollected” (Dossier Kampf um Bergkarabakh und Genozid an den Armeniern. In: *Der Spiegel* 1992). Out of this an a-historical parallel is drawn whereby the theme of “genocide” in the Ottoman Empire is brought to bear directly on the Karabakh conflict: the roles are cast with Armenian victims, on the one hand, and Azerbaijani-Turkish culprits on the other. This encourages the reader to empathize and choose sides accordingly, since the actual fact of an Armenian policy of annexation is entirely left out.




Fig. 17: Example I <sup>49</sup>

4) Names and terminology used by correspondents suggest correctness to the reader, since the author is presumably close to the event and bound to know...At the same time a process of habituation takes place among the readers which in fact renders all questioning of the correctness increasingly difficult. Karabakh’s belonging to the Azerbaijani Republic is rhetorically side-stepped by being referred to as an en-/exclave, and accorded to Armenia.

<sup>49</sup> DER SPIEGEL (14/1992): Wir werden euch ausrotten – Kampf um Berg-Karabach und der Völkermord an den Armeniern (II).

The use of Stepanakert in place of the official name Khankendi is politically incorrect and journalistically unprofessional. Nonetheless it continues to be used since the fall of the USSR (cf. *Smartes Stück Kolonialismus* (18.10.1993)).



Fig. 18: Stepanakert instead of Xankändi <sup>50</sup>

5) Another important point of criticism of the professionalism and objectivity is the portrayal of the conflict parties: the societies of the South Caucasus are presented as perpetually in diametrical opposition to one another on account of their religious differences.

Islamist movements or (quasi-)religious hatred have not gained a foothold in Azerbaijani society, although the same cannot be said for other places. This is alluded to in an interview in *Der Spiegel*: “[...] religious feelings have barely played a role in the current excesses [in Sumqayit, ed.][...] Hooligans in Azerbaijan use Islam as a justification, as a disguise [...]” <sup>51</sup> And yet at the same time the director Augstein himself is unable to go beyond stereotypes of a binary understanding of the conflict as being between Christians and Muslims:

“The whole world is acting as though the Balkans were the linchpin of the earth. One would have expected London to grasp that there are civil wars driven by clashes of religion and civilization which it has taken centuries still not to resolve—just look at Northern Ireland. If we only sent Reißmüller from *F.A.Z.* out to the Christian Armenians, who are fighting with the Muslim inhabitants of Azerbaijan in order to carve out a corridor to Nagorno-Karabakh. Then we would be sure to be spared his Bosnian warmongering for a while. It is not the case that only the Muslims or the Serbs commit atrocities. If we were to accept the ruling logic, then it was the Serbs who began the First World War...” <sup>52</sup>

The act of describing the Karabakh Armenians and those of the Armenian Republic as forming a national(ist) unity, characterized by Christianity, makes eternal mutual hatred

<sup>50</sup> DER SPIEGEL (01.10.2007): Säbelrasseln in Baku.

<sup>51</sup> DER SPIEGEL (28.3.1988): Es gibt nichts zu beschönigen.

<sup>52</sup> DER SPIEGEL (19.04.1993): Kein Platz mehr für Stammesfehden (by Rudolf Augstein).

seem like an inherent feature of the forms of nationalism involved. As though every Christian were commanded to hate every “Muslim Turk” (i.e. all ethnic Azerbaijanis as well), and conversely every “Turk” commanded to hate all Armenians (and all of their supporters). “[...] when the Red Army arrived they [the Armenians and Azerbaijanis, ed.] joined forces against the invaders.”<sup>53</sup> Instances of inter-ethnic cooperation, such as those mentioned in this quotation, but also personal friendship past and present were presumably erased from collective memory. Mixed marriages would seem a thing of the past, and would today be the object of persecution.

And yet most articles go even further than merely repeating these myths. They pass them on to their unreflecting readers. Orientalism in E. SAID’s sense of the word is being practised here, in so far as a dichotomy is reproduced, whereby two sides are pitted against each other, the one essentially “good” and the other essentially “bad”. The role of the “good” is claimed for the “self”. According to one’s perception, this self may be of religious, cultural or national(ist) nature; or it may be defined as a combination: in *Der Spiegel* this “self” appears to take the form of a trans-confessional Christian community, which appears blind to the difference represented by the predominance of Armenian orthodoxy for the “Christian people of the Armenians”.<sup>54</sup> This “self” or “relative” seems to stand in opposition to the (equally undifferentiated) Islam, their enemy, as can be seen in such derogatory formulations as:

“[...] Moscow would seem to take sides [...] with the Azeris—so as not to come into conflict with the remaining 48 million Muslims in the USSR, much less the entire Muslim world”<sup>55</sup>, and “thus in 1962 Aliyev became party boss of his Muslim Republic.”<sup>56</sup>




Fig. 19: Example II<sup>57</sup>

53 DER SPIEGEL (22.01.1990): Gorbatschow muss hart sein.

54 DER SPIEGEL (7.04.1997): Von Gott verlassen.

55 DER SPIEGEL (22.01.1990): Gorbatschow muss hart sein.

56 DER SPIEGEL (26.09.1988): An die Kehle.

57 DER SPIEGEL (23.03.1992): Wir werden euch ausrotten – Kampf um Berg-Karabach und der Völkermord an den Armeniern (I).

The ostensible role of eternal victim assigned to the “co-religionists”, if not to say “brothers”, makes them seem “not evil” or even “good”. In order to arouse the sympathy of the readers, descriptions aimed at generating empathy are included, such as: “once again cut-off and isolated; once again abandoned by the rest of the world, as though God had conspired against the Armenians [...]”<sup>58</sup> Following the logic of the fundamental opposition between “good” and “evil”, the enemy of one’s “relative” comes to be the enemy of one’s “self”. In order to make it clear that their role is that of the enemy, the Azerbaijanis - of (predominantly) Muslim upbringing - are laden with the worst moral turpitudes possible. They come across as though they were acting according to a collective political will,



Fig. 20: Armenian volunteers: “we are fighting for our families”<sup>59</sup>

a kind of “national pact” to kill all Armenians: “Turanism is the mainspring of the Azerbaijanis’ campaign of extermination”<sup>60</sup>. As has been mentioned before, these portrayals of the enemy are in fact widely circulated in the societies affected by the conflict. The intensity of this dichotomy is so deep-seated that not only the “anti-self” is “evil”, but everything that is “evil” can be redefined as part of the “anti-self”: “a rumour [...] is circulating in Armenia that Gorbachev has a Turkic-Islamic family tree, is related to the Baku party boss Vezirov, and his wife Raisa is a Tatar [since he has not publically taken the Armenian side, ed.]”<sup>61</sup>. The reader is morally obligated to side with the Armenian Christians, who as a collective have always occupied the position of victim. Such stereotypes used in portrayals of the enemy are to be found throughout reports, thereby calling into question the neutrality of the entirety of *Der Spiegel’s* coverage of the Karabakh conflict.

58 DER SPIEGEL (07.04.1997): Von Gott verlassen.

59 DER SPIEGEL (22.01.1990): Gorbatschow muss hart sein.

60 DER SPIEGEL (30.03.1992): Wir wollen euch ausrotten – Kampf um Bergkarabach und der Völkermord an den Armeniern (II). [ We are going to wipe you out the struggle for Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian genocide (II)

61 DER SPIEGEL (22.01.1990): Gorbatschow muss hart sein. Note: Tatar is linguistically related to Azeri and Turkish.

The historical context for this construction of a Christian-Muslim dichotomy is aptly summarised in HUNTINGTON's model of a "clash of civilizations" . This struggle would be the successor of the Cold War duel, and would see the world be divided into several competing blocks. One of these would form the "Christian cultural sphere", or "the West". A military confrontation with the neighbouring "Islamic" block would thus seem destined to take place and inevitable. Ultimately any attempt to establish whether the present results are due to partisanship or merely ignorance or unprofessional conduct is hindered by the murkiness of the sources. The neutrality of the handling can at the very least be criticized.

Given that up to 56 percent of readers enjoy reading reports of foreign events (see *Research object and methods*), the effect of such representations should not be underestimated: three quarters of the publications on the Karabakh conflict in *Der Spiegel* were published under the heading foreign news. Leading media such as *Der Spiegel* (cf. on the choice of newspapers) are capable of exerting a large influence on public opinion of the Karabakh conflict, which at any rate has received little attention since 1993. They are liable to contribute to tensions in German society by importing stereotypes of the enemy "from abroad", as borne out by developments in the recent past.

### 3.2 Coverage in Die Zeit

Many of the tendencies identified in regards to *Der Spiegel* are also present in *Die Zeit*:

04.03.1988	Die Minderheiten melden sich zu Wort [The minorities begin to speak];
04.03.1988	Ein Volk steht auf [A people rise up];
11.03.1988	Blutiger Nationalismus im Kaukasus [Bloody nationalism in the Caucasus];
18.03.1988	Die schrecklichen Tage von Sumgait [The terrible days of Sumgait];
01.04.1988	Glasnost in kleinen Dosen [Glasnost in small doses];
20.05.1988	Wider die Gleichschaltung [Against forced conformity];
17.06.1988	Die Heimkehr in das Gelobte Land [Return to the Promised land];
22.07.1988	Mit der ganzen Macht des Staates [With all the state's power];
02.12.1988	Armenien: Heilige Erde vollgesogen mit Blut [Armenia: holy soil soaked in blood];
02.12.1988	Reform säen, Sturm ernten [Sowing reform, reaping a storm];
23.12.1988	Das Leiden, die Hilfe und der Hass [Suffering, help and hatred];
05.05.1989	Die Attacke der alten Garde [Attack of the old guard];
09.06.1989	Die Wahrheit bricht sich Bahn [The truth is coming out];
11.08.1989	Der Schmerz des Übergangs [The pains of transition];
26.01.1990	2000 Jahre Völkerfehde [2000 years of feuds between the peoples];
26.01.1990	Der kaukasische Teufelskreis [The vicious circle of the Caucasus];
26.01.1990	Chronik der Krise [Chronicle of the crisis];
26.01.1990	Moskaus Alptraum [Moscow's nightmare];
02.03.1990	Wenig bekannte Dokumente [Little-known documents];
12.04.1991	Kein Friede in der Stadt der Winde [No peace in the city of the winds];
23.08.1991	Die Gorbatschow-Jahre [The Gorbachev years];
13.03.1992	Rache ohne Ende [Revenge without end];
20.03.1992	Selbst die ewige Flamme ist erloschen [Even the eternal flame has gone out];
04.09.1992	Der blutige Sieg des Hasses [Hatred's bloody victory];
12.11.1993	Nur Rußland ist Sieger [Only Russia is victorious];
23.12.1994	Afghanistan im eigenen Land [Afghanistan in one's own land];
26.05.1995	Alter Reichtum, Neues Wunder [Old wealth, new wonder];
16.06.1995	Kalter Krieg ums Öl [Cold war over oil];
04.11.1999	Das Opium der Völker [The opiate of the people];
05.01.2000	Im Bauch von Jerewan [In Yerevan's belly];
22.11.2007	Staaten kosten Menschenleben [States cost human lives].



Numerous **headlines** reflect a certain degree of pro-Armenian subjectivity, or cast the conflict parties in terms of a historically grounded irreconcilability:

Alleged causes of the **Karabakh conflict** are mentioned on 64 occasions in *Die Zeit*.

On twelve occasions the pre-Soviet history of Transcaucasia is examined.

The cause of the conflict is situated 24 times in the Soviet Union. “This was Stalin’s precise aim when in 1921 he allocated Karabakh, which was a part of Armenia, to its hostile neighbour Azerbaijan” <sup>62</sup>.

The petition made by the Soviet of People’s Deputies of Karabakh (oblast’-level Soviet, which by the time of vote only represented the Armenian population) to leave the Azerbaijani SSR is identified as the seed of the military conflict, whereas no causes of conflict are identified for the post-Soviet period: “[...] democratic majority decision of the oblast’ Soviet of Karabakh on seceding to Armenia [...]” <sup>63</sup>. The Karabakh conflict is presented as an ethnic conflict on seven occasions.

Attention is drawn to the religious context 20 times, an example being: “[...] dispute between the Christian and Muslim Soviet republics in the Caucasus.” <sup>64</sup> The terms *Völkermord* and




Fig. 21: Journalistic evaluation in *Die Zeit*

*Genozid* [*Holocaust* and *Genocide*] are the most frequent of the keywords in the evaluation, and appear practically in every second article published in connection with Karabakh. They

<sup>62</sup> DIE ZEIT (12.11.1993): Nur Rußland ist Sieger. In an analogous manner to SPIEGEL, the reader is presented with an a-historical Armenia.

<sup>63</sup> DIE ZEIT (18.03.1988): Die schrecklichen Tage von Sumgait.

<sup>64</sup> DIE ZEIT (04.03.1988): Ein Volk steht auf.

are treated as synonymous. They are overwhelmingly used to refer to the Ottoman-Armenian history, and Azerbaijani complicity in these events is construed through a concept of “ethnic relatedness”: “[...] [T]he Bolsheviks assigned [...] the Armenian territories of Karabakh and Nakhchivan to the Azerbaijanis, a Shiite Turkic people [!]. Yet the Turks had committed the first terrible genocide of the twentieth century against the Armenians in 1915.”<sup>65</sup> (It is left unclear how far these territories are to be considered Armenian, and a connection to the “second terrible genocide”, the Holocaust, is unavoidable. More on this below.)

The phrase *right to self-determination* is mentioned seven times to the benefit of the Karabakh Armenians: “[...] [Karabakh] on the way to saving its right to self-determination [underlined by the author]”<sup>66</sup>. The tacit agreement with the unilateral declaration of independence of Karabakh, as well as the military intervention of the Republic of Armenia, shines through in this quotation. The concept of territorial integrity is only once mentioned. The military presence of the Republic of Armenia in Karabakh is referred to five times either as occupation and annexation. The Karabakh conflict is presented on seven occasions as a civil war. The term aggression appears on one occasion in the context of the Sumqait excesses. In a further instance the author declines to use the term aggression in relation to the Karabakh Armenians, since “they are in the minority”<sup>67</sup> and therefore cannot be the aggressors.

**Actors** in the conflict are mentioned at 331 points. “Moscow” appears, under the guise of political centre of the USSR and the succeeding Russian Federation, 70 times out 331 (ration 1:5) as the most frequent actor.

As in *Der Spiegel* there Karabakh conflict is perceived as an “internal” affair threatening the integrity of the USSR: “Public opinion would have been in uproar had the presidium of the Supreme Soviet approved Nagorno-Karabakh’s joining Armenia.”<sup>68</sup>

Second place is occupied by the national populations (inter alia “people”, “masses”, “the Armenians”, “the Azerbaijanis/Azeris”), at 16.6 percent. *Die Zeit* does not see the conflict as a confrontation between states, but rather as a “struggle between peoples”: “then the Azerbaijanis, no longer wishing to stand by and watch the Armenian *people’s* diplomacy [stress by the author], strike.”<sup>69</sup>

The third actor with 13.9 percent is the capital of the Azerbaijani SSR, from 1991 capital of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “Baku” (symbolic centre of power of Azerbaijan).

The *Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic* and, when appropriate, *Republic of Armenia*, with its 10.2 percent share, plays a more prominent role than the disputed “*Republic of Karabakh*”/“*Artsakh*”, with its 4.5 percent portion. The role of the Karabakh Armenians as an autonomous entity decreases in favour of a competition between the Armenian and Azerbaijani populations.

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<sup>65</sup> DIE ZEIT (04.03.1988): Ein Volk steht auf.

<sup>66</sup> DIE ZEIT (02.12.1988): Armenine: Heilige Erde vollsogen mit Blut.

<sup>67</sup> DIE ZEIT (12.11.1993): Nur Rußland ist Sieger.

<sup>68</sup> DIE ZEIT (22.07.1988): Mit der ganzen Macht des Staates.

<sup>69</sup> DIE ZEIT (26.01.1990): Der kaukasische Teufelskreis.



*Refugees/displaced persons* and population movements add up to more than a tenth each of the named actors.




Abb. 22: Actors according to *Die Zeit*

External political powers receive sporadic mention:

At 5.7 percent *Turkey* is slightly ahead of “western” organizations such as CSCE/OSCE, EU and USA (4.8 percent each appr.). Even here *Turkey* features most prominently in the context of Ottoman-Armenian history, or as “brother to the Azerbaijanis”. *Iran* is mentioned only 1.5 percent of the time, either as a possible supporter of Azerbaijan, or as potential hegemon in the region. There is only a single mention at the UN.

**Attempts at a solution and peace talks** are mentioned on 14 occasions. “Moscow” appears with five mentions to have the greatest interest in peace politics, followed by the CIS, *attempts at bilateral negotiation*, and the *EU/Council of Europe*, with two mentions each. There is one mention of the *Helsinki Citizens Assembly*<sup>70</sup> and the *UN*. The *Minsk Group* is entirely disregarded.

**Political events** enjoy a high degree of awareness, accounting for 49.7 percent of the 204 events mentioned. 36.3 percent affect *socio-economic* aspects (including pogroms and strikes), *military* actions are underrepresented at 18.6 percent. Consequently the military invasion of Azerbaijani territory by Armenian troops, not only in Nagorno-Karabakh, but in the surrounding areas as well, was almost completely left out. *Cultural* events are only attended to 5.4 percent of the time.

The **interest's** category of coding received 85 hits. *Geopolitical* and *peace politics* interests are ascertained at a proportion of 29.4 percent each. Above all “Moscow” is accused of

<sup>70</sup> DIE ZEIT (04.09.1992): Der blutige Sieg des Hasses.

harbouring such interests, either so as to secure peace on Soviet territory, or along Russia's southern border, which also constitutes a post-Soviet sphere of influence: "now Moscow is stoking the civil war in Transcaucasia in order thereby to don the mantle of referee." Muscovite peace policy is understood as motivated either by a genuine desire for peace, or as a mere geopolitical lever. The *territorial interests* of "Baku" and "Yerevan" follow suit. In the service of *socio-economic* interests, with 10.6 percent "*Moscow*" and "*the West*" appear to be wrestling over control of Baku's oil. Surprisingly, military interests are mentioned only once, the same number of times as *cultural* interests.

Analysis of the reporting of key events in the Karabakh conflict revealed the following:

No mention was made of the *Azerbaijani mass demonstrations of January '88* or the expulsion of Azerbaijanis from Armenia.

The *resolution of the Supreme Soviet of Karabakh on joining the Armenian SSR* was picked up by *Die Zeit* one whole month after the fact.<sup>71</sup>

The *massacres of Sumgait* of February 27th to 29th '88 were covered over the course of the following four weeks in two reports, and made it to the headlines on one occasion: *Die schrecklichen Tage von Sumgait* (DIE ZEIT, 18.3.88)<sup>72</sup>.

DIE ZEIT Nr. 12 - 18. März 1988 - Seite 3  
 Aus dem Archiv bei ZEIT ONLINE:  
<http://www.zeit.de/1988/12/die-schrecklichen-tage-von-sumgait>

**N**ur eine Straßenbahn trennt die beiden Moskauer Friedhöfe. Den Strom der Menschen, der an allen Feiertagen aus den quietschenden Wagen der alten Elektrischen quillt, drängt es nach rechts zu den goldenen Zwiebeltürmen. Hinter der orthodoxen Kirche ziehen sich die langen Alleen der russischen Gräber steifrig in den Birkenwald. Um die Stätten der Ruhmreichen – Poeten, Sänger, Akademienmitglieder – wird es hier nie still. Auf der linken Seite der Bahnschienen hingegen herrscht Ruhe. Dort liegen die letzten Ruhestätten der Armenier in Moskau. Dunkle Mauern schirmen den versteckten Ort ab.

An diesem Sonntag ist der armenische Friedhof erweckt – unter dem Schmerz einer geküllten, von ihrem Trauma verfolgten Nation. Hunderte drängen sich vor der schmucklosen Kapelle aus rostrot überlängtem Ziegelstein und halten ihre Spruchbänder den westlichen Kameras entgegen. „Völkermord“, steht da zu lesen. „Sumgait ist eine Intervention des Panürkentums in der UdSSR“, „Wir sind für glasnost. Wir fordern glasnost in der Karabach-Frage“.

Die Nachfahren jener Generation, die 1915 in der Türkei zum Opfer des ersten Völkermords in diesem Jahrhundert wurde, gruppieren sich hier auf der hügeligen, eingetragenen Fläche vor dem kleinen Portal wie der antike Chor in einem Amphitheater. Auf den offenen Gesichtern zeichnet sich Fassunglosigkeit ab, nicht Fanatismus. In Schneefall und Frost betrat die Moskauer Armee von zwölf Uhr mittags bis zum Anbruch der Dunkelheit, wie sie ihre Forderungen aufrechterhalten und gleichzeitig Gehör bewahren können.

Zeitgleich, doch zweiseitig, Kilometer weiter südlich, zelebriert das achtzigjährige Oberhaupt der ältesten christlichen Staatskirche, der Katholikos Watzen I., im armenischen Nationalheiligtum Eadschmidzin einen Gedenkgottesdienst für die Opfer von Sumgait. Dort hatten aserbeidjanische Nationalisten Ende Februar unter der armenischen Minderheit ein Blutbad angerichtet – als Antwort auf das Verlangen der (zu Aserbeidjan gehörenden) armenischen Enklave Nagornyj-Karabach, an die Nachbarrepublik Armenien angeschlossen zu werden.

Ein Volk, das die Russen als Schutzmacht stets respektiert hat, das den Kodex von *glasnost* und *perestrojka* peinlich genau beachtet, um seine ethisch gerechtfertigte, politisch aber unerfüllbare Zusammenführung zu betreiben, steht vor den Gräbern eines neuerlichen Pogroms. Geprügelt von alten, begreiflichen Verfolgungsgängen, jedoch unrichtig noch in seinen realen Hoffnungen stellt dieses Volk Gorbatschows Politik der moralischen Erneuerung auf die bisher schwerste Probe.

Michail Sergejewitsch hat unseren Unterländern gesagt, daß wir keine Extremisten sind“, ruft einer über die Gräber. „Aber *Tas*, die zentrale Presse und die Fernsehen vermitteln den gegenteiligen Eindruck. Und über die grausamen Gewalttäter, die von den Aserbeidjanern ganz gezielt nach Sumgait in Marsch gesetzt wurden mit Messern, Stöcken und sogar Kalaschnikows, schweigt die Presse völlig – das ist verbrecherisch.“

**Die schrecklichen Tage von Sumgait**

In Moskau berichten Armenier von den Pogromen der Aserbeidschaner / Von Christian Schmidt-Häuer

**Das Nationalitätenproblem macht Gorbatschow immer mehr zu schaffen. Kann er die Minderheiten in der Sowjetunion unter Kontrolle halten?**

offeneren Haus zu machen, die Bewohner zu heftigeren und massiven Forderungen ermutigt hat. Freilich wäre es voreilig, alle Manifestationen der letzten einundhalb Jahre vom Balkan bis zum Kaukasus, von den Tschetschenen bis zu den Kasachen unter der Überschrift zu summieren: „Das Imperium wackelt“. Dem steht entgegen:

**Erstens:** Es gibt kein einheitliches, gemeinsames, abstimmbares Aufbegehren gegen Moskau.

**Zweitens:** Ähnliche Demonstrationen wie die heutigen haben auch im vergangenen Vierteljahrhundert begrenzte Erfolge gehabt – nur keine ver-

natürlichen Verbündeten der Oktoberrevolution machen müsse. Für die Nationen im Sowjetimperium selbst gilt im Prinzip das gleiche.

Wie England und Frankreich vor ihrem Abstieg vom Sockel der Kolonialmächte, so bekommt heute auch Moskau die Verbitterung der bevormundeten und unerzogenen Nationen zu spüren – von den höher entwickelten und rücksichtslos erniedrigten baltischen Ländern ganz zu schweigen. Die Sowjetunion will den Abstieg vermeiden – sie versucht statt dessen, den Sockel zu senken.

In Karabach hat dieser Versuch zum bisher

71 DIE ZEIT (18.3.88): Die schrecklichen Tage von Sumgait.

72 further DIE ZEIT (11.3.88): Blutiger Nationalismus im Kaukasus.

The *Armenian law on the accession of Karabakh* of December '89 is not covered in any article.

The events of January 19th/20th '90 were written about in the three reports over the course of one week *Chronik der Krise* (26.1.90), *Der kaukasische Teufelskreis* (26.1.90) and *Moskaus Alptraum* (26.1.90), and referred to as Black January.

The *massacre of the population of the Karabakh village Khojali* on the night of February 25th/26th '92 finds mention in *Die Zeit* only two articles later.<sup>73</sup>

Absolutely no mention is made of the efforts of the *Minsk Group*, the *Armenian march into territories outside of Karabakh* or the *ceasefire of May 12th 94*.

Hence *Die Zeit* did not inform its readers about several central events of the Karabakh conflict.

Additionally, **one-sided figurative language** was not avoided: descriptions such as “*Islamic butchers*” and misleading explanation such as “*Turkish-influenced Azerbaijan*” are not consistent with *Die Zeit*’s claim to orient itself towards academics and members of the educated class (cf. Chapter ON THE CHOICE OF NEWSPAPERS). In much the same way as in *Der Spiegel*, undifferentiated images are presented of warring parties, based on ethnic criteria - Armenian versus “Turks” (including the linguistically-related Azeri) - and religious criteria - Christians versus Muslims:

“Between Yerevan and Baku a feud is raging with roots running back centuries: a volatile mixture of xenophobia, religious mania, economic jealousy and thirst for revenge has exploded between the oldest Christian people on earth, the Armenians, and the surrounding Islamic Turkic peoples.”<sup>74</sup>



<sup>73</sup> DIE ZEIT (20.3.92): Selbst die ewige Flamme ist erloschen.

<sup>74</sup> DIE ZEIT (26.01.1990): Der Kaukasische Teufelskreis.

This quotation represents an extreme example, bringing together a series of the stereotypes to be found in the reports as a whole: a seemingly eternal enmity between the Armenians and the “Turks” is presented, which is supplemented by the religious difference (although this requires the confessional difference between the predominantly Twelver Shi’a Azerbaijanis and the predominantly Hanafi Sunni Turks to be overlooked). Only occasionally are we presented with a more differentiated depiction than that of “eternal enmity”, in which the author mentions that “for generations Armenians and Azeris lived peacefully alongside each other as neighbours.”<sup>75</sup>

Comparisons are regularly made with the Balkan conflict. Nonetheless it is worth noting that comparisons are also made with Judeo-Israeli history, and terms such as *Exodus* and *Holocaust* are used in connection with the “fate” of the Armenians.

### **Summary:**

- 1) One may conclude that, owing to the small number of correspondents, the coverage of the Karabakh conflict is threatened with subjectivity.
- 2) The sources for the articles are unclear in so far as only 50 percent mention the place of writing. Thus the reader is left unable to tell whether the reporting is conducted from the location in question, the Moscow branch office, or even from Germany. The channels of information are not forthcoming, making it impossible to assess the factual accuracy let alone objectivity of the reporting.
- 3) The reports examined appear for the most part to have been written from Moscow, which entails a considerable degree of separation from the theatre of conflict. The question therefore arises, to what extent the correspondents possessed an accurate picture of the events as they unfolded, especially given the fact that, during the “hot phase” of the conflict, mobile telephones and internet connections were not available, and transportation routes heavily restricted. At any rate the Armenian community, especially among intellectual and dissident circles, was better represented in Moscow than their Azerbaijani counterparts, which made it possible for selected information to be fed to western journalists present there.
- 4) Doubt must be cast on the neutrality of the correspondents’ informants in the event that they were directly affected by the conflict, and if their statements were not verified by any further witnesses. On the basis of the actual or presumable locations of writing and interview partners, it appears that the correspondents gave more space to “(pro-)Armenian” voices than their “opponents”.
- 5) Admittedly the articles were written by experts trained to be competent in Eastern Europe, Russia or South-Eastern Europe. How thoroughly acquainted they were with the context of the Caucasus remains questionable. A Eurocentric perception consigns the Caucasus to the periphery. The same applies to its relation to the specifics of Turkic-language societies. These two traits are nonetheless fundamental to the Azerbaijani population. The middle-european

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<sup>75</sup> DIE ZEIT (04.09.1992): Der blutige Sieg des Hasses.

is presented with such misleading descriptions as “Turkish-influenced Azerbaijan” <sup>76</sup> Many of them, however, are completely unaware of the similarities and disparities between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Such depictions, rather, form the impression in the reader that the Azerbaijanis are exactly as unilaterally and groundlessly “martial” as the Ottoman Turks are alleged to have been. Thus they are made to bear a certain shared guilt for the Ottoman-Armenian history. As a corollary the occupation of Karabakh by Armenia is accorded legitimacy as “compensation for past injustice and suffering.”

6) This same experts, it seems, misjudged the role played by Islam in the Karabakh conflict. In particular, the constant reference to Iran with every mention of shiism, against the backdrop of the Islamic Revolution, appears to have achieved its intent of evoking alarm in the lay reader at the prospect of “fundamentalism”.

The Armenians by contrast are referred to as the “first Christians”, who “[are] corralled between three Islamic states.” <sup>77</sup>

7) Pre-Soviet Armenian-Azerbaijani relations remain for the most part uncharted territory for the reader. In place of this, the Ottoman-Armenian relationship is provided as a substitute. As a result the Armenians are cast as the constant victims, the Azeris and Turks, pejoratively expressed, as their tormentors: “Azerbaijani hordes” und “lynch troop[s]” <sup>78</sup>, “slaughter defenceless Armenians in a rage of national-religious purging” <sup>79</sup> in the original wording. The flight of Azerbaijanis out of Armenia, and later from Karabakh and neighbouring regions, is mentioned by the by, or not at all.

The caricatured portrayals of enemies provided by the correspondents correlates with the assumption of careless reporting or even intentional subjectivity. Splitting the conflict parties into a binary pairing is admittedly not the original work of the writers. The notion is in fact ever present among the local populations, as nationalist forces have managed to establish their own myths. Yet by alluding to the mind-set through the quotation of hate speech from the Sumgait pogrom - “long live Jingsis Khan!” <sup>80</sup> -, *Die Zeit* reproduces caricatures of the ‘other’, which do not pertain to the actual causes of the conflict.

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<sup>76</sup> DIE ZEIT (12.11.1992): Nur Rußland ist Sieger.

<sup>77</sup> DIE ZEIT (20.03.1992): Selbst die ewige Flamme ist erloschen.

<sup>78</sup> DIE ZEIT (18.03.1988): Die schrecklichen Tage von Sumgait.

<sup>79</sup> DIE ZEIT (5.5.1989): Die Attacke der alten Garde.

<sup>80</sup> DIE ZEIT (18.3.1988): Die schrecklichen Tage von Sumgait.

### 3.3 Reporting in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (F.A.Z.)* is the central organ of the middle class elites, has the highest presence abroad, and possesses a network of foreign correspondents which still ranks among the largest in the world. Although its original orientation from the days of its founding towards entrepreneurs has remained intact over the decades, its readership has widened.

Today the paper is considered as a media of the educated classes. Indeed, a corporate brochure for the paper appeared in 2003 with the slogan “there’s always a clever head behind it”<sup>81</sup>. Further down is written:

“The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* is Germany’s *foremost opinion-shaping* newspaper. The *debates* it *sparks*, the assessments it makes, the information it offers - all this *has an effect long after the day of publication*. So long in fact, that after reading it *no questions remain unanswered*. [...] Why ‘Allgemeine’ [general]? It should be clear from the title alone: the *relationship between political, economic and cultural reporting maintains an equilibrium*. Why ‘Zeitung’ [newspaper]? It has no wish to be either a local or regional paper, much less a *tabloid or sensationalist piece*. And certainly not a partisan paper. Its intention is to write for a *demanding readership, one which prefers reporting that is all-encompassing and faithful to the truth*. In this regard, nothing has changed yet.” [emphasis by the author].

It was ultimately against these criteria that coverage of the Karabakh conflict was measured.

Analysis of the codes assigned for the category causes revealed the following results:




Fig. 23: Causes of the conflict according to FAZ

<sup>81</sup> Dahinter steckt immer ein kluger Kopf. Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung stellt sich vor, Frankfurt a.M. 2003, pp. 1, 3, 5, 13; cf. <http://www.lombard-media.lu/pdf/DE/FAZ-Imagebroschue.pdf> (retrieved 14.2.2015).



Causes of the conflict	Number of articles coded
general—historical	73 articles
Soviet period	309 articles
“struggle for independence”	372 articles
ethnic	151 articles
religious	61 articles

The code category *general-historical* encompasses all articles which treat events before the sovietisation, during the Soviet period, and over the course of the collapse of the USSR. The code category “*struggle for independence*” was applied as an “accompanying code” to relevant articles which were already assigned one or both of the “*ethnic*” and “*religious*” codes.

The ethnic factor is referred to explicitly as a cause of conflict in 151 articles. The following is an example of this type of depiction:

“Soviet State and Party chief Gorbachev has set a deadline of two days for the Soviet Republics Armenian and Azerbaijan, which have become hostile to one another due to ethnic clashes, to arrive at a solution to the railway blockade of Armenian which has lasted for a month.”<sup>82</sup>

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is mentioned especially frequently at the beginning of the 1990s in connection with other “ethnic clashes” occasioned by the fall of the Soviet Union. Conflicts in Georgia, Central Asia and the Baltic republics are general regarded as “ethnically-charged”:

“General Shatalin quoted numbers of units stationed by the Interior Ministry in various regions of the Soviet Union: 1.800 soldiers are stationed in Armenia, 3.600 in Azerbaijan—of them 2.600 in the capital Baku, 5.500 in Nagornij-Karabakh, 4.500 in Georgia and 2.300 in Uzbekistan. The general reported that in total around 300 people have been killed in ethnic clashes in the Soviet Union since 1988, with 5.600 wounded.”<sup>83</sup>

An example of the elision of “ethnic” with “national” can be seen in the following example, which by and large presents struggles against assimilation as “natural” and not “nationalistic”. This line of reasoning is then applied to the Karabakh Armenians, justifying their “taking up of arms” without checking the facts:

“[...] assimilation through planned migration—this is the single biggest danger for minority peoples, even when they make up entire nations such as the Estonians [...] To defend oneself against this is not nationalistic; it is natural. An ethno-cultural group which blithely acquiesces capitulates [...]. A national minority needs autonomy, at the very least wide-ranging self-government, above all in cultural affairs. The Armenians in the Azerbaijani region of Nagornyj Karabakh possessed both of these up to now only on paper [...]”.

<sup>82</sup> FAZ (26.09.1989): Gorbatschow will Eisenbahnblockade beenden.

<sup>83</sup> FAZ (25.10.1989): Schewardnadse: Normen verletzt.

The religious aspect of the main cause of the Karabakh conflict is very visible in numerous readers' letters. In these Christianity and Christian traditions are presented for the most part as being suppressed by the Muslim Azerbaijanis in Karabakh:

"The Armenian churches and monasteries in Nagornyj Karabakh, irreplaceable cultural monuments, many of them dating back to the fourth or fifth centuries, under Azerbaijani rule were abandoned to decay and wilful destruction. Over the course of the *bloody war waged by the Azerbaijani government against the Armenian minority seeking independence* they even became the object of targeted air strikes, as in the case of the famous Gandsassar Monastery. Nonetheless the numerically far superior 7.1 million Azerbaijanis, predominantly Shiite Muslims, have not managed to *break the Armenian will to survive or shake their religious convictions*" <sup>84</sup> [emphasis by the author].

"The Christian-Armenian population of Nagornyj Karabakh is in urgent need of help, otherwise they will die before our very eyes. Such help is all the more necessary because the territory is situated roughly two thousand kilometres away from Moscow, as a small *Christian* exclave within the *Islamic* world. It is therefore dependent on our support. With this request for help the chairman of the council of the Armenian Apostolic Church in Baden Württemberg, Grigor Minasian, appealed to the public in Stuttgart. The Armenian Minasian, who has been living in Germany for many years, has been in Armenia numerous times lately in order to hand out relief supplies gathered Swabia. Following his return from his most recent trip, Minasian has described the situation of the roughly 160,000 Christian Armenians in the autonomous territory of Nagornyj-Karabakh as indescribably bad [...]" <sup>85</sup> (Emphasis by the author)

At the same time, historical developments are presented in shortened, one-sided or simply unverified and untrue form. As a cause of the conflict, the undocumented "immigration of the Turkic tribes" ("the future Azerbaijanis") is left standing:

"The history in brief: starting in the 11th century, as nomadic Turkic tribes—the formation of the Azeri (Azerbaijani) nation came later—pushed their way into the steppes westwards of the Caspian Sea, they wiped out smaller, in part Christian, peoples living there, and forced the settled Armenians into the mountainous parts of their tribal homeland. Around 1500 even this area, the Old Armenian Artsakh, came under Muslim, to be precise Persian, suzerainty. Under their rule, the Turkish name Karabakh became established for this area as well. It was a political alliance of five Armenian principalities, which were free to control domestic affairs, and even possessed a national defence with which to protect the population from invading nomads. For centuries it was the only territory in which Armenian culture and Christianity were free to develop." <sup>86</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> FAZ (31.12.1994): Armenisches Christentum älteste Staatsreligion.

<sup>85</sup> FAZ (18.12.1990): Christen in Karabach brauchen Hilfe.

<sup>86</sup> FAZ (22.05.1989): Without Title.



A review of the actors in the conflict as identified by journalists at the *FAZ* gives the following findings:




Fig. 24: Actors according to FAZ

actors of the conflict	Number of articles
USSR	282 articles
Russian Federation	237 articles
Armenian SSR	169 articles
Republic of Armenia	572 articles
Azerbaijani SSR	157 articles
Republic of Azerbaijan	633 articles
Iran	96 articles
Turkey	173 articles
UN	25 articles
EU/USA Caucasus policy	219 articles
citizens' movements	183 articles
internal refugees/IDPs	19 articles
refugees/DPs	60 articles
national populations	101 articles
"Karabakh/Artsakh"	131 articles

The sub-code "*EU/USA Caucasus policy*" was used both for individual EU member states and for the EU itself as a single actor in its own right. The sub-code "*Karabakh/Artsakh*" (and several spelling variants) was applied to those cases where the formerly autonomous territory and present-day annexed territory of Azerbaijan claimed to act as a self-declared sovereign subject, and its self-description carried over into the article:

"According to figures provided by the government in Stepanakert, the number of foreign tourists who have visited the Republic of Artsakh in the last ten months of this year is approaching nine hundred. In actual fact significantly more foreigners may have used their stay in Armenia to visit the region which is also known as Nagorno-Karabakh. Although foreign visitors officially require a visa, many of them use the Armenian-occupied Latchin Corridor in order to enter Artsakh without a visa, a territory which belongs de jure to Azerbaijan, but which since the civil war of 1989 to 1991 is de facto independent. Tourism to this territory, still today marked by war, may have played a minor role until recently; however, the government wishes to change this. A possible means of achieving this may be the Nagornyj Karabakh Arts Festival, planned to take place for the first time this summer in Shushi. This city, with architecture typical for the region, set in a Romantically wild mountain landscape, is the second largest in Artsakh and the country's most important tourist centre. However, there is still a lack of hotels which would meet West European expectations. Up to now these have only existed in the country's capital Stepanakert. The government of Artsakh, a country which is at present only reachable overland, has announced its plans to set up a national airline in the coming year, and to establish regular air connections to Istanbul, Yerevan, Moscow and Cyprus."<sup>87</sup>

When Turkey is mentioned as an actor in the Karabakh conflict, the tendency is to present the land as trying without success to be a mediator in the conflict, in relation to which both the unwillingness of the Armenian side and the Azerbaijani expectations of the way its partner in alliance should behave are discussed:

"[...] And so during the meeting Turkey attempted to mediate between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the conflict in the province of Nagornij-Karabakh. Over breakfast the foreign minister Cem offered his Armenian counterpart Oskanian the possibility of regular talks, but Oskanian did not take him up on it. Additionally Georgian President Shevardnadze confidently asserted that after ten years of talks a solution for the renegade province of Abkhazia would finally be found."<sup>88</sup>

"[...] Armenia's neighbour in the East is Azerbaijan, in the West Turkey. In the last few weeks Turkey seemed ready to open the border with Armenia, at least for the transport of goods. The Copenhagen Criteria for accession to the European Union require of all candidates that they have good relations to all of their neighbours. By now Turkey has fulfilled this requirement, with the exception of Armenia. But Azerbaijan arranged a march starting from different points in Ankara, and Aliyev made a swift journey to Turkey and threatened the Turkish government that they should not jeopardise the planned commencement of services on 15th

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<sup>87</sup> FAZ (23.11.2000): Artsakh öffnet sich.

<sup>88</sup> FAZ (26.06.2002): Treffen in Istanbul. Schwarzmeeranrainer vereinbaren intensivere Zusammenarbeit.

August 2005 of the oil pipeline running from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan [...].”<sup>89</sup>

Moscow is not infrequently depicted as an opponent to Azerbaijani-Turkish economic cooperation, and as protective power of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, whereas ‘America’ is seen as supporting Azerbaijan:

“[...] The conflict also complicates relations to the West: Turkey is a member of NATO, Azerbaijan, which it supports, enjoys large American interest on account of its oil resources. The oil pipeline running from the Azerbaijani capital Baku via Tbilisi to Ceyhan, brought into operation last year, the construction of which was to a significant degree run by America, earns huge profits for Azerbaijan, money which has gone into multiplying its military spending, which this year amounted to 600 million dollars, or sixty percent of Armenia’s entire national budget. Meanwhile the Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev threatens to take back Nagornij Karabakh by force should no negotiated solution be reached.

This ties Armenia closer to Russia, whose support also contributed to the military victory of the Karabakh Armenians in the war during the nineties. Moscow still maintains deployments of troops in Armenia, and is transferring there a large portion of the military apparatus that it is currently obliged to withdraw from Georgia. At the same time, however, within Armenian society criticism is growing towards Russia, which since the 19th century has traditionally been seen as a protective overlord against Islamic neighbours. Grounds for criticism are above all Moscow’s obvious desire to use the economy to control Armenia politically as well. Already several years ago certain key firms in the Armenian economy fell into Russian hands [...].”<sup>90</sup>

“[...] In military terms, Armenia still has the upper hand with its support from Russia; economically, however, the country is increasingly falling behind Azerbaijan. Because of the conflict its borders both with Azerbaijan and with the latter’s ally, Turkey, are closed, and thus the largest potential trade routes remain blocked. The new pipeline has dramatically accentuated this economic imbalance, which will have a bearing on the balance of military power. Moreover, Armenia cannot rely entirely on Moscow’s support. It is dependent on the latter’s goodwill, since Russian concerns control Armenia’s entire energy supply, and the Kremlin is trying to do business again with those in power in Azerbaijan, ever since they have started fearing a Western-backed democratic revolution—a new parliament is to be voted on 6th November there [...].”<sup>91</sup>

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89 FAZ (12.05.2004): Bogen der Instabilität. Seit zehn Jahren herrscht Waffenstillstand in Nagornyj Karabach.

90 FAZ (11.04.2006): Armenische Abhängigkeiten. Wie Eriwan und Moskau ihren Gasstreit beigelegt haben.

91 FAZ (24.09.2005): Eine Pipeline und die Quadratur des Kreises. Bewegung im Konflikt zwischen Armenien und Aserbaidschan.

### Code: *Language/style*

Particular care was required when attending to the code *language/style*, in order not to muddy the boundary between objectivity and subjectivity. Only once (06.11.1989) did an article exhibit an extreme example of one-sided figurative language.




Fig. 25: Stylistic elements in the language of *FAZ*

Code	Number of articles
replication of known terms	407 articles
comparisons	150 articles
stereotypes	54 articles
caricatures of the enemy	36 articles
one-sided figurative language	173 articles
caricaturing	42 articles

The code *comparison* was used for those articles where it was attempted to compare with Judeo-Israeli history, and terms such as Exodus and Holocaust are used in connection with the “fate” of the Armenians.

The codes *stereotypes* and *one-sided figurative language* were used for sections where the reality is simplified or presented in black-and-white terms. Here follows an example of an article in which Turkish-Azerbaijani brotherhood is brought to the fore, and used to draw conclusions about Turkish/Azerbaijani-Armenian enmity:

“Something is afoot behind the scenes. The Turkish media are cautiously introducing the public to the idea of rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. In “secret meetings” the two foreign ministers, Gül and Oskanyan,

are said to have agreed upon an equally “secret package” detailing ten steps to building trust, the Turkish daily paper ‘Milliyet’ revealed...Gül is emphatic that Turkey bears no hostility towards Armenia. Furthermore flight connections have been established from Istanbul and Antalya to Yerevan, 40,000 citizens of the Republic of Armenia work in Turkey, and Turkey wishes to make its contribution to solving Armenia’s economic crisis. In spite of this the border remains closed between these two neighbours. Diplomatic relations have still to be resumed, even though Turkey was one of the first states to recognise the independence of the newly-created Republic of Armenia in 1991.

An issue close to the hearts of the Armenians is the protection of their ancient churches and monasteries in Anatolia. These are the last remains of a great culture. Very few Armenian Christians still live in Eastern Anatolia. Their fathers and mothers established a high culture there, and repeatedly founded short-lived kingdoms. In 1914 the Armenian Patriarchy in Istanbul counted 210 monasteries, more than 700 monastic churches and 1639 lay churches in Anatolia. Most of them no longer exist. Archaeologists and historians from around the world have repeatedly state that Turkey is doing nothing to save these monuments, such as the Church of the Holy Cross on the island of Aghtamar. They are making no move to prevent disappearance of the last visible traces of Armenian presence on the territory of present-day Turkey.

Before anything can take place, Turkey expects certain gestures from Armenia, says Gül, without stating them in concrete terms. The newspaper “Milliyet” claims to know that the gestures relate to four points that Armenia must fulfil before the agreement can be signed on the trust-building measures: Armenia is supposed to remove references in its constitution to territorial demands from Turkey, to recognise the border as agreed between Turkey and the Soviet Union in the Treaty of Kars of 1921, no longer to push the accusation of genocide as a foreign policy priority, and to withdraw from the occupied territories in Azerbaijan.

The most difficult demand is the withdrawal from the occupied Azerbaijani territories, which is to say from Nagornij Karabakh and the buffer zone surrounding this mountainous region. *In 1990 Azeris attacked villages in Armenia from within the enclave of Nakhchivan. From 1992 onwards Azerbaijani units overran Nagornij Karabakh and massacred the Armenian population living there. Yet within two years militarily disadvantaged Armenian militias expelled the heavily-armed Azerbaijani bands. Ever since Azerbaijan has mourned the loss of Karabakh in a war that they themselves instigated; only under Stalin was the territory allocated to Azerbaijan.* (Emphasis of distorted facts added by the author).

Yet Azerbaijan possess a lot of oil and, unlike Armenia, is today rich. The country does not wish to engage in a war to regain Nagornij Karabakh, so as not to scare away foreign investors and jeopardise its still nascent prosperity. So Baku resorts to political pressure, and Turkey is its lever. Out of sympathy for the Azerbaijanis, its brother people, Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993. Since then the country’s only open borders are with Georgia and Iran. When, one year ago, Erdogan’s government was on the verge of opening the border, the Azerbaijani

president Aliyev hastily travelled to Ankara. He threatened that Turkey should not frivolously endanger the commencement of operations of the oil pipeline from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port Ceyhan, planned for August 2005. Azerbaijan expects of Turkey that they only normalize their relations to Armenia at such point as Nagornij Karabakh is returned to the territory of Azerbaijan, and Turkey is a willing hostage to Aliyev's regime. At the start of the year foreign minister Gül assured the foreign minister in Baku that he should not ought to have no cause for worry about the border being opened as long as Azerbaijani territory is under occupation. This was repeated on 30th March by the Turkish commander of the navy on a visit to Baku.

The other prerequisites for the beginning of normalization with Armenia are less controversial. Admittedly the Armenian government that came to power in 1998 gave increased priority to the recognition of the genocide by Turkey. Yet such recognition was never a requirement for the resumption of diplomatic relations – even though powerful parties in Armenia, such as the nationalistic Dashnaksutiun, would wish it were so. Moreover, the Armenian foreign minister Oskanyan has repeatedly emphasised that, as a successor state to the Soviet Union, Armenia is subject to the Treaty of Kars, which in 1921 defined the border between Armenia and Turkey. Hitherto no Armenian politician had ever called the treaty into question, says Oskanyan.

By contrast, the discussion over Armenia's possible territorial claims from Turkey is much more heated. Ilter Türkmen, opposition MP in the CHP party and architect of Turkish policy concerning Armenia and the genocide debate, cannot imagine little Armenia being able to make demands of territorial reassignment and reparation payments from Turkey. According to Türkmen, all initiatives in this direction are doomed to failure due to the fact that there are no courts to which such appeals could be made. Many Turkish Armenians in Istanbul regret that significant diaspora circles, particularly among the Dashnaksutiun, are hindering a coming to terms with Turkey over the genocide through their unwillingness to drop demands territorial and financial compensation. Up until 1945, the massacre of Armenians had been openly discussed in Turkey in terms of a "crime against the Armenians". On 21st March 1945 Stalin demanded the relinquishment of the Eastern Anatolian provinces of Kars and Ardahan, justifying these territorial claims as compensation for the massacre of Armenians in 1915. From then on Turkish assessments of the events of 1915 shifted, and the country was hastily ushered in as a founding member of NATO.

The Turkish social scientist Hikmet Özdemir has recently published a British map from the First World War. It purports or show that London had foreseen two Armenian states on the territory of modern-day Turkey, around Van and in Cilicia. The orthodox Turkish line is summarised by the Turkish general staff on its website. There the generals accuse the Armenians of following a plan, which they refer to in Turkish as "the four T's". Three of these are particularly painful: recognition of the genocide (tanimak), reparation payments (tazminat) and territorial claims (toprak)."<sup>92</sup>

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92 FAZ (25.05.2005): Schwierige Annäherung. Die Türkei und Armenien bewegen sich 90 Jahre nach dem Genozid nur langsam aufeinander zu.



An article from 06.11.1989 is another striking example for the code *one-sided figurative language*:

“More than one thousand people in Yerevan have participated in the foundational conference for an “Armenian National Movement”. The movement sees itself as an umbrella organization for ten different groups following the example of the people’s fronts in the Baltic Soviet republics: separation from the Soviet Union is not what is sought after, but rather Union-wide laws should only come into force in Armenia after being accepted by the Supreme Soviet in Yerevan. The initiative was launched by the Karabakh committee. Party chief of Armenia, Arutyunyan, gave a welcoming address.

One of the aims of the new movement appears to be the separation of Nagornyj-Karabakh from Azerbaijan and its joining onto Armenia. Further news from Bonn stated that the blockade, which Azerbaijan has imposed on Armenia since 3rd July, is continuing. The situation is becoming critical. People are suffering from hunger, are without provisions, and their state of need is forcing them to attack. Armenians are fleeing Azerbaijan in large numbers. Hence thousands of the erstwhile 500,000 have left the Azerbaijani capital Baku. Armenian congregations in Germany are presently collecting signatures to be submitted to the United Nations. It is stated therein that “a crisis has come to a head in the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh and the neighbouring provinces which threatens to ignite civil war and mass murder.” The document contains demands for a national referendum in Nagornyj-Karabakh, guaranteed safety for the Armenians living there, and for the adopting of “measures against anti-Armenian pogroms.”<sup>93</sup>

### **Code: *Evaluation***

The *evaluation* code was used in order to draw inferences on the basis of the usage of specific terms in regards to the evaluation of the conflict.

Although in the eyes of international law, the right to national self-determination (the Armenian position) and the territorial integrity of a state and the inviolability of its international borders (the Azerbaijani position) stand on an equal footing, in practice the principle of a state’s territorial integrity is generally valued higher. All the official documents of the United Nations concerning the Karabakh conflict adhere to this tenet, which expressly confirms the inviolability of the state borders of Azerbaijan (cf. Resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884, and the appendix of the concluding document of the OSCE summit meeting in Lisbon in 1996).

Since even Western literature interprets the principles of *territorial integrity* and *right to self-determination* in consistently contradictory ways, it is interesting for us to consider the degree to which the German media follow international assessments (the Azerbaijani position and that of international organizations) or the national(ist) conceptions (Karabakh Armenians, leadership of the Republic of Armenia, segments of the Armenian diaspora, above all in the USA and France).

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<sup>93</sup> FAZ (06.11.1989): National-Bewegung gegründet.



The code *aggression* was used for the use of violence of various sorts, both in the context of violent action between people (assault), and the violation of human rights as formulated in international law (“acts of aggression” against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of a state according to § 8 (2) of the Roman Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17th July 1998 including the revisions of 10th/11th June 2010 <sup>94</sup>). The potential for comparison of the findings needs to be qualified due to the fact that the other groups only pay attention to the state of affairs under international law. The comparatively high number of instances of the conflict being evaluated as *aggression* can be explained first and foremost by the large number of violent crimes.




Fig. 26: Journalistic evaluation in the *F.A.Z.*

Evaluation code	Number of articles
Civil war	34 articles
Aggression	152 articles
Occupation	104 articles
Genocide	34 articles
Territorial integrity	118 articles
Right to self-determination	89 articles

The results clearly show that **territorial integrity is more highly valued than the right to self-determination**. It is above all apparent that this refers to the occupation of foreign territories. At the same time the high degree of violence in the conflict is continuously reflected upon. This can be seen in those articles categorized under the terms aggression, genocide.

<sup>94</sup> cf. [www.icc-cpi.int](http://www.icc-cpi.int)

### Code: *Interests*

Similarly to the *political* sub-code and the *event* code, *political interests* (attendant upon the outbreak and continuation of the conflict) top the list with 530 articles. *Territorial interests* of the respective conflict parties could be identified in 517 articles.

What was problematic in this code was the division of sub-categories, in particular *political-territorial* and *military-geopolitical*. It is striking that along with the geopolitical aspects of the conflict, cultural interests take up the last place in the list. By contrast, the pressure to assimilate and the violation of cultural autonomy were originally the main arguments of the separatists.

interests in the conflict	Number of articles
political	530 articles
peace policy related	318 articles
socio-economic	168 articles
geopolitical	89 articles
cultural	114 articles
territorial	517 articles
military	181 articles

### Code: *Solutions/negotiations*

Before the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the central government was the highest authority for conflict regulation in the entire Soviet Union. Consistent with the strictly hierarchical structure of both party and state, Moscow was expected to intervene and offer a solution to the conflict. Simultaneously, the Karabakh conflict very quickly became a yardstick for the reformist policies of Gorbachev. NGOs and representatives of civil movements only very slowly came to international attention as potential negotiators for a peaceful solution, and nothing changed in this regard over the entire time period under investigation.

Code: Solutions	Number of articles
USSR (in part Russian Federation)	171 articles
Minsk Group	34 articles
EU/Council of Europe/US government/ CSCE	157 articles
UN	18 articles
CIS	46 articles
bilateral negotiations	96 articles
NGOs/international organizations	2 articles

When at the beginning of the 1990s the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict transitioned from a civil war to an international conflict between two states, the position of mediator was left to the

Russian Federation. At the same time other international negotiators came on the scene. The code for *EU/Council of Europe/ US government/CSCCE* also contains certain individual EU member states, which at the same time are coded under *bilateral negotiations*. In this regard it is striking that only 46 articles treated the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the overall structure of the CIS.

## Summary

Although the *FAZ* published a solid number of articles on the theme of the Karabakh conflict over the period of investigation (1988-2008), a significant decrease is noticeable from 1995 onwards. There were only 9 mentions for the whole of 2002, which can be interpreted as a clear sign of decreased interest in the by now “frozen” conflict. Only isolated skirmishes on the frontline or consultations between presidents merited a report, while the emphasis increasingly came to be placed on developments with Armenia and Azerbaijan, which may have occasioned passing mention of the Karabakh conflict.

Most pieces were written as news articles and date from the period 1988 to 1994, whereas the majority of reportages are found in the period from 2001 onwards. This means that the correspondents before 2001 only seldom reported personally from the conflict zone. Instead Soviet and later Russian sources were overwhelmingly cited. The quality of the reports and news articles for the beginning and escalation phases of the Karabakh conflict can at the very least be doubted with regards to objectivity, on account of their overwhelming use of Moscow “informants”. The style of coverage suggested to the contemporary reader that the conflict centred on the “legitimate right to secession of Armenians under cultural, religious and political suppression by Azerbaijan”, and that the “re(?)-establishment of the rule of law in this territory” was at stake, which had been violated by Stalin and the Bolsheviks working in league with the Turks and Azerbaijanis. Such a depiction was completely consistent with then current Armenian and Russian modes of propaganda, meaning the *FAZ* had departed quite a ways from its own credo of “*comprehensive and true to fact reporting*” (*FAZ* statute).

Although initially the conflict was treated as just one part of the unrest affecting the whole Soviet Union, the situation improved once German correspondents began conducting research in the region itself. There are definitely legitimate attempts in this vein to illuminate the conflict from the perspectives of both parties concerned. However, the number of “attempts at balance” is small: only 20 reportages in the entire period of investigation give space for both conflict parties. Under the interviews heading (4 with Armenian and 3 with Azerbaijani representatives) the attempt was also made to maintain parity. More extensive pieces and book reviews at the very least make an attempt at plurality. Thus the *FAZ* distinguishes itself from *Die Zeit* and *Der Spiegel*, at least for the period after 1992. The picture once again becomes murkier after 2003 and 2005. The election of Ilham Aliyev as new president of Azerbaijan and the economic improvements in the country make internal developments interesting, and such themes as “democratic deficits” and “human rights” push the actual topic of Karabakh to the margins. Azerbaijan becomes the single “evil actor” in the unresolved conflict, while Armenia is portrayed as poor and burdened by suffering, and its role in the conflict is overlooked. Very seldom is an article to be found in the entire time period in which Armenia’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is described, and any responsibility is accorded to the country for whether or not a solution is reached.

### 3.4 Coverage in Neues Deutschland

In what follows, a choice of four exemplary investigative parameters will be contextualized and subjected to a media analysis.

The parameters chosen within this framework for each of the newspaper media are, firstly, the situation of the cause of the Karabakh conflict and, secondly, the assessment of the confrontation and the course of the conflict. The third point illustrated by in the present analysis is the means used and the nature of the depiction of the actors in the conflict. The fourth and final criterion of analysis consists of the linguistic and stylistic structure of the reporting. The investigative parameters can only be described by way of a few examples in the present study. The results herein presented are thus to be viewed as provisional pending a comprehensive interpretation of the historical sources.

#### **“From past decades” – The causes of the Karabakh conflict in the newspaper NEU ES DEU TSCHI AND**

In contrast to the media hitherto investigated, during the period of investigation, the newspaper *Neues Deutschland* (ND) underwent a series of fundamental changes. In the period from 1988 to the end of the GDR, its contents trod the narrow path laid by the politburos of Berlin or Moscow. This is not only clear to see in the identification of the causes of the conflict, a glance at the language used to develop the theme reveals how thoroughly saturated daily news reporting was with the linguistic modes of state socialism.

By way of cause of the conflict, a few articles at the start of the period of investigation identify very generally defined historical factors. Hence on 7th February 1990 ND printed, under the title “The fate of perestroika is at stake” excerpts from a speech given by General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev, in which he dismissed the historical dimensions of the conflict between Armenian and Azerbaijan as being relatively insignificant, and situated some general causes in an undefined past: “it is hardly worth our while today to lay out the entire prehistory of the conflict, whose roots lie deep in the past.”<sup>95</sup> The printing of political speeches given by state authorities occupied a fairly significant portion of the coverage in ND in the years up to 1990, whereas after the peaceful revolution of 1989 this form of reporting was barely to be seen if it all. Along with the frequent references made to Soviet newspapers (especially *Pravda*), this practice is typical of the period before 1990, in which the newspaper represented a mouthpiece of state controlled media policy.

Another example of relatively unclear references to the past can be seen in an article from 21st March 1988:

“During the meeting it was openly discussed that there are difficulties in developing relations between the nationalities that originate in the past. There are also problems which arise over the course of time.”<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> ND (07.02.1990): Es geht um das Schicksal der Perestroika, p. 3.

<sup>96</sup> ND (21.03.1988): Treffen im ZK der KPdSU mit Persönlichkeiten aserbaidshanischer und armenischer Nationalität, p. 5.

Along with an ascription to the causes of the conflict to an undefined past, and once again an unfiltered reproduction of the official state narrative, the readers of the paper on 21.07.1988 could read the following under the headline “*Gorbachev on the problems surrounding Nagorny Karabakh*”:

“General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, has assessed the events in Nagorny Karabakh as a nationwide problem whose origins go back to decades past.”<sup>97</sup>

By situating the causes of the conflict in an imagined past, the official state coverage had the option to avoid attributing blame to political errors of judgement in the recent past. A tentative first step towards criticism, however, can be seen in the article “*USSR speakers on the situation in Azerbaijan and Armenia*” from 30.03.1988, as it explains the causes of the Karabakh conflict in the fact “[...] that they are rooted in errors that were committed over many years of nationality policy.”<sup>98</sup>

A more specific analysis of the causes for the confrontation can be found in a quotation taken from an issue of *Pravda* from 22.03.1988. In this a whole series of causes are presented: a religious dimension of the conflict, along with “differences between the leading organs of Armenia and Azerbaijan”, which brought “the seeds of national egoism” into being.<sup>99</sup> At the same time, no ethnic-related narratives for the causes of the violent confrontations had yet appeared up to this point. Generally speaking, only a single clear attribution of cause to ethnicity can be found in *ND* for the entire period of investigation. This is in a report from 29.01.1990, in which it is stated that “as Shevardnadze went on to say, the conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis is based not in problems of religion or world view, but in ethnic ones.”<sup>100</sup>

At the same time, the previously mentioned article in *Pravda* from March 1988 clearly illustrates the position adopted by the state press in relation to the question of territorial integrity versus the right to self-determination:

“The national territory of Nagorny Karabakh has for decades been tied to the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan by a thousand bonds, the article in ‘Pravda’ goes on to say. To sever these bonds would not only have negative effects on the socio-economic situation in Nagorny Karabakh and Azerbaijan, but in across the entire country as well.”<sup>101</sup>

Accordingly *ND* tended to favour the position declared from Moscow, according to which greater importance<sup>102</sup> was accorded to territorial integrity than to national self-determination. At the same time, this article presents a generally negative assessment of the Armenian activists in Karabakh.

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97 *ND* (27.07.1988): Gorbatschow zu Problemen um Nagorny Karabach, p. 5.

98 *ND* (30.03.1988): UdSSR-Sprecher zur Lage in Aserbaidschan und Armenien, p. 5.

99 *ND* (22.03.1988): *Pravda* über die Ereignisse in und um Nagorny Karabach, p.5.

100 *ND* (29.01.1990): Lage im Transkaukasus weiter normalisiert, p. 5.

101 *ND* (22.03.1988): *Pravda* über die Ereignisse in und um Nagorny Karabach, p.5.

102 *ND* (22.03.1988): *ibid.*

Quite in keeping with the socialist linguistic mode, *ND* reproduces statements from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union without any further comment, and writes in the same article:

“The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has brought it to the attention of the party and state leadership of Azerbaijan and Armenia more than once in the past few years that there are serious shortcomings in the formation of class-conscious attitudes among the workers towards phenomena in society, as well as in education in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism.”

Alongside such ideologically loaded narratives, several articles also mention the social and economic situation of Nagorno-Karabakh as a further cause for the violent confrontation:

An article from 22.03.1988, for example, cites as causes for the conflict the “shortcomings in the socio-economic development of the Autonomous Territory of Nagorny Karabakh as well as the violation of national and political rights.”<sup>103</sup>

In addition to the articles providing commentaries of the conflict, at the end of the 1980s *ND* also provides event-oriented reporting, for example of the violent clashes in Sumgait in February 1988<sup>104</sup> or the strikes in the Autonomous Territory of Nagorno-Karabakh in May 1989<sup>105</sup>, while no mention is made of the attacks against Azerbaijanis in Armenia.

Across the entire time-span of the investigation, the most conflict origin is most frequently identified in general historical terms; 13 times altogether in the pages of *ND*. In the years 1988-1995 eight historical references are made to the Soviet period; for example, in order to blame the conflict situation on political errors of judgement.<sup>106</sup> Furthermore the editors of *ND* only ones cited ethnicity as an argument<sup>107</sup>, and only twice religiously motivated causes<sup>108</sup>. All of the articles coded under “*causes*” for the purpose of the investigation, in which a clear statement is made on this subject, appeared in the years 1988-1999. Later articles from the period 2000-2008 generally pay less attention to the question of conflict causes.

### ***Evaluation* – territorial integrity or right to self-determination?**

The *evaluation* category of the analysis had the task of assessing the newspapers for particularly judgemental formulations in the reporting. A preliminary choice of seven terms was arrived at, which were judged to be particularly judgemental and scarcely neutral with regard to Karabakh. As well as *aggression*, *occupation* and *civil war*, these include the

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<sup>103</sup> *ND* (22.03.1988): *ibid.*

<sup>104</sup> *ND* (22.03.1988) Staatsanwaltschaft der UdSSR berief Sonderkommission zur Untersuchung der Verbrechen in Sumgait.

<sup>105</sup> *ND* (16.05.1989): In Nagorny Karabach weiteten sich die Streiks aus, p. 14.

<sup>106</sup> *ND* (21.07.1988): Gorbatschow zu Problemen um Nagorny Karabach, p. 5.

<sup>107</sup> *ND* (29.01.1990): Lage in Transkaukasus weiter normalisiert, p. 5.

<sup>108</sup> *ND* (30.10.1999): Tiefe Gräben, p. 8; as well as *ND* (22.03.1988): Prawda über die Ereignisse in und um Nagorny Karabach, p. 5.



use of terms *genocide*. A consideration of the paired terms *right to self-determination* and *territorial integrity* is particularly pertinent for the Karabakh conflict.

The term *aggression* is a regularly appearing term in *ND*, mentioned in 14 separate contexts, but mostly quoted from different actors in the conflict. A characteristic instance is to be found in the article of 27.12.1994 which bears the title: *Hürden für KSZE-Truppen in Nagorny Karabach* [Hurdles facing CSCE troops in Nagorny Karabakh]:

“Azerbaijan’s President Gaidar Aliyev claimed that more and more members of Armenia’s regular army are fighting on the opposing side, and accused the neighbouring country of aggression.” <sup>109</sup>

A general tendency emerges, whereby the term *aggression* appears principally in passages characterizing the actions of the Armenian side, or as part of quotations reproduced by *ND*. Based on the use of the term *aggression* in coverage concerning Armenia, one may conclude that *ND* ascribed a position of greater dominance and aggression to the Armenian actors in the conflict.

Results of content analysis for the term *occupation* showed that out of a total of 20 instances from 1988 to 1998, in only a single case was ‘Azerbaijani occupation’ spoken of:

“According to a communication by the press office of the parliament of Nagorny-Karabakh on Sunday to ITAR-TASS, the Azerbaijanis have occupied and ‘incinerated’ 15 Armenian settlements.” <sup>110</sup>

All remaining instances of the terms *occupation* and “occupy” in *ND* pertain to the Armenian offensive of 1994. The argument is relatively frequently made in connection with this event that 20 percent of the territory of Azerbaijan outside of the Nagorno-Karabakh region is under occupation. A characteristic instance of the usage of the term in this context can be seen in a paragraph from a reportage on the topic in 1996:

“Nagorny Karabakh is occupied by Karabakh Armenians, the Azerbaijani populace has been driven out, around one fifth of the state territory of Azerbaijan is under occupation. Hundreds of thousands have fled, leaving behind houses and lands as well as their own history on the fought-over territory.” <sup>111</sup>

The first mention of the term is dated to May 1992, when the European Community criticized the “*aggressive operations*” and “*continued occupation*” by the Armenian side. <sup>112</sup>

Interestingly, *genocide* and related terms appear very seldom in *ND* with regard to the theme; only three times, to be precise, with the connection made explicitly to the conflict. A further mention appears within the context of the genocide against the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 20th century. This is joined by two instances of the term “*ethnic cleansing*”. One of these is in an article which refers to the ethnic cleansing

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109 *ND* (27.12.1994): *Hürden für KSZE-Truppen in Nagorny Karabach*, p. 7.

110 *ND* (15.06.1992): *Großoffensive Bakus in Nagorny Karabakh*, p. 1.

111 *ND* (28.12.1996): *Ehre für Fizuli. Ein Dichter wird zur identitätsstiftenden Symbolfigur*, p. 15.

112 *ND* (20.05.1992): *Türkei warnt Armenien vor Expansionspolitik*, p. 4.



against the Armenian population in Azerbaijan<sup>113</sup>, while a further contribution opens a discussion of Armenian complicity in crimes against humanity:

“Azerbaijan accuses the Armenians of having practised a policy of ethnic cleansing during the war, which according to the norms of international law ought to be counted as a crime against humanity.”<sup>114</sup>

The term *civil war* appears as a keyword in the study, as its usage is especially indicative of the characterisation of the conflict. The term *civil war* appears a total of 13 times only in *ND*. Interestingly, a cluster of usages of the term appeared in 1990, such that 8 of the 13 instances are from that year alone.

All of the remaining uses of the term came in the years 1992-1994. The concentration of the term at the beginning of the 1990s can be explained by the fact that at that point of time the confrontation in Nagorno-Karabakh was perceived in German print media first and foremost as a domestic conflict over a region belonging to Azerbaijan seeking autonomy. This understanding was consistent with international law; however, the role of the Republic of Armenia as a party in the conflict was paid little heed. This can clearly be seen in the front-page article in *ND* of 17.01.1990, among others:

“In spite of a state of emergency being declared on Monday, the violent clashes between Azerbaijanis and Armenians now threaten to spill over into a civil war in the autonomous region of Nagorny Karabakh.”<sup>115</sup>

The question of right to national self-determination in relation to the territorial integrity of states is particularly relevant to the Nagorno-Karabakh region. As for *ND*, use of the term territorial integrity is clearly dominant, with 20 instances. By contrast *right to self-determination* was only to be found 12 times in the time period of investigation. Alongside *territorial integrity*, closely-related formulations, such as “*territorial inviolability*” and “*territorial unity*”, were also included for the purposes of analysis.

Given this unevenness in the coverage of the conflict, the question arises as to what conclusions and results may be taken from this.

The ambivalent symbiosis of intertwining interests that link actors in politics and the media, along with the readership and general public on the receiving end, is too complex to allow this result to be attributed to a single cause. Along with a thorough investigation of the reporting, the matter of the external parameters which play a decisive role in shaping the contents and structure of the print media is of further interest. Hence should not seek a mono-causal explanation for greater frequency of the term *territorial integrity* vis-à-vis the less frequent use of *right to self-determination* in an automatic equation of these facts with a political tendency in the reporting. One must also bear in mind that a paper such as *ND* is faced with the task of reflecting the voices current from a day to day basis of the actors in the conflict. In this regard the visibility of these political actors to the media and their

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113 *ND* (12.07.1993): Ungleiches Gespann im Bündnis auf Zeit, p. 7.

114 *ND* (20.09.2008): Berg-Karabach- Aserbaidischans offene Wunde, p. 25.

115 *ND* (17.01.1990): Im Kaukasus droht nun ein Bürgerkrieg um Karabakh, p. 1.




Fig. 27: Journalistic evaluation in *ND*

activities determine how often they are cited in the media. On the other hand, one must not forget that German media landscape is structured in a pluralistic manner. The political affiliation of newspapers has a not insignificant bearing on the emphasis and depiction of political events. Without wishing to oversimplify the matter, after 1990 *ND* can be regarded as a newspaper offering a forum for left-wing debates and themes, as well as outlining the foreign policy priorities of the PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism] in the Bundestag. The presence of political influence on the coverage of the Karabakh conflict in *ND* can therefore not be ruled out. That said, insofar as the paper gave more space to the *territorial integrity* of Azerbaijan than to the *right to self-determination*, this not only reflects an adherence to the traditional line of Soviet nationalities' policy, but also the fact that the paper was guided, more so than any of the other media analysed, by relevant resolutions of the UN, as well as European policy in the Caucasus.

## Actors

The *actors* category of analysis was particularly important for the present investigation into media perceptions in German daily newspapers and magazines, as the representation of the conflict hinges on the presentation of the interplay of power between actors. Given the twenty year time-span of the investigation, a period in which the state structures of the region were fundamentally altered by the breakup of the USSR and the independence of former Soviet Republics, it was deemed sensible to maintain a variety of different *actor* categories. These can roughly be divided into state actors in the region, on the one hand, and intra-state and international actors on the other. The regional state participants in the conflict comprised the Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia and their socialist equivalents before the breakup of the Soviet Union. The "*international*" category is composed of the Russian Federation and the USSR, Iran, Turkey, European/American policy in the Caucasus and the UN. For the purposes of this project, intra-state categories are defined as comprising

citizens' initiatives, *refugees and displaced persons*, along with internal refugees including any representative bodies (NGOs) which may exist. This latter category for analysis was also used to group together all simplistic references to national populations ("*the Armenians*" or "*the Azerbaijanis*"), as well as all actors claiming to represent the region "*Karabakh*".




Fig. 28: Actors according to *ND*

State and institutional actors are overrepresented by the reporting in *ND* compared to citizens' movements, refugees and *displaced persons* and the national populations, which were also involved. This may be blamed, among other things, on the fact that *ND* is a medium which offers its readership political reporting first and foremost, and has in mind state actors in the events of the conflict above all. Although refugee movements are consistently mentioned (refugees and *displaced persons* on 69 occasions, internal refugees on 3 occasions), they tend to be marginalized in comparison to state participants in the events of the conflict. The same is true for the category of actors comprising "citizens" seeking conflict solutions "from below". As with the other media under investigation, they receive no attention.

In keeping with its strongly text-based nature, the presentation of conflict actors by *ND* principally takes the form of descriptions of the political constellations and events. Nonetheless, a total of 45 articles on the Karabakh conflict contain accompanying photographs. These war photographs allow the reader to form an impression of the course of the conflict from the comfort and peace of the country of publication of *ND*. Many of these photographs seek to depict the human tragedy of war, and therefore take the form of portraits of people. The job of the photograph, as mentioned in the quantitative section of the analysis, is to counteract the emotional distance between the events of war and the viewer of the photograph.

The same cannot be said of the cartographical depictions, whose task it is to situate the conflict for the reader in its regional context, and to inform him or her of the current contours of the political borders. It is interesting to note that the use of geographical depictions and photographs, which were tagged under *accompanying images*, is relatively equally

balanced. This unusually high presence of cartographical representations can probably be explained by the sketchy geographical awareness of the Caucasus region among the majority of readers.

**NAGORNY KARABACH** (Berg-Karabach): 4000 km<sup>2</sup> groß, vor Ausbruch der Kämpfe von 180 000 Menschen bewohnt (80 % Armenier, 18 % Aserbaidshaner).

Aserbaidshan betrachtet das einstige „Khanum Karabach“ als Wiege aserbaidshanisch-moslemischer Staatlichkeit. Armenien sieht mittel- und kleinasiatische Turkstämme erst im 18. Jahrhundert in den gebirgigen Teil des Gebietes eindringen. 1813 schließt es sich „für alle Zeiten“ Rußland an.

1918-1923: Nach unterschiedlichen Beschlüssen (u.a. einer „feierlichen Abtretung“ an Armenien) wird Nagorny Karabach ein autonomes Gebiet innerhalb Aserbaidshans.

1988: Im Februar fordern Demonstranten in Jerewan und

1990: Verhängung des Ausnahmezustands (15. Januar)

1991: Unabhängigkeitserklärung der „Armenischen Republik Nagorny Karabach“ (2. September). Baku erklärt die Proklamation für ungültig und hebt die Autonomie auf.

1992/93: Die Truppen der GUS ziehen aus dem Gebiet ab. Offensiven der einen folgen Gegenoffensiven der anderen Seite. Im Ergebnis erobern armenische Karabach-Verbände weite Gebiete auch außerhalb Nagorny Karabachs (Kelbadshar, Agdam, Tschebrazil, Fisuli u. a.) und stoßen bis zur iranischen Grenze vor.

Zum Teil gemeinsame Vermittlungen Rußlands, Kasachstans, Irans, der Türkei, von UNO und KSZE führen zwar wiederholt zu Waffenstillstandsabkommen, die jedoch nie eingehalten wurden.

Stepanakert den Anschluß an Armenien. Ein „Krieg der Steine“ wird zum bürgerkriegsähnlichen Konflikt. Armenier fliehen nach Pogromen aus Aserbaidshan, Aserbaidshaner aus Armenien. Im Juli beschließt der Gebietssowjet von Nagorny Karabach den Austritt aus Aserbaidshan und die Bildung eines „Autonomen Gebietes von Artsach“, das zu Armenien gehört. Jerewan setzt sich für den Anschluß ein, Baku und Moskau lehnen ihn ab.

1989: Errichtung einer „Sonderverwaltung“ durch Moskau (12. Januar)

NAGORNO-KARABAKH: 4,000 km<sup>2</sup> in size, 180,000 inhabitants before the start of the conflict (80 percent Armenian, 18 percent Azerbaijani).

Azerbaijan considers the former “Khanate of Karabakh” to be the cradle of Azerbaijani-Muslim statehood. Armenia witnessed the incursion of Turkic tribes from the Near East and Asia Minor into the mountainous part of the region no earlier than the 18th century. In 1813 it was annexed by Russia “for all time”.

1918-1923: following various resolutions (including among others “peaceful transfer” to Armenia), Nagorno-Karabakh was made an autonomous territory inside of Azerbaijan.

1988: in February demonstrators in Yerevan and Stepanakert demand transition to Armenia. A “war of stones” develops into a conflict resembling a civil war. Armenians flee Azerbaijan following pogroms, Azerbaijanis flee Armenia. In July the territorial Soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh passes a resolution to leave Azerbaijan and form an “autonomous territory of Artsakh”, which is to belong to Armenia. Yerevan agrees to the annexation, Baku and Moscow refuse.

1989: establishment of a “special administration” via Moscow (12th January).

1990: State of emergency declared (15th January).

1991: Declaration of independence of the “Armenian Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh” (2nd September). Baku declares the proclamation invalid and overrules the autonomy.

1992/93: CIS troops withdraw from the territory. A series of offensives and counteroffensives by both sides. As a result Armenian Karabakh bands invade large swathes of territory even outside of Nagorno-Karabakh (Kelbadshar, Agdam, Cherabjil, Fizuli among others), and push up against the Iranian border.

Although ceasefires are reached through the semi-concerted negotiation of Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, Turkey, the UN and CSCE, they never last.

Fig. 29: “Ein weiterer Vermittlungsversuch ist gescheitert” (K.-J. Herrmann)<sup>116</sup>

<sup>116</sup> ND (03.02.1994): p. 7.

The presentation of conflict actors in *ND* can be considered from a number of different angles. The gender specificity of the accompanying images of actors in the conflict scene is quite apparent. Initially women are significantly underrepresented in the coverage in *ND*: Photographs in which people are visible show only half as many women, girls and children as they do men. In addition to this numerical imbalance, it is also apparent that specific roles are assigned to both women and girls and male actors. These serve to reproduce the received wisdom about who is victim and who is perpetrator in the conflict of battle. Women and girls appear first and foremost as passive victims of the conflict; they are scarcely present in the war photographs as active subjects capable of shaping the course of politics. Instead, women and girls serve as emblems of refugees. An example of such gendered reporting can be seen in illustration from 03.03.1992 under the title “*Warum das Gemetzel in Nagorny Karabach?*” 117 [Why such slaughter in Nagorno-Karabakh?].



Fig. 30: Why such slaughter in Nagorno-Karabakh? 118



Fig. 31: Example I 119

117 ND (03.03.1992): Warum das Gemetzel in Nagorny Karabach?, p. 4.

118 ND (03.03.1992): *ibid.*

119 ND (15.01.1994): In der Klemme, p. 11.



Similar images of female actors in the war are displayed in the photograph of a refugee camp under the title *In der Klemme* [In a tight spot] from 15.01.1994: <sup>120</sup>

In conflict situations women and girls are susceptible to violence and persecution. At the same time, they are no mere passive victims of the war; rather, they are active agents capable of shaping their own lived realities. Reducing them to the role of refugees, of suffering and expelled people, does not do justice to the total breadth of experience of women and girls in situations of conflict. What is also obscured by this type of reporting is the fact that men and boys were also, obviously, victims of violence, expulsion and massacres in the Karabakh conflict.

It is interesting to note that in *ND* male actors are not presented as victims to the same degree; rather, they tend more to be shown as actively shaping their situation, for example as soldiers or leading personalities in politics. Examples of this type of representation can be seen in two photographs from July 1992 and February 1994:



Fig. 32: Aserbaidshan: Martialischer Freudentaumel [Azerbaijan: outbursts of martial joy] <sup>121</sup>



Fig. 33: Example II <sup>122</sup>

<sup>120</sup> ND (15.01.1994): *ibid.*

<sup>121</sup> ND (24.07.1992): p. 4.

<sup>122</sup> ND (03.02.1994): Ein weiterer Vermittlungsversuch ist gescheitert, p. 7.

Along with considering its contents, reporting in *ND* is also amenable to an analysis of language and style. The first years, 1988-1990, are particularly interesting from the point of view of the linguistic and rhetorical structures used, as they open a window onto the socialist narratives in the politicized reporting. An additional area of interest was the analysis of the newspapers as historical sources, looking for instances of stereotyping, the reproduction of caricatures of the enemy, one-sided figurative language.

Early reporting is characterised above all by the formulaic repetition of arguments and rhetoric. One of the most frequent instances of one-sided figurative language is in the identification of causes for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In *ND* specific groups of people are made responsible for the violent clashes at the beginning of the conflict, without identifying them as following a definite political agenda. Instead, those responsible are identified in the following manner: “groups of hooligans provoked unrest in the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait on the Caspian Sea on Sunday.”<sup>123</sup> A further paradigmatic instance of the stylistic structure of this quotation can be found in an article from 05.03.1988:

“Weak-minded, immature individuals, under the sway of false rumours about the events in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, were roped into the unlawful actions. Criminal elements committed acts of violence and plunder.”<sup>124</sup>

It is interesting to note the uncritical reproduction of state narratives which reflect the socialist plan for society, which can also be seen in the following quotation from 25.02.1988:

“The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, steadfastly guided by the Leninist principles of nationality policy, has appealed to the patriotic and internationalist feelings of the Armenian and Azerbaijani populace, and called on them not to allow themselves to be provoked by nationalist elements, and to promote and strengthen the brotherly friendship among the Soviet peoples as the greatest achievement of Socialism.”<sup>125</sup>

An article from April 1988 can be cited as a further instance of ideologically shaped reporting in *ND*, as it quotes from *Pravda*, and thus presents its readers with an unmediated voice from Moscow. The formal and thematic structure of the article is visible in the title itself: “*The clients of Western radio stations want to use nationalism to dig a grave for socialism*”.<sup>126</sup>

Furthermore the religious classification of conflict actors plays a certain role in the coverage by *ND*. By emphasizing religious affiliations, corresponding stereotypes are strengthened. On various occasions in the coverage of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, a religious

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123 *ND* (02.03.1988): Rowdys provozieren Unruhen in Sumgait, p. 5. Similar formulations are to be found in, for example, *ND* (05.03.1988): Ausschreitungen in Sumgait von Rowdys provoziert-31 Todesopfer, p. 5; *ND* (10.03.1988): Sowjetischer Sprecher zur Situation in Sumgait, p. 5.; *ND* (22.03.1988): Staatsanwaltschaft der UdSSR berief Sonderkommission zur Untersuchung der Verbrechen in Sumgait, p. 5.

124 *ND* (05.03.1988): Ausschreitungen in Sumgait von Rowdys provoziert-31 Todesopfer, p. 5.

125 *ND* (25.02.1988): Zu den Ereignissen in Nagorny Karabach, p. 5.

126 *ND* (25.02.1988): Auftraggeber westlicher Rundfunk-Stationen wollen dem Sozialismus mit dem Nationalismus das Grab graben, p. 5.



opposition between majority Christian Armenians and Muslim Azerbaijanis is constructed. An example of the ascription of the trait of being “*Christian*” to the Armenians can be seen in the following excerpt: “Nagorno-Karabakh, 4,400 square kilometres in size and for the most part inhabited by Christian Armenians, was during the Soviet time an Autonomous Region incorporated in the Azerbaijani SSR.”<sup>127</sup> There is also a corresponding identification of religious affiliation for the Azerbaijani populace:

“The bearded Armenian ‘black shirts’ (in mourning over Nagorno-Karabakh) and the Muslim-nationalist influenced Azerbaijani ‘white shirts’ do not want to give up the territory even in death.”<sup>128</sup>

The question attendant upon this form of reporting the position it adopts vis-à-vis the religious affiliation of the actors in the conflict is what kind of clarification these descriptions offer the readers. Does religious affiliation actually play an important role in the course of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, as is suggested by these two articles? Or is *religion* used as a simplified way of explaining the conflict between the Armenian and Azerbaijani populations of the Caucasus, since a thorough investigation of the political, social and historical background to the war appears too complex for a short report on the political situation of the region?

Along with religious stereotypes, ethnic ones could also be found in *ND* for the years 1988-2008. A particularly interesting instance of this is the oft reproduced concept of an ethnic relatedness between Azerbaijanis and Turks. “[...] ethnically the Azerbaijanis (Azeris) are the closest relatives of the Turks”<sup>129</sup>; or: “the most important ally of Azerbaijanis, along with the ethnically related Turks, is the USA.”<sup>130</sup> These representations cast the historical development of the region in an ethnic light, and are based on the assumption that there is such a thing as “pure” ethnic origin a correspondingly direct identity between nations and populations. In reality both of these are subject to a variety of influences, such as migration movements, for example. Hence the imputation of “ethnic” relatedness of the “Turks” and “Azerbaijanis” has very little to say about the historical, social and political similarities and differences between these populations. What is clear, by contrast, is the fact that ethnic stereotypes occupy an important position in reporting on the Caucasus region, decisively shaping the impression formed of this conflict by the German-language readership.

### Primary sources from the daily newspaper *Neues Deutschland*

ND (25.02.1988), p. 5:	Zu den Ereignissen in Nagorny Karabach [On the events in Nagorno-Karabakh];
ND (02.03.1988), p. 5:	Rowdys provozieren Unruhen in Sumgait [Hooligans provoke unrest in Sumgait];
ND (05.03.1988), p. 5:	Ausschreitungen in Sumgait von Rowdys provoziert-31 Todesopfer [Excesses in Sumgait provoked by hooligans—31 dead];

<sup>127</sup> ND (05.10.2008): Tristesse in der Bergrepublik, p. 3.

<sup>128</sup> ND (19.01.1990): Im Kaukasus eskaliert der Krieg der Steine, p. 6.

<sup>129</sup> ND (05.10.2008): Auch in Jerewan regieren Karabach-Armenier, p. 3.

<sup>130</sup> ND (20.05.2003): Proteste gegen Präsident Alijew, p. 7.

ND (21.03.1988), p. 5:	Treffen im ZK der KPdSU mit Persönlichkeiten aserbaidshischer und armenischer Nationalität [Meeting in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with personalities of Azerbaijani and Armenian nationality];
ND (22.03.1988), p. 5:	<i>Prawda</i> über die Ereignisse in und um Nagorny Karabach [ <i>Prawda</i> on the events in Nagorno-Karabakh];
ND (22.03.1988), p. 5:	Staatsanwaltschaft der UdSSR berief Sonderkommission zur Untersuchung der Verbrechen in Sumgait [Public prosecutor's office of the USSR summoned special commission to investigate the crimes in Sumgait];
ND (30.03.1988), p. 5:	UdSSR-Sprecher zur Lage in Aserbaidshan und Armenien [USSR spokesman on the situation in Azerbaijan and Armenia];
ND (21.07.1988), p. 5:	Gorbatschow zu Problemen um Nagorny Karabach [Gorbachev on problems in Nagorno-Karabakh];
ND (27.07.1988), p. 5:	Gorbatschow zu Problemen um Nagorny Karabach [Gorbachev on problems in Nagorno-Karabakh];
ND (16.05.1989), p. 14:	In Nagorny Karabach weiteten sich die Streiks aus [Strikes in Nagorny Karabakh have spread];
ND (17.01.1990), p. 1:	Im Kaukasus droht nun ein Bürgerkrieg um Karabach [In the Caucasus the threat of civil war looms over Karabakh];
ND (19.01.1990), p. 6:	Im Kaukasus eskaliert der 'Krieg der Steine' [Escalation of the 'war of stones' in the Caucasus];
ND (29.01.1990), p. 5:	Lage im Transkaukasus weiter normalisiert [Situation in Transcaucasia returned to normal];
ND (07.02.1990), p. 3:	Es geht um das Schicksal der Perestroika [The fate of perestroika is at stake];
ND (06.02.1992), p. 5:	Krieg der tausend Schlachten um Nagorny Karabach [War of a thousand battles for Nagorno-Karabakh];
ND (03.03.1992), p. 4:	Warum das Gemetzel in Nagorny Karabach? [Why such slaughter in Nagorno-Karabakh?];
ND (20.05.1992), p. 4:	Türkei warnt Armenien vor Expansionspolitik [Turkey warns Armenia against expansionist politics];
ND (15.06.1992), p. 1:	Großoffensive Bakus in Nagorny Karabach [Baku's major offensive in Nagorny Karabakh];
ND (19.06.1992), p. 4:	Ausnahmezustand und Mobilmachung verkündet [State of emergency and mobilization announced];
ND (24.07.1992), p. 4:	Aserbaidshan:
ND (12.07.1993), p. 7:	Ungleiches Gespann im Bündnis auf Zeit [Unequal burden over time];
ND (04.09.1993), p. 5:	Türkische Armee in Alarmbereitschaft [Turkish army in state of alert];
ND (15.01.1994), p. 11:	In der Klemme [In a tight spot];

ND (03.02.1994), p. 7:	Ein weiterer Vermittlungsversuch ist gescheitert [Yet another attempt at negotiation has failed];
ND (27.12.1994), p. 7:	Hürden für KSZE-Truppen in Nagorny Karabach [Hurdles facing CSCE troops in Nagorny Karabakh];
ND (28.12.1996), p. 15:	Ehre für Fizuli. Ein Dichter wird zur identitätsstiftenden Symbolfigur [Honouring Fizuli. A poet becomes the symbolic figure in the creation of identity];
ND (30.10.1999), p. 8:	Tiefe Gräben [Deep graves];
ND (20.05.2003), p. 7:	Proteste gegen Präsident Alijew [Protests against President Aliiev].
ND (20.09.2008), p. 25:	Berg-Karabach- Aserbaidshans offene Wunde [Nagorno-Karabakh—Azerbaijan's open wound];
ND (05.10.2008), p. 3:	Tristesse in der Bergrepublik [Dreariness in the mountain republic];
ND (05.10.2008), p. 3:	Auch in Jerewan regieren Karabach-Armenier [Karabakh Armenians are in charge in Yerevan as well];

## 4.0 Background: the Nagorno-Karabakh region and the secessionist conflict with Armenia (in dates)

### Key moments in the developing conflict <sup>131</sup>

On 20th February 1988 the regional Soviet (local parliament) of the Autonomous Territory of Nagorno-Karabakh submitted a petition to the parliaments of Azerbaijan, Armenia and the USSR. The goal was to separate Nagorno-Karabakh from the Azerbaijani SSR and for it to join the Armenian SSR. As expected the Armenian deputies agreed, while the parliaments in Baku and Moscow refused in June and July 1988. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR backed up its decision with reference to Article 78 of the then Soviet constitution, which states that: “the administrative boundaries of a Union Republic may not be altered without its agreement to this”. On 1st December 1989 the Armenian Parliament in Yerevan passed a law on Nagorno-Karabakh’s joining Armenia. This law is in force up to the present day. Indeed, it received indirect confirmation through a verdict passed by a court in Yerevan at the beginning of 2003, which allowed Robert Kocharyan to stand as a candidate in the presidential elections. According to the current legislation, anyone wishing to be elected president of Armenia must hold Armenian citizenship. Kocharyan comes from the predominantly Azerbaijani-inhabited part of Nagorno-Karabakh, and consequently did not meet this requirement. That he was nonetheless able to be elected head of state is a clear sign of a political direction towards a union between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.

Azerbaijan viewed the Armenian attempts to have Nagorno-Karabakh incorporated as an assault on its territorial integrity and sovereignty. As a violation of Soviet laws and the principles of international law. Following the August putsch of 1991 in Moscow, Karabakh Armenians declared the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh to be an independent republic on 2nd September 1991. Its independence remains to this day unrecognized by any state. <sup>132</sup> Not even Armenia recognizes it. After the breakup of the Soviet Union the military clashes which had begun between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1988/89 escalated into a war. At the time of the outbreak of hostilities, the population of the disputed region was made up of three quarters Armenians and one quarter Azerbaijanis. Armenia proceeded to occupy a further seven cities in Azerbaijan outside of Nagorno-Karabakh, and ever since has held roughly 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s state territory under its power. Military clashes ended in the middle of 1994 with a cease fire. Roughly one million Azerbaijanis and 400,000 Armenians had been driven from their homes since the start of the war. Around 30,000 people perished during the war. The theatre of battle was restricted exclusively to Azerbaijani territory. Material damages amount to roughly 22 billion US dollars.

### Negotiations by the OSCE

In March 1992 a group from the CSCE (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, since 1994 OSCE) was sent on a mission of mediation to the Nagorno-Karabakh

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<sup>131</sup> For the whole text see: Nabiev, R. (2003): Stabilitätspakt für den Kaukasus [Pact of stability for the Caucasus]; cf. <http://www.eurasischesmagazin.de/artikel/Stabilitaetspakt-fur-den-Kaukasus/80903> (retrieved 08.06.2015)

<sup>132</sup> The only recognition granted was in 2012/13 by certain Australian provinces US states.

conflict. Among the eleven participating states including Azerbaijan and Armenia, Russia, the USA, Germany and France were also present. The so-called Minsk Group of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) has spent eleven years searching for a solution to the conflict. The mediation group bears the name of the Belarusian capital, as this is where the concluding peace conference was once planned to take place. From March 1992 to May 1994 they attempted, under Italian and Swedish guidance, to bring about a ceasefire agreement between the conflict parties. Their limited success is in large part due to the rivalry between the OSCE's peace mission and that of Russia. Indeed, Moscow also attempted on a unilateral basis to bring about an end to the conflict, which they succeeded in doing in May 1994. However, the pressure exerted by the USA and certain European states also played an important role in brokering a ceasefire.

The following points comprise the nub of the Minsk OSCE group's negotiations:

- withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan;
- the return home of refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh and the guarantee of their safety;
- the status of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh;
- the establishment of a corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh under its international protection.

#### **Four causes of the sluggish pace of conflict settlement:**

*History as a political tool:* two very different understandings of history converge on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenia and Azerbaijan adopt the standpoint of having “historical justice” on their side. Historiography in both these countries has departed from the academic plane a long time ago. In the fraught negotiating process, each side cites historical grounds to justify their own demands and delegitimize those of the opponent.

*Exploitation of socio-economic problems:* the Armenian government in particular tends to exploit social and economic problems in Nagorno-Karabakh in order to justify splitting the region off from Azerbaijan. The fact that economic development in the rest of Azerbaijan is in no ways better is ignored, along with the fact that the main culprit for this is decades-long mismanagement of the central government in Moscow.

*The conflict presented as a question of national importance:* Armenians and Azerbaijanis accord existential importance to the conflict. To be, or not to be—that is the question asked by both sides. This results in both sides being completely unwilling to compromise over their position.

*Collision of three principles of international law:* Karabakh Armenians invoke the right to national self-determination. Conversely, the Azerbaijani side argues for the territorial integrity of the state and the inviolability of international borders. All three positions are

fundamental positions of international law. Legally speaking, there is no hierarchical scale which separates them. In practice, however, the territorial integrity of the state tends to be granted greater importance. And so it is that all official documents issued by the United Nations on the subject of the Karabakh conflict up to now confirm the inviolability of Azerbaijan's international boundaries (cf. Resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 and the appendix of the concluding document of the OSCE summit meeting in Lisbon in 1996). Accordingly self-determination as it bears on this case is interpreted in the following way: the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians have the right to a say in political organisation within the Azerbaijani state, but they are not authorised to seek out a state for themselves on their own initiative.

## Chronology of events (selected)

<b>1918</b>	
February 23rd	Formation of a Transcaucasian Sejm in Tbilisi
March 30th /1st April	Violent clashes between Armenians and Azeris, declared as being the “suppression of an uprising of Musavatists” by the Bolsheviks in Baku (since 1998 marked as a day of national remembrance of the “genocide”).
April 22nd – May 26th	Federal Transcaucasian Republic (with Armenia and Georgia)
28th	Declaration of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan in Tbilisi; de facto joint rule
Spring-Autumn	Civil war and intervention of British, Turkish and Russian troops
June 4th	Friendship treaty between Turkey and the Azerbaijani Provisional Government
19th	“Law on the formation of an Azerbaijani parliament” (planned total of 120 MPs: 80 Azeris; 21 Armenians; 10 Russians; 1 each for Germans, Jews, Georgians and Poles; 5 places for representatives of professional associations.
<b>1919</b>	
August 22nd	Signing of a “provisional agreement”, which grants, accompanied by the recognition of administrative and cultural autonomy for the Armenians, the remainder of Karabakh to Azerbaijan.
November 23rd	Agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan on a peaceful resolution of conflicts
December 14th	Joint Armenian-Azerbaijani conference in Baku on the resolution of contentious issues.
<b>1920</b>	
January 11th	Supreme Council of the League of Nations recognizes the de facto independence of Azerbaijan.
April 27th-29th	11th Red Army marches in, transfer of power to the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, end of the Republic (establishment of Soviet power in Baku on 28th), chairman of war tribunal M. Bagirov. First waves of the “Red Terror”.
<b>1921</b>	Referenda in Nakhchivan and Karabakh on territorial affiliation.
February/March	As part of the so-called “Oriental Treaties”, Nakhchivan’s affiliation with Azerbaijan is established, the borders are resolved upon, and norms established for cooperation between the RSFSR, Turkey and Iran. Art. 5 & 6 of the (Soviet-)Iranian friendship treaty (26.02.1921) provide for the rights to occupy South Azerbaijan by Soviet troops in the event of threat.



October 13th	Treaty of Kars (ratified September 1922 in Yerevan) determines (Soviet-)Turkish border and confirms Nakhchivan as part of Azerbaijan; Soviet Union abandons claim to Ardahan and Kars.
<b>1922</b>	
12th March	Creation of the Federal Alliance of Transcaucasian Republics (ZSFSR)- Narimanov becomes one of the three chairmen of the Presidium of the Transcaucasian Federal Soviet, with headquarters in Tbilisi.
22nd December	Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia become incorporated into the USSR as the Transcaucasian Socialist Soviet Republic
<b>1923</b>	
July 7th	Decree on the creation of the Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh within the Azerbaijani SSR
<b>1938</b>	Forced resettlements from the NK autonomous oblast' into the Agdam and Agdžabedi rayons.
<b>1939</b>	Forced resettlements from the "border regions". Total population rose in the space of 14 years from 2.3 million (1925) to 3.2 million.
<b>1943</b>	Resettlement of Iranian Armenians into the USSR as part of the "Tehran Conference"
<b>1947, 23rd December</b>	Edict of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the resettlement of kolkhoz farmers and other segments of the Azerbaijani populace out of the Armenian SSR into the Kura-Araxes plain of Azerbaijan"
<b>1948-1953</b>	Deportation of ca. 100 thousand Azeris from Armenia and former Zangezur; settlement of ca. 90,000 Armenians from Iran, Turkey, the Near East and the Balkans into Armenia.
<b>1962/65/67/86/87</b>	Memoranda by Armenian civil rights activists on the Karabakh problem
<b>1969</b>	
12th July	Election of G. Aliev as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan
<b>1972</b>	
29th December	Azerbaijani SSR, NK autonomous oblast', Nakhchivan ASSR are awarded "Friendship of Peoples Star"
<b>1985</b>	
21st February	Chernenko's illness. Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union places the question "On measures in connection with the 70th anniversary of the genocide of the Armenians" on the agenda: its goal is to establish 24th April as an official memorial day. Politburo members Tikhonov, Gromyko, Grishin, Zimjanin are against this.
11th March	M. S. Gorbachev becomes General Secretary of the CP of SU; introduction of the reform process in the Soviet Union

23rd April	Gorbachev: “strengthening of Socialist democracy and self-governance among the peoples” is necessary.
<b>1986</b>	
25th February	XXVII. Party Conference of the CP of the SU: “Glasnost”
<b>1987</b>	
28th January	Plenum of Central Committee of the CP of SU: “Perestroika”
Spring	International conference in Athens on “the Armenian question and Turkish expansionism”
June	European Parliament adopts resolution “on the political resolution of the Armenian question” (on the initiative of left-wing factions in the European Parliament).
August	Armenian deputies from Karabakh travel to Moscow in order to “inform the public of the Karabakh problem” in the context of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire.
October	G. Aliev forced to retire from his posts in the party and central government. Gorbachev’s advisor on economic matters, A. Aganbegyan, states in Paris (“Humanité”) that Karabakh is more closely tied to Armenia than Azerbaijan – a corresponding suggestion for unification is circulated.
From Autumn 1987	Harassment of Azerbaijani citizens in Armenia begins, first expulsions and people fleeing.
<b>1988</b>	
	Demands made during the mass demonstrations at Theatre Square in Yerevan attract union-wide and international attention.
25th January	First Azerbaijani farmers expelled from Armenia arrive in Azerbaijan.
February	
from 11th	Mass demonstrations in Nagorno-Karabakh demanding union with the Armenian Republic
18th	Azerbaijani farmers expelled from Kafan rayon (Armenia) arrive in Azerbaijan (four thousand in one night).
20th	Request of the regional Soviet of NK submitted to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Armenian SSR and the Azerbaijani SSR for Nagorno-Karabakh to be released from Azerbaijan and placed under the territorial sovereignty of Armenia. Request denied with reference to §78 of the Soviet constitution (agreement of the republic affected). General strike breaks out.
26th	Ca. one million people demonstrate in Yerevan at Theatre Square, demanding merger of Karabakh; Gorbachev receives an Armenian writer.
27th-29th	Pogroms in Sumgait (victims: 26 Armenians, 6 Azerbaijanis, 96 soldiers injured)

March	
28th	Supreme Soviet of the USSR refuses demands made by the Karabakh Armenians and passes resolution on a socio-economic, cultural and educational development programme for the autonomous territory.
May	
16th	First mass demonstrations in Baku
21st	Dismissal of the party leadership of Armenia and Azerbaijan
July	
17th	Resolution of local authorities of Karabakh on joining Armenia
18th	Request for territorial amendment once again refused by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
July/August	General strikes in Armenia, blockade by Azerbaijan
Summer	“Baku Scholars’ Club” formed as a cell in the citizens’ movement.
November	Mass flight of Armenians out of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis out of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.
13th	Publication in the newspaper „ <i>Bakinskij rabočij</i> “ of an article entitled “Zov Topchany” on the destruction of protected forests in Karabakh.
17th	“Permanent meetings” on Republic Square in Baku (in front of Government House)
December	
5th	Violent dispersal of meetings by military. Commanders’ regime, Panachov arrested among others (until Spring/Summer 1989).
<b>1989</b>	
January	
12th (to 28th November)	NKAO receives special administrative status and directly subordinated to Moscow.
16th	Semi-legal inaugural congress of the People’s Front of Azerbaijan (PFA); resolutions passed by the organ only to have advisory nature!
September	
10th	Commencement of official negotiations over the recognition of the People’s Front in Azerbaijan.
11th	Cessation of the long-term strike in Azerbaijan (but blockade of Armenia not lifted).
15th/16th	Under pressure of the PFA the end of the special status and Moscow administration over Karabakh demanded.
23rd	Law “On the Sovereignty of Azerbaijan”
October	
5th	PFA officially registered as a party

December	
1st	Resolution by the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Soviet Republic “On the union between the Armenian SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh”. According the opinion of “Memorial” this action contributed to the further escalation of the conflict. <sup>133</sup>
2nd	At joint session of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia and “National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh” union declared.
December/January	Movements across Azerbaijan-Iran border, local seizures of power (Lenkoran, Nakhchivan)
<b>1990</b>	
January	
6th/7th	Third (extraordinary) conference of the PFA passes new statute; a new (radical) leadership establishes itself; on 7th representatives of the liberal wing (Z. Alizade, L. Yunusova Social-democratic group) leave the party.
11th	People’s Front organizes mass protests against the inaction of the government on the Karabakh question.
13th-16th	Unrest in Baku (according to Armenian reports 68 dead, evacuation of Armenian and Russian sections of the populace)
15th	Declaration of state of emergency for Karabakh imposed by Supreme Soviet of USSR, also recommended for Baku and Gjandža.
19th/20th	Occupation of Baku by Soviet troops: officially 131 dead and 744 seriously injured.
22nd	Secretary of Central Committee, A Versirov, replaced by A. Mutalibov; mass resignations from Communist Party of SU.
24th	Mutalibov becomes chairman of Supreme Soviet.
March	
2nd	Mass demonstrations occur on occasion of 40-day mourning; during this time sustained strikes arise in memory of the victims of 20.1 (longest national strikes in the entire Union).
May	
18th	A.Mutalibov elected by Supreme Soviet to President of Azerbaijan; since the legislative period of the Supreme Soviet as specified in the constitution had elapsed at the time Mutalibov assumed office, the election is declared invalid by the opposition and planned new elections postponed till the autumn.
July	
	Heydar Aliiev returns to Azerbaijan (initially becomes deputy, from 1991 chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Nakhchivan, and thus one of the acting chairmen of the Supreme Soviet/Milli Meclis of Azerbaijan.

133 cf. [http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/karabah/Getashen/chapter1.htm#\\_VPID\\_2](http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/karabah/Getashen/chapter1.htm#_VPID_2).

August	
	Levon Ter-Petrossian becomes chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia.
27th	Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan declares dissolution of Autonomous Territory of Nagorno-Karabakh
September/October	
	New elections to Supreme Soviet, PFA accedes along with 40 other groups within the “Democratic Block” in 132 out of 349 election districts. Out of 360 mandates, 31 go to members of the opposition, 230 to professional officials, 21 to representatives of the organs of justice.
<b>1991</b>	
January	
14th	Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan rescinds status of the Šaumjan Rayon to the north of NK.
March	
April/May	Russian military deployed to the Martunasen and Getasen regions; the Armenian population flees to Moscow and Armenia.
19th	Aliiev’s resignation from Communist Party of SU.
August	
19th/21st	Attempted coup in Moscow
30th	Declaration “On the reestablishment of state sovereignty of Azerbaijan”; dissolution of the Communist Party.
September	
2nd	Karabakh, along with Šaumjan district, declares its independence as the “Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh”
8th	Referendum confirms A. Mutalibov as president.
October	
	Leader of the Karabakh Committee, Ter-Petrossian, elected president of the Republic of Armenia
9th	Resolution “on the formation of national armed forces” in Azerbaijan
18th	Passing of the “Constitutional act on the national independence of Azerbaijan”; emphasis placed on territorial integrity, autonomous status of Karabakh rescinded, declaration of independence of Karabakh not recognized.
December	
9th	Law “on the state boundaries of the Republic of Azerbaijan”
10th	Referendum on the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh
16th	Briefing by president on the subordination under Azerbaijani sovereignty of border units of the Red Army on Azerbaijani territory.

24th	Almaty: CIS foundation act signed by Mutalibov
25th	Law “on the formation of the national guard of the Republic of Azerbaijan”
30th	Recognition of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the Federal Republic of Germany
<b>1992</b>	
January	
2nd	Introduction of the presidential regime in 15 territories of Azerbaijan
	Dissolution of the defence council of the Republic of Azerbaijan
6th	Declaration on the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh (=self-declared Republic of Artsakh)
18th	Parliament of NK formed; President Oleg Jesajan, Prime Minister Artur Mkrtchian
24th	Vice President of NK Georgi Petrosjan
29th	Azerbaijan takes over the Transcaucasian pipelines, the engineering company “Neftegazmash” and other establishments within the oil sector within the structure of “Azerineft”.
	The Congress for Security and Cooperation in Europe begins with observation and attempts at mediation in the Karabakh conflict.
February	
25th	Briefing by the president “on the creation of organs of protection for state power”
25th/26th	Armenian incursion on the road between Stepanakert and Martakert Massacre of Khojaly (26th)—613 dead, among them 150 women and 63 children. 1,575 prisoners. OSCE demands that Azerbaijan put an end to the blockade of transport routes to Armenia.
March	
3rd	Azerbaijan becomes a member of the UN.
6th	Mutalibov announces his retirement.
12th	Law “on the formation of a committee for state defence”, offensive in Agdam, Khojaly area continued by the Armenian side. Azerbaijan appeals to the UN.
18th	Armenian invasion of the Martakert rayon
24th	Minsk Group founded to direct an international peace conference under the chairmanship of M Raffaelli.
April	
7th	Azerbaijani military called home from the Baltic and Belarus.

14th	Following the death of A. Mkrtchian, G. Petrosjan takes over the role of president in NK, Boris Arushian that of vice-president.
May	
7th/8th/9th	The Armenian side takes control over the Lachin corridor and Shusha.
19th	State Council renamed Milli Meclis. Composed of ex-communists and the opposition in equal numbers (25 delegates each) it assumes the powers of Supreme Soviet until its abrogation.
June	
3rd	Law "on political parties" in Azerbaijan
7th	Election of Elchibey as president with 59 percent of votes; H. Aliev had been excluded from candidatures by the introduction of an upper age limit.
17th	Inauguration of president. Commencement of the Azerbaijani offensive, recapture of several rayons in NK.
August	
13th	State of emergency declared in NK.
September	
25th	Agreed-upon ceasefire is not upheld.
November	
21st	Founding of the "Eni Azerbajdžan" party in Nakhchivan, chairmanship assumed by H. Aliev.
December	Party conference of the PFA manages to resist its dissolution, but splintering of the citizens' movement nonetheless continues.
<b>1993</b>	
January	
21st	The European Parliament passes a resolution branding the blockade of the transport routes to Armenia as a violation of human rights.
April	
3rd	Declaration of a state of emergency, limited to 60 days, by President Elchibey. Nomination of 21 military commanders for cities and districts as part of the creation of new military units in response to the continued Armenian offensive which lead to 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory being annexed. (Lachin corridor, Kelbadjar, Fizuli...)
13th/14th	Özal the president of Turkey in Baku, condemnation of Armenian aggression, a military intervention is only considered after all other possibilities are exhausted.



21st	Creation of a “military union” out of representatives of the commandos of troops stationed in Gāncā and Karabakh. Turkish military ceases its training programme.
26th	Foreign Minister T Gasymov officially gives the agreement of his government to the American-Russian-Turkish peace plan for the conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.
	Armenian bands take over Kelbadjar
30th	UN Security Council concerns itself with the conflict in NK and weighs up the possibility of launching a peace mission – UN Resolution 822 (1993) <sup>134</sup>
June	
	Agdam, Martakert and neighbouring rayons are occupied by Armenian bands. In the South, the creation of a “Talysh-Mughan Republic” under Alikram Gumbatov is announced.
15th	Heydar Aliev takes on position as successor to I. Gambar.
24th	Transfer of presidential power to H. Aliev via a resolution by the Milli Meclis; S. Gusejnov becomes Prime Minister.
July-August	Fizuli, Jebrail, Kubatli, Zangelan occupied by Armenian bands.
29th	UN Resolution 853 (1993) on the basis of a report by the chairman of the Minsk Group of the OSCE on 27th July; demand for a ceasefire; protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan demanded.
August	
18th	UN Security Council demands that the government of Armenia exert its influence and withdraw its troops from the occupied territories in Azerbaijan.
October	
3rd	Presidential elections, victory of H. Aliev
December	Counteroffensive by Azerbaijani forces
<b>1994</b>	
May	
12th	The conflict parties in the Karabakh war agree to a ceasefire
25th	Ceasefire
July	
7th	Meeting of CSCE in Vienne; NK participates.
8th	Armenian President Ter-Petrossian declares he is checking the CSCE and Russian proposals for conflict involvement.
27th	The defence ministers of the conflict parties agree to a continuation of the ceasefire and to begin talks.
December	“Budapest meetings” on the Karabakh conflict
22nd	NK Parliament elects R. Kocharyan president of the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh

<sup>134</sup> Resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993) of the United Nations Security Council.

<b>1995</b>	
April	
30th	70 percent of Karabakh Armenians elect 24 out of 31 deputies for the Parliament of Karabakh, renamed the “National Assembly”.
October	
9th	Consultation behind closed doors between the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict parties on the Aaland Islands.
<b>1996</b>	
1st	Presidential elections in Karabakh: Robert Kocharyan victorious (1997 prime minister of Armenia, 1998 president of Armenia).
	OSCE Lisbon summit → principle of territorial integrity forms basis for the solution of the conflict.
<b>1997</b>	
End of May	Aliev expresses his position towards the problems in Karabakh; increase of production of oil from he identified as the most important revenue source to compensate for the war and improve standard of living.
August	
29th	Russian-Armenian treaty for friendship and cooperation signed; it is met by protests in Azerbaijan, as it foresees the possibility of military cooperation.
September	
1st	For foreign minister, Arkadi Gukasian wins presidential elections in NK with 89.3 percent of the vote.
23rd	OSCE delegation (Minsk Group) discusses the latest peace plan in a meeting with G. Aliev.
October	
7th	Current president of NK, Arkadi Gukasian declines the most recent OSCE peace plan, as it negates the political status and security interests of NK.
10th	Meeting between Ter-Petrossian and Aliev in Strasburg; they express their willingness to pursue tripartite negotiations under the mediation of the OSCE.
22nd/23rd	US Undersecretary of State Eizenstat heralds progress in negotiations over the Karabakh problem before the end of the year. In order to “forestall speculation”, the first phase should consist solely of the withdrawal of Armenian troops out of the six occupied rayons surround NK.
<b>1998</b>	
	OSCE proposal of dividing the matters of securing the peace and the question of status into separate documents (stage plan)

November	
9th	OSCE: Minsk Group in Baku. Refusal of the passage “State of Karabakh” by G. Aliev.
<b>1998 to ca. 2001</b>	Demands for package solution (ARM) and very varied (internal) concepts: among others, → “common state” (confederation model); → “exchange of land” (Gobleplan)
<b>2004</b>	Priority of returning the territories outside of NK; postponement of the status question
<b>2007</b>	“Madrid Principles” (renewed 2010): 1. End to the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territories outside of Nagorno-Karabakh, 2. Interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh, guarantee of self-determination and security, 3. Land corridor connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, 4. Resolution of the status question via referendum, 5. Right to return for all refugees, 6. international guarantees of security, including possibility of stationing a multilateral peace-keeping force. (Source: IWPR 2009)
<b>2008</b>	Resolution of the UN General Assembly of 1st March 2008 (39 votes versus 7, 100 abstentions) demanding of Armenia an “immediate and complete withdrawal of troops from the occupied Azerbaijani territories”.

Appendix: Ramification of the conflict




Fig. 34: Migration in the South Caucasus between 1988-2004 (source: IDMC).

## 5. All German-language Russia-correspondents (November 2007)

Moscow/Kiev. A total of 43 correspondents report for the German-language media from Russia and the Ukraine, above all from the Russian capital Moscow. One thing that is particularly apparent is the increasing number of pedlar correspondents; i.e. correspondents who (are obliged to) work for several different publications.

### **Pedlar correspondents...**

Maintaining a correspondents office in Moscow is an expensive hobby, the prices of renting an office and paying living expenses for journalists in the Russian capital are exorbitantly high. Smaller newspapers cannot even dream of having their own correspondent; their only resort is to take on texts provided by news agencies.

Larger regional papers are provided for by so-called pedlar correspondents, who have earned their moniker through the way they shout out the wares they have on offer to anyone who may need them, as the Zurich Press Association ZPV bluntly puts it.

### **...now also to be found at NZZ**

As of recently the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* has been selling its wares to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in Russia: the NZZ business correspondent reports from Moscow for the FAZ (conversely, his opposite number at the FAZ in Tokyo reports for the NZZ). Switzerland's only globally recognized paper promises its readers dense and varied reporting from both of these countries, without the specific qualities of the respective titles being watered down.

Its large worldwide network of correspondents, unusual for a newspaper from Switzerland, is a mark of quality for the NZZ firm, which is their reports feature so prominently in the paper. This is also why the journalists at NZZ reacted so sceptically to the arrival of the first pedlar correspondent. For the Zurich Press Association to write ...even if the reports by correspondents on the websites of CNN, BBC, Google-News and RSS are hardly read by anybody nonetheless comes across as scarcely distinguishable from a declaration of journalistic bankruptcy.

## **German Media**

### **Agency/Online medium**

- „Deutsche Presse-Agentur“ dpa: Erik Albrecht, Moskau;
- „Deutsche Presse-Agentur“ dpa: Stefan Voss, Moskau;
- „Evangelischer Pressedienst“ epd: ?, Moskau;
- „RUFO/Russland Aktuell“: André Ballin, Moskau (also for *Der Spiegel*);
- „RUFO/Russland Aktuell“: Susanne Brammerloh, Sankt Petersburg;
- „RUFO/Russland Aktuell“: Lothar Deeg, Sankt Petersburg;
- „RUFO/Russland Aktuell“: Christian Jahn, Moskau (also for *Der Spiegel*);
- „RUFO/Russland Aktuell“: Alexander Mironow, Moskau;
- „RUFO/Russland Aktuell“: Gisbert Mrozek, Moskau.

## **Radio/Television**

„Deutschlandfunk“: Robert Baag, Moscow;  
„Westdeutscher Rundfunk“ WDR/ARD: Thomas Roth, Director of the ARD Studio in Moscow;  
„Westdeutscher Rundfunk“ WDR/ARD: Albrecht Reinhardt, Moscow;  
„Westdeutscher Rundfunk“ WDR/ARD: Ina Ruck, Moscow;  
„Westdeutscher Rundfunk“ WDR/ARD: Stephan Stuchlik, Moscow;  
„Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen“ ZDF: Joachim Bartz, Moscow;  
„Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen“ ZDF: Britta Hilpert, Moscow;  
„Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen“ ZDF: Roland Strumpf, Moscow.

## **Magazines/weekly newspapers**

„Der Spiegel“: André Ballin, Moscow (also for RUFO/Russland Aktuell);  
„Der Spiegel“: Christian Jahn, Moscow (also for RUFO/Russland Aktuell);  
„Der Spiegel“: Uwe Klussmann, Moscow;  
„Der Spiegel“: Jörg R. Mettke, Moscow;  
„Focus“: Boris Reitschuster, Moscow;  
„Die Zeit“: Johannes Voswinkel, Moscow.

## **Daily newspapers**

„Berliner Morgenpost“: Manfred Quiring, Moscow (also for Die Welt);  
„Berliner Zeitung“: Katja Tichomirowa, Moscow;  
„Die Welt“: Manfred Quiring, Moscow (also for Berliner Morgenpost);  
„Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung“ FAZ: Kerstin Holm, Moscow;  
„Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung“ FAZ: Michael Ludwig, Moscow;  
„Frankfurter Rundschau“ FR, „Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung“ WAZ, various other newspapers: Florian Hassel, Moscow;  
„Handelsblatt“: Thomas Wiede, Moscow;  
„Rheinischer Merkur“: Klaus-Helge Donath, Moscow;  
„Rheinische Post“ RP: Doris Heimann, Moscow;  
„Sächsische Zeitung“: Ulrich Heyden, Moscow;  
„Süddeutsche Zeitung“ SZ: Daniel Brössler, Moscow;  
„Tagesspiegel“: Elke Windisch, Moscow;  
„Tageszeitung“ taz: Klaus-Helge Donath, Moscow;

## **Swiss media**

### **Daily newspapers**

„Neue Zürcher Zeitung“: Markus Ackeret, Political correspondent in Moscow;  
„Neue Zürcher Zeitung“: Gerald Hosp, Business correspondent in Moscow (also for FAZ);  
„Neue Zürcher Zeitung“: Ulrich Schmid, East-Middle-Europe correspondent in Prague;  
„Tages-Anzeiger“: David Nauer, Moscow;  
„Zürcher Landzeitung“ (Zürichsee-Zeitung, Zürcher Oberländer, Zürcher Unterländer): Christian Weisflog (also for Moskauer Deutsche Zeitung).

### **Radio**

„Schweizer Radio DRS“: Max Schmid, Moscow (until winter 2007/08);  
„Schweizer Radio DRS“: Peter Gysling, Moscow (from Spring 2008).






Fig. 35: So what's new? <sup>135</sup>

## Austrian media

### Radio/television

„ORF“: Susanne Scholl, Moscow;

„ORF“: Georg Dox, Moscow.

### Magazines/weekly newspapers

„Profil“: Tessa Szyszkowitz.

### Daily newspapers

„Der Standard“: Eduard Steiner;

„Die Presse“: Jens Hartmann (also as business correspondent for Die Welt). <sup>136</sup>

<sup>135</sup> Cartoon by Karl-Heinz Schoenfeld; cf. [http://www.bdzv.de/veranstaltungen-termine/veranstaltungsarchiv/veranstaltungen-2005/400-jahre-zeitung/redaktionspaket/karikaturen/\(retrieved??\)](http://www.bdzv.de/veranstaltungen-termine/veranstaltungsarchiv/veranstaltungen-2005/400-jahre-zeitung/redaktionspaket/karikaturen/(retrieved??))

<sup>136</sup> This contribution is based inter alia on the following sources: various Moscow correspondents, Wikipedia (de) (engl) (rus). The text may nonetheless contain incomplete or incorrect facts. Submitted by RSS collector on 07.11.2007 - 07:00.

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